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usual structure  of Shakespeares plays is that after  
an expository first act, the three central acts — the
 main body of the play — are given over to dramatic
 representation of the main body of the narrative
 action that constitutes the story and the plot, before
 crisis and resolution are achieved in act 5; thus the
 central portions of King Lear deal with the progres
­sive degeneration of both the Lear and the Glouces
­ter families, those of Hamlet with the Princes
 progress from uncertainty to commitment and with
 the changing fortunes of the Polonius household, and
 those of Macbeth with the period of Macbeths
 unchallenged
 
rule. When it  comes to Othello, howev ­
er, Shakespeare is forced to adopt a rather different
 method, for the simple reason that the events which
 provide the nominal mainspring to drive the plot of
 Othello never in fact take place. Desdemona’s adul
­tery with Cassio, on which all Othello’s 
actions depend, is quite literally a non-event; even if it were
 not, it could never, as Iago so pithily reminds Othel
­lo, be represented on the stage. In its place Shake
­speare must put something else to act as the central
 
busines
s of the play; instead of the representation of  
an act, he offers us the representation of Iago’s story
 of that act — which thus stands, in fact, as the repre
­sentation of
 
a representation. In so doing, he draws  
attention to the fact and effect of performance in
 itself, as well as to its status as mode of representa
­tion, as Iago stages fictive playlets and deploys as his
 props two other ways of mediating the contents of
 the mind to the outside world: things written, and
 things dreamed. As this play of non-events, slippages
4
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and substitutions unfolds, writing, performance and dreamwork will be insis
­






 which is so preeminently about stories should have at its  
heart a story
 
is apt. It could perhaps be said that all of Shakespeare’s plays nec ­
essarily display a strong interest in modes of narration, but what seems to me
 to distinguish Othello from the other works of
 
Shakespeares early and middle  
period is precisely the radical falsity of the rooted belief that most strongly
 informs the hero’s actions. Lear perceives his mistake very early on, and Ham
­let obsessively tests the truth of what he is told, but Othello gives us a central
 character whose view of events is so divorced both from our own and from
 “reality” that he has lent his name to a delusional psychiatric condition, the
 Othello syndrome (see Enoch and Trethowan). 
Even
 here, we may be struck  
by the fact that, unlike Lear or, apparently, Hamlet, Othello is certainly never
 obviously certifiable, leading us to note how delicately the borderlines of a dis
­torted perception are plotted. This emphasis on the idiosyncratic viewpoint
 and its disjunction from external facts is further
 
underlined by the drunkenness  
of Cassio, with its accompanying mood-altering tendencies, and 
his
 equally  
abrupt return to a more normal perspective. To some extent, similar effects may
 be found in other Shakespeare plays with which Othello has strong links: A
 Midsummer
 
Night's Dream, with its magic juices, and two other plays of jeal ­
ousy, The Winters Tale and Cymbeline (jealousy being a condition peculiarly apt
 for the dramatization of belief in the false). In all of these, though, the pres
­ence of a supernatural element and of a comedic teleology allows for the realist
 mode to be overridden by the very different conventions of romance. It is
 uniquely in Othello that modes of representation and narration are systemati
­cally explored exclusively within the confines of the "realist” mode (pace
 Rymer!) and of a theatricality that is 
never




In the case of Othello, the play’s concern with narration has been often
 noticed (see for instance Gardner; Bayley; Sinfield; Bates; Wayne; and Purkiss).
 Mark Thornton Burnett remarks that “in Othello, stories abound and conflict
 with 
each
 other, and the play delineates the attempts of characters to construct  
narratives for themselves which will permit them to understand personal pre
­occupations, to 
replace
 fear with certainty and self-assurance” (62). Thomas  
Moisan comments that “ Othello engages us intertextually in the kinds of narra
­tives, and narrativity, from which it derives its fable” (50), while Stephen
 Greenblatt sees the play’s characteristic process as “submission to narrative self
­fashioning” (234). Patricia
 
Parker also takes this insistence on narrativity as the  
springboard for her telling examination of the function of “dilation” and “dela
­tion” in the play (“Shakespeare and Rhetoric” 54-74; see also Callaghan 61). I
 propose to argue, however, that it is not 
merely
 the fact of narration but the  
modes of narration, and their implications for dramatic representation, on
 which the play centers. In particular, Othello
 
demonstrates a consistent concern  
with speaking, writing, performing, and narrating.
Not only does Othello insistently emphasize the telling of stories, it also
 
shows, in Iago’s case, the means 
by
 which they are concocted, and such means,  
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of full consciousness. The  play itself registers a conspicuous interest in the  
logic and status of the dream as a mode of representation. Unlike A Midsum
­mer Night's Dream, which it may seem to resemble in the extent of this concern,
 Othello has no play-within-the-play; it does, however, offer repeated instances
 of a kind of ventriloquization, by means of
 
which one character co-opts the  
voice of another either innocently or as a technique of 
willful
 misrepresenta ­
tion. Finally, Othello also lacks, unlike Shakespeare’s other tragedies, a scene in
 which the text of a letter is read aloud and glossed; nevertheless, it contains a
 number
 
of packed and allusive images that center precisely on the decoding and  
on the communicative status of written, as opposed to oral, texts. Through
 examination of Shakespeare’s representation of all these representational
 
modes, 
I hope to reflect on the aesthetic experience afforded  by a theatrical per ­
formance of Othello, The play
 may 
encode a sophisticated understanding of the  
problematics of the meaning of meaning, but it can still speak a raw language
 of 
pain. Othello opens with the words “Tush, never tell me” (1.1.1); its closing lines
 are Lodovico’s promise: “Myself will straight abroad, and to the state / This
 heavy act with heavy heart relate” (5.2.371-2). Here the business of narration
 is directly foregrounded, and the impulse to recount offers the only form of
 comfort that seems available to the surviving characters in the face of the
 tragedy that they have witnessed. It is not only in the face of disaster, howev
­er, that characters are moved to tell tales; it is, on most occasions, more or less
 their first impulse. In our first encounter with Iago, he and Roderigo are quite
 literally telling 
tales,
 as they attempt to convince Brabantio that his daughter  
has eloped with Othello. When Othello himself enters, the story that he tells
 of himself to the Senate casts him as the consummate teller of exotic romance
 narratives, as he speaks to Desdemona
 
of “The Anthropophagi, and men whose  
heads / Do 
grow
 beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5). Burnett comments of  
this that “Othello’s story caters to assumptions about his status as a black man
 even as it seems to resist them: it closely resembles contemporary 
accounts
 of  
travels to newly discovered countries” (65).1 There is, however, a curious reluc
­tance on Othello’s part to dwell on the processes of his own storytelling, for he
 actually seeks to render his own narration transparent
 
and to obliterate all traces  
of its mediating 
effect
 on the facts of his life. His offer to the Senate is as fol ­
lows:
And till she come, as faithful as to heaven
I do confess the vices of my blood,
 
So justly to your grave ears I’ll present
 How I did thrive in this fair lady’s love,
 And she in mine. (1.3.122-6)
Othello promises to be both
 
“faithful” and “just” in his recounting, proffering a  
realist narrative in which the action of retelling is in effect a recreating; more
­over, the verb he chooses, “present,” is suggestive more of an acting out than of
 a telling, with an echo of what Moisan has called “the uneasy antiphony the
6
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play negotiates between its narrativity and its theatricality” (68). Othello will
 
in
 effect replay the scene for them, except that in the absence of Desdemona —  
on which this whole interlude depends — he will also take her part.
Having thus secured the attention of his audience, he begins:
Her father lov’d me, oft invited me,
Still questioned 
me
 the story of my life,  
From year to year; the battles, sieges, fortunes,
 That I have pass’d:
I ran it through, even from my boyish days,
To the very moment that he bade 
me
 tell it. (1.3.128-33)
Here the mimetic properties claimed by Othello for his narrative enactment
 
become even more pronounced. Both Moisan and Parker (“Fantasies”) have
 pointed to the intimate relationship between difference and différance in narra
­tive, between dilation and delation; this is precisely what
 
Othello seeks to ignore  
as 
he
 presents his own narrative as transparent and authoritative, not as the  
product of rhetoric
 
or  art. His whole life is summoned  up, its immediacy accen ­
tuated by
 
its striking culmination in the “now” of Brabantio’s command; and its  
truth is implicitly asserted by the starkness with which the potential fictionali-
 ty
 
of “story” is canceled out by the bald claim to factuality of “my life.” The nar ­
rative process itself is not only elided but is, quite literally, figured as a gap, a
 moment of non-existence: Othello’s life
 
to date stops at the moment when  Bra-  
bantio bids him recount it, not at the moment when he had actually recounted
 
it.
 It is odd that storytelling, in many ways the key activity of Othello’s life, is  
thus apparently not counted 
by
 him as a part of that life at all — although to  
recount the story
 
of the  whole of it  must,  presumably, have occupied quite some  
time. In this play in which the relationship of events to time is so thoroughly
 problematized, this is perhaps the most 
remarkable
 piece of temporal legerde ­
main of all. There is a slippage here that is further emphasized 
by
 the fact that  
Othello’s invitation to Desdemona to “witness it” (1.3.169) coincides, literally,
 with her entrance: she is asked to attest to the truth of an account she has not
 heard, and this seems to arise not so much from any bad faith on Othello’s part
 as from his blindness to the processes of narrative that differentiate his verbal
 reconstruction from, the event itself, at which Desdemona has indeed been pre
­sent and to which she could, therefore, witness.
What of the story
 
itself? Is it really true, or, more importantly, since noth ­
ing in a play is, in one sense, true, would its various audiences have considered
 it to 
be
 so? It seems to me to be important in two major aspects: what it does  
say, and what it does not. It reveals strikingly little of either of those two pri
­mary demarcators of people 
(arguably
 in most circumstances, but overwhelm ­
ingly in Shakespeare’s Venice), class or
 
race background;  it  offers no clues about  
motivation. Instead, its primary
 
function is to depict the exoticism and dangers  
of his travels, and Othello attributes its spectacular success in winning over
 Desdemona’s affections to its fulfillment of this aim. This is certainly stirring
 stuff: a mere summary of it moves the Duke to comment, “I think this tale
 would win my daughter too” (1.3.171). Is it plausible, though? The Arden edi
­
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tor comments of the Anthropophagi and the “men whose heads / Do grow
 
beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5) that “such travellers’ tales were current,
 and it seems as idle as the deserts to try
 
to determine whether Shakespeare  was  
primarily
 
indebted to Mandeville or Raleigh or Holland’s Pliny.” Parker, how ­
ever, remarks that “Othello’s "dilated’ traveler’s tale recalls Africanus, Mandev
­ille, Pliny, and the rest” (“Fantasies” 98), all of whose veracity was much in
 doubt, and Jyotsna Singh describes Othello’s “stories of slavery and adventure”
 as featuring him as “a character’ in an imaginary landscape which viewers, then
 and now, recognize as a semi-fictional creation of colonialist travel narratives”
 (288).
Part of the attraction of “travellers’ tales” is surely
 
their overt improbability,  
and an age with a growing interest in anatomy and medicine might well be
 skeptical of men with heads beneath their 
shoulders.
 In this case, the lack of  
immediacy of this narration of a narrative is further figured by Othello’s tauto
­logical replacement of the word “cannibal” with “anthropophagi.” Cannibal,
 which seems in anagrammatized form to have provided the origin of Caliban’s
 name, perhaps functions as an isolated relic of the native speech of which we
 hear so little in Othello; its replacement by the classical term “anthropophagi”
 thus symbolizes not
 
only Othello’s learning but also the firmness  with which  he  
is inserted into pre-existing discourses of travel that must radically inform and
 structure his ostensibly experiential
 
account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his  
story, it in fact 
tells
 him, but he is as blind to its constitutive structures as he is  
to the narrative constraints that make the telling of the story as much a part of
 the chronological history
 
of his life as the experience of it is. Othello, in short,  
thinks narration is a transparent mode, as he demonstrates again when he
 claims simply that “My parts, my title, and 
my
 perfect  soul, / Shall manifest me  
rightl ” (1.2.31-2) and that “My services, which I have done the signiory, /
 Shall out-tongue 
his
 complaints” (1.2.18-19). What Shakespeare’s representa ­
tion of narration shows the audience, however, is that narration is always
 already a representation that in fact 
remakes
 itself with each re-presentation.
Such 
consciousness
 of fictionality never  features in Othello’s account,  but it  
is perhaps appropriate that Desdemona’s immediate response to 
his
 story is to  




And bade me, if I had a friend that lov’d her,
 I should but teach him how to tell 
my
 story,  
And that
 
would woo her. (1.3.163-6)
Desdemona here seems clearly aware that the concoction of a fiction can be a
 
useful
 mechanism for the direct manipulation of reality: upon this hint, Oth ­
ello spake. It 
may
 well seem ominous that Othello here can register the dis ­
guised truth of Desdemona’s story, recognizing it as a “hint” and as referring to
 himself and to her rather than to the putative “friend,” but that he can show no
 awareness of 
his
 own imbrication in similar tactical  ploys: implicitly, he already  
assumes mendacity in her and truth in himself. Ironically, though, Desde
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from experience, a cut-and-dried rerun of it, but in com ­
plex and mutually formative interplay with it. The story that Othello has told
 of his life has resulted in a change to the story that, in the future, he will tell of
 it (as we see in act 5 when his anecdote of the killing of the Turk 
takes
 on new  
symbolic meaning when applied to his present circumstances); once again, the
 stress is on the materiality and the consequentiality not only of the narration
 but of the lived (or, on the Shakespearean 
stage,
 represented) moment of its  
representation. For Othello, though, essence and representation are consistent
­ly figured as fused. His attitude, and its difference from that prevalent in
 Venice, is perhaps best encapsulated in two paired moments in act 1, scene 3.
 When the First Senator is told that the
 
Turks are heading for Rhodes, he dis ­
misses the news with “’tis a pageant, / To keep us in false gaze” (1.3.18-19);
 when Othello
'
s followers draw in his defense, he rebukes them as follows:  
“Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it, / Without a prompter”
 (1.2.83-4). The supersubtle Venetian senator plays with the discourse of the
­atricality, which he casts as inherently deceptive, but Othello draws no distinc
­tion between 
his
 own internalized behavior and the externalized fictionality of  
the stage, and registers no consciousness of the kind of perceptional fallacy that
 is so obvious to the Senator. It is in the same 
vein
 that he will later command  
Iago, “if thou dost love me, / Show 
me
 thy thought” (3.3.119-20).
Othello’s absolute faith in the reliability of his own story as a transparent
 mediator of his experiences clearly prepares him all too well for 
his
 role as the  
dupe of Iago. From the outset of
 
the play, Iago exhibits a sustained concern  
with modes of narration, persuasion, and figuring, both to oneself and to oth
­ers. Suggestively, he registers an 
early
 awareness of a mechanism for self-nar ­
ration of which he will later make very telling use, the dream: he assures
 Roderigo,
 
“If ever I did dream of such a matter,  / Abhor me” (1.1.5-6). He also  
mounts a miniature play-within-the-play in 
his
 use of inset dialogue to charac ­
terize (and presumably, in performance, to “impersonate”) Othello:
But 
he,
 as loving his own pride and purposes,
Evades them, with a bombast circumstance,




 mediators: for “Certes,” says he,  
“I have already chosen my officer.” (1.1.12-17)
Strikingly, Iago also refers to his own preferred method of communicating
 
information: he feels that Othello should have promoted him on the grounds
 of sure personal knowledge, referring to himself as “I, of whom his eyes had
 
seen
 the proof” (1.1.28). For all his later brilliance as a manipulative stage  
manager of the various representational strategies through which he will
 deceive Othello, and for all the sophistication in hermeneutics that leads him
 to explain to Othello the impossibility of
 
ocular proof, it is precisely on such  
proof that his own claim is based. As the word “proof” re-echoes throughout
 the later part
 
of the play (we hear it at  3.3.194-5,200,436,448, and, as “prove,”  
at 5.1.66), we 
may
 recall this ur-investigation of its problematics.
9





s inability  to prove even by  proof is radically symptomatic of the prob ­
lem he experiences in the early part of this scene. Although what he is telling
 Brabantio is true, he cannot initially get him to believe it — an ironic contrast
 with the ease with which he will later persuade Othello of a lie. The break
­through, suggestively, involves a recurrence of the dream motif, as Brabantio
 moves from incredulity to declaring, “This accident is not unlike my dream, /
 Belief of it oppresses 
me
 already” (1.1.142-3). This prefigures Iago’s later fab ­
rication of a dream sequence involving Cassio, and it also exemplifies his most
 successful strategy of inducing his victim to internalize the persuasion. Inter
­estingly, a later comment of Iago’s is similarly prophetic: “I must show out a
 flag, and sign of love, / Which is indeed but sign” (1.1.156-7). This not only
 plays grimly on his own role as Othello’s flag-bearer; it 
equally
 affords an iron ­
ic prolepsis of his later co-optation of the handkerchief as literal
 
“flag, and sign  
of love.” Throughout the 
early
 stages of the play, Shakespeare lays great stress  
on the provisionality
 
of Iago’s plan, and on the processes of its formation “A  
double knavery ... how, how? ... let me see” (1.3.392). To see the later devel
­opments of the scheme foreshadowed here may 
well
 be to glimpse Shake ­
speare’s representation of
 
something akin to dreamwork taking place in Iago s  
mental processes, and certainly this is echoed in the way Iago himself figures
 the progress of his strategy: “If consequence do but approve my dream, / My
 boat sails freely, both with wind and stream” (2.3.58-9). To some extent, the
 unfolding action of Othello does indeed reflect Iago’s dream
 
—  or  Iago’s night ­
mare — come true.
In 
itself,
 and as it forms the main business of both Iago’s plot and Shake ­
speare’s, Iago’s story is as circumstantial as Othello’s own, and it is no more
 inherently improbable: indeed Coppélia Kahn argues that Iago himself effec
­tively comes to believe it (143). Like Othello “presenting” his story to the sen
­ate, Iago too cements his narrative structure with carefully staged playlets:
 Cassio handing the stolen handkerchief to Bianca, Cassio drunk and fighting,
 Iago offering us his little vignette of Cassio’s dream. In this last instance, Iago
 functions as a double of Othello’s own performative style: just as Othello acts
 out Desdemona’s part in her absence from the senate meeting, so Iago plays
 Cassio’s role for him. In both cases the role of the subsidiary actor is ventrilo
­quized: fictionally, we are offered their voices, but factually they are silent.
 Although it has no formal play-within-the-play, Othello
'
s exploration of the ­
atricality repeatedly offers such moments of characters playing
 
each other, from  
Iago’s quotation of Othello’s promotion of Cassio to the Duke’s highly sugges
­tive words to Brabantio, “Let me speak like yourself” 
(1.3.199);
 Iago will pro ­
duce another such moment of role-slippage when he labels women “Players 
in your housewifery; and housewives in your beds” (2.1.112), and Othello makes
 perhaps the most poignant use of the motif when he 
firsts
 casts Emilia as a  
bawd (4.2.28-30) and then, ironically, pretends to misrecognize Desdemona as
 not being the whore that, in fact, she is not (90-2). It is this technique that
 will later allow Iago to attempt the incrimination of Bianca by a similar ven-
 triloquization, this time involving the language of the body: “Stay you, good
 gentlewoman; look you pale, mistress? / Do you perceive the gestures of her
 eye?” (5.1.104-5). Finally, the ultimate act of ventriloquization will also be the
10
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most poignant: Emilia, on her deathbed, will imitate Desdemona as she
 
resolves, “I will play the swan, / And die in music: [Singing] Willow, willow,
 willow" (5.2.248-9). Emilia, unlike her husband, does not mean to deceive
 here; but both she and 
we
 are well awar  of the precise status of this moment  
as re-presentation, since it is precisely from that quality that it takes its affec
­tive force.
Iago’s relation to Cassio, though, is more sustained than any of these other
 
examples of impersonation. In all of Iagos stage-managed 
episodes,
 Cassio is  
allotted a part, and Cassio
'
s promotion is the reason for Iago 's initial discon ­
tent: Iago sees Cassio in the role he had coveted for himself. Iago and Cassio
 are doubled in other ways. Famously, they twice offer closely juxtaposed and
 completely antithetical views of Desdemona: Cassio blazons her to the Cypri
­
ots
 (2.1.65), whereas Iago is “nothing, if not critical” (119), and their respons ­
es to the withdrawal of Desdemona and Othello 
for
 their wedding night are  
similarly counterpointed, Cassio seeing purity and Iago lust (2.3.15-25).
 Equally, though Cassio’s lament for lost reputation is soon echoed
 
by Iago 's dis ­
quisition on good name (3.3.159-65), contrasts of dramatic context and rhetor
­ical style make for a very different effect. Just as the substance of their speech
 is different, so is there a marked difference in the way they are received as
 tellers of stories. Whereas Iago
'
s messages are, initially at least, habitually dis ­
regarded, Cassio
'
s are avidly received, and he is repeatedly turned  to as an infor ­
mant of authority. When we first encounter him, Othello immediately asks
 him, “What is the news?” 
(1.2.36)
 and follows it up two lines later with,  
“What’s the matter, think you?” (38). Arriving in Cyprus, Desdemona greets
 him with “I thank you, valiant Cassio; / What tidings can you tell me of my
 lord?” (2.1.87-8).
Most notable in this respect is the description of Cassio’s own arrival on the
 
island, which immediately follows the Third Gentleman’s assurance that the
Turkish fleet is destroyed:
Mon. How, is this true?
Third Gent.
 
The ship is here put in,
A Veronesa; Michael Cassio,
Lieutenant to the warlike Moor Othello,
Is come ashore: the Moor himself at sea,
 
And in full commission here for Cyprus.
 Mon, I am 
glad
 on’t, ’tis a worthy governor.  
Third Gent, But this same Cassio, though he speak of comfort,
 Touching the Turkish loss, yet he looks sadly,
 And prays the Moor be safe, for they
 
were parted,  
With 
foul
 and violent tempest. (2.1.25-34)
The Arden edition prints “How, is this true?”; but it would be just as apposite
 
to read “How is this true?” because that is what
 
the  passage is substantially con ­
cerned with. The precise mechanism of the transmission of this information is
 
never
 uncovered (it cannot be “the ship” that speaks the message), but it is  
amply suggested by the introduction of Cassio’s name followed by the idea of
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 sees, tells, and is believed, and nothing occurs  
later in the 
play
 to undermine the substance of his report. There are other  
echoes of this sane world: Desdemona wants the Clown to “[b]e edified by
 report” (3.4.12), and Emilias imagined story about the putative storyteller who
 has slandered Desdemona is, ironically, true. Equally, Bianca, despite the fact
 that she is told so little, manages usually
 
to get a pretty accurate idea of what is  
going on through conjecture. Perhaps to some extent these moments of sim
­plified decoding provide the same kinds of respite from tension as is supplied
 in other tragedies by comic relief, of which there is so noticeably little in Oth
­ello. Perhaps they afford us instead a sort of epistemological relief, though one
 that only makes more poignant our understanding of the machinations of Iago.
Iago
'
s own approach to the transmission — or in his case to the distorting  
— of information is clearly characterized. He is himself a remarkably insensi
­
tive
 reader of situations, believing Emilia to be likely to commit adultery  with  
both Othello and Cassio, believing Cassio to be in love with Desdemona,
 believing it possible that she might return the affection. Emilias word for his
 
wis
hes is, interestingly, “fantasy” (3.3.303). His recapitulations, in particular,  
are crude, albeit inflected for the benefit of Roderigo: “with what
 
violence she  
first lov’
d
 the Moor, but for bragging, and telling her fantastical lies” (2.1.221-  
2);
 
“Lechery, by this hand: an index and prologue to the history of lust and foul  
thoughts” (254-5). Iago’s initial problem, seen from 
his
 own perspective, is no  
small one: a man whose announcements are rarely heeded must try to weave a
 convincing story whose success will depend entirely
 
on people acting in certain  
ways that are, in fact, against their own interest. His first attempt at producing
 such a narrative
 
is particularly fraught, since he must  retell the story of the fight  
between Montano and Cassio, in the presence of both, in a
 
way that while not  
seeming directly to incriminate Cassio will actually have precisely that effect;
 and 
he
 must, moreover, avoid being caught  out in any of the lies he has told. In  
this last consideration, he sails particularly close to the wind. He tells Othello
 that he heard “Cassio high 
in
 oaths, which till to-night / I ne’ er might see  
before” (2.3.226-7), and he thus comes dangerously close to contradicting his
 earlier assertion to Montano that Cassio’s drunkenness is habitual. In fact,
 though, to focus exclusively on 
swearing
 allows him to deflect attention com ­
pletely from the problematic issue of the frequency of Cassio’s drinking, and his
 re-presentation of the affair has precisely the effects that he desires. Later, he
 will use a similar strategy when he deliberately makes his interlude
 
with Cassio  
a dumbshow, an archaic mode of representation in theatrical terms but
 
the only  
one that will do duty 
here.
 It  is particularly ironic that this is overtly framed in 
terms that hint at its fictionality: Iago opens the episode
 
with, “For I will make  
him tell the tale anew” 
(4.1.84),
and Othello comments aside, "Iago beckons  
me, now 
he
 begins the story” (130); but Othello’s uncritical attitude towards his  
own storytelling prevents him from perceiving the re-presented nature of even
 so crude and unrealistic (in metatheatrical terms) a device as the dumbshow.
The crucial role in Iago’s story is of course that of Desdemona, but since she
 
continually refuses to play it for him, Iago has to resort to an overt declaration
 of the unstageability of certain parts of his narrative:
12





 a tedious difficulty, I think,
To bring ’em to that prospect, damn ’em then,
If ever mortal eyes did see them bolster
More than their own; what then, how then?
What shall I say? where’s satisfaction?
It is impossible you should see this .. . (3.3.403-8)
This is 
an
 aesthetic strange to Othello, who is unused to the notion that any  
experience, however arcane, whether of slavery or of anthropophagi, cannot be
 summoned up for the imagination of the 
auditor.
 Iago, as his inability to con ­
vince Brabantio in the first scene showed, is a poorer narrator and stager than
 Othello, despite — or perhaps 
because
 of— his far more sophisticated  
approach to the problematics of representation. But his approach works
 because he is able to 
effect
 a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative  
expectation. Initially, Othello adheres to his own ideas of the entire trans
­parency of representational systems: he adjures Iago to "give the worst of
 thought / The worst of word” (136-7); he complains:
Thou dost conspire against thy friend, Iago,
If thou but thinkest him wrong’d, and makest his ear
A stranger to thy thoughts. (146-8)
Once again, Othello shows no consciousness whatsoever of
 
the mechanics of  
representation: 
for




 sets to  work on these ideas, however. It  is remarkable how much  
of his attack on Othello consists not in the providing of evidence but in
 instructing his victim 
in
 new ways of interpreting evidence. When Othello  
demands, “give me the ocular proof” (3.3.366), Iago explains patiently, “It is
 impossible you should see this” (408). He amazes Othello
 
by telling him of the  
alleged representational code of Venice: “their best conscience / Is not to leave
 undone, but keep unknown” (207-8). Othello, whose very identity
 
is so exten ­
sively predicated on narration, responds in appalled fascination: “Dost thou say
 so?” (209) — a reply that ironically 
encodes
 the very problematics of represen ­
tation that it discounts, since the fact that Iago says so does not make it true.
 Iago continues in this 
vein,
 repeatedly stressing an aesthetics of concealment:
Alas, alas!
It is not honesty in me to 
speak
What I have seen and known . . . (4.1.272-4)
And Othello is convinced. The man who earlier in the play is presented to us
 
as the consummate narrator, and who has earlier demanded with such vehe
­mence an accurate account of the origins of the brawl, begins to veer towards
 silence:
I should make very forges of my cheeks,
That
 
would to cinders burn up modesty,
Did I but 
speak
 thy deeds. (4.2.76-8)
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This is the effect of Iago
'
s doctrine of the dangers of re-presentation, and it is  
potent indeed: Othello, the worker with words, will not use them now, and it
 is actually his refusal
 
to make any more specific accusation than this that so rad ­
ically disempowers Desdemona, since she can make no detailed rebuttal.




 he not only  feeds Othello false information but  radically  conditions  
his mechanisms for responding to it. Left alone, Othello mutters, “This hon
­est creature doubtless / Sees and knows more, much more, than he unfolds”
 (3.3.246-7). Most terribly of all, this new belief
 
in the power of  the hidden  
does not completely
override
 his earlier faith in the transparency of narration,  
but rather fuses with it. When Iago, mock-deprecatingly, asks, “Will you think
 so?”, he replies at once, “Think so, Iago?” 
(4.1.1),
 suggesting that though the  
Moor has lost faith in signifying systems, he remains 
paradoxically
 and dan ­
gerously adamant about his own ability to decode them: even if everything
 Desdemona
 
says to him is a lie, he can know the truth about  her. He  is, we rec ­
ognize, caught up in the epistemological impasse of the Cretan paradox.
As for Desdemona herself, she remains blissfully 
unaware
 even of what  
story she has been cast in. This is revealed by
 
her dogged persistence in plead ­
ing for Cassio and in refusing to believe that her husband 
could
 be jealous of  
her. In this respect, she may well seem to play into Iago’s hands; certainly, in
 the stories that they have told of her, critics have frequently constructed her as
 naive, even irritating, in this part of the play. Equally, however, Desdemonas
 actions can be seen as arising from a total lack of awareness of the role script
­
ed
 for her  by both Othello and Iago. What she discovers is that even when she  
is physically present on the stage and apparently controlling her own behavior,
 she is still subject to ventriloquization through the interpretative strategies
 applied to her by others. When she does finally learn this, her response is 
an apt one in this play structured by narratives, for she too tells a story: displac
­ing her own anxieties into the safely distanced world of fiction, in a classic nar
­rative strategy, she tells the tale-within-the-tale of Barbary, her mother’s maid,
 who at a time of grief herself fell back on the recounting of stories as she sang
 the “song of willow” that, though
 
“an old  thing,” “express’ d her  fortune” (4.4.28-  
9). This bedchamber scene that
 
shows us Desdemona and Emilia alone togeth ­
er is ostensibly colored by an atmosphere of intimacy, but actually it is largely
 structured by absences and silences, as Desdemona, instead of revealing to us
 her own innermost thoughts, tells us a story of a woman who told a story. As
 such, it can be taken to stand for all the stories in Othello that have a hollow
­ness at their heart, as is so strikingly figured 
by
 the imaginary nature of the  
adultery that 
forms
 the very kernel of the play.
The most striking gap in any story in the play is perhaps that in Iago’s.
 Famously, critics have been consistently unconvinced that the motivation that
 Iago himself describes is sufficient to actuate the levels of malice that he
 demonstrates. What is his hidden agenda, the 
secret
 self that he never reveals  
to us, what is his “dream” and his “fantasy”? To plug this gap, critics have
 offered stories of their own, reading Iago as anything from disgruntled 
soldier to repressed homosexual. On one level, it is arguable that this is because his
 part is in fact underwritten. But I would like to suggest that it may be 
precise­ly the secret of Shakespeare’s success, of his universally acknowledged “great
­ness,”
 
that he habitually underwrites roles, and  indeed whole  plays, in ways that
14
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provide immense stimulation to audience involvement and imagination. Iago
 
is perhaps merely the most striking example of the phenomenon. Equally, his
 opacity may serve as 
an
 important corrective to Othello's own aesthetic of the  
transparency of narrative by reminding us of the inherent difficulties involved
 in all decoding. In an ultimate irony Iago, whose stories and whose ventrilo
­quized playlets we know we must disbelieve, thus nevertheless becomes the
 most reliable voice to guide us in the proper interpretation of our own experi
­ences of stage representation.
The 
difficulties
 of decoding are most strikingly figured at the very end of  
the 
play
 in a tale  by  that most innocent  of tellers, Othello himself. Othello, fit ­
tingly, chooses to 
die
 as he has lived, recounting a story:
Set you down this,
And say 
besides,
 that in Aleppo once,  
Where a malignant and a turban’d Turk
 Beat a Venetian, and traduc’
d
 the state,  
I took by the throat the circumcised dog,
 And smote him thus. [Stabs
 
himself.] (5.2.352-7)
This is a story that obviously means a lot to Othello: he dies uttering
 
it, giving  
it the talismanic force habitually attached to last words, and he is anxious that
 those hearing it should, in their turns, recount it. It is, however, unclear how
 exactly this relation relates to him. Initially, Othello is the hero of his own
 tales: has he now become the villain? Both the "I" and the “him” of the story
 (suggestively echoing Desdemona’s earlier and more sophisticated comment
 that “I do beguile / The thing I am by seeming otherwise” [2.1.122-3]), he is
 himself both Turk and not-Turk, subject and object of his own narration. Per
­haps, however, even to think in such terms is
 
in itself to commit one of the most  
common (though at the same time 
one
 of  the least, if  at all, avoidable) of  all  
interpretative errors: to 
read
 the self into the text. On a thematic and psycho ­
logical level, of course, it obviously
 
is a roman à clef; I am not saying that  I can ­
not see the extraordinary symbolic force of having Othello at this crucial
 moment presented to us as that most demonized of others, the Turk. Mention
 of Turks may also, however, remind us of their abrupt disappearance from the
 narrative (if not the thematic) structure of the play at the opening of act 2,
 when all the narrative competence we possess encouraged us to expect them to
 form a major part of the story. It thus underlines the problematics and con
­taining structures of the narrative mode itself.
This reminder that we ourselves have, during the course of the play, expe
­
rienced problems with the decoding of narrative may serve to concentrate our
 minds on the interpretative processes of Othello himself, and in particular to
 make us aware of the delicately drawn relation between Othello as narrator and
 Othello as hearer. The logic of his account to the senate implies a stress on the
 presentness of representation, rather than on the element of re-presenting,
 which
 
would allow for the introduction of difference. When he himself is told  
a story by Iago, though, he focuses instinctively on precisely those elements of
 the narrative that allow for the maximum flexibility of reader response and,
 ostensibly at 
least,
 for greatest interpretative leeway. Repeatedly, he imposes  
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his own guilt-based reading over the possibilities of innocence that Iago pre
­
tends to hold out to him. Iago
'
s narrative, then, is for Othello both an accurate  
representation — a transparent account of events — and, simultaneously, a re
­presentation, a version of events offered by an inaccurate narrator whose poor
 
readings
 must be erased in favor of those supplied by Othello himself. Though  
uncritical as narrator and spectator, Othello does, in many ways, pride himself
 on his performance as close reader.
The “reading” element of the interchanges between Iago an
d
 Othello is  
interestingly imaged at several points. One such passage is perhaps the most
 famous in the play, and as such may 
well
 be taken rather for  granted: but when  
Iago declares that “trifles light as air / Are to the jealous, confirmations strong
 / As proofs of holy writ” (3.3.327-9), we should, I think, be particularly atten
­tive to the implied comparison between the suggestions he has been making to
 Othello and a written text. This is made especially pointed if we take “proofs”
 as meaning not only
 
“evidence” but “page proofs,” a usage first recorded by the  
OED in 1563 and with recorded occurrences also in 1600, 1612 and 1613. In
 a rather similar vein, Othello refers to Iago
'
s mutterings as “close denotements”  
(3.3.127), and the idea of “note” there is precisely what Iago repeatedly invites
 Othello to do. This is a play that, uniquely among Shakespeare’s “great”
 tragedies, has no written text-within-the-text. No letter is read out on stage
 and glossed, as they are by Claudius, Gloucester and Lady Macbeth, and Iago
 suggestively refers to Othello’s “unbookish jealousy” (4.1.101). However, Iago
 holds out the alleged relationship
 
between Desdemona and Cassio as a  text that  
he himself has lightly annotated but that obviously requires much more exten
­sive marginalia, and these Othello is only too happy to supply, as the two join
 
each
 other in a happy game of glossing and outglossing in which Desdemona  
is the
 
“most goodly book” “to write 'whore’ on” (4.2.73-4). The  proofs are, after  
all, only at proof stage; they still need to be corrected, and Othello can emend
 them to what he pleases.
It is at the close of the play that the emphasis on its textuality is most
 
marked, as Lodovico laments, “O bloody period!” (5.2.358) with its connota
­tion of the literal, printed full stop. Interestingly, Gratiano’s response to this is
 that “All that’s spoke is marr’d.” As much as anywhere in the play, it is 
in
 this  
final scene that the dynamics and problematics of narration, representation and
 ocular proof
 
find incisive exploration. When Othello, in a potentially highly  
bizarre moment, looks towards Iago’s, feet and finds them 
uncloven,
 he seems  
finally to have accepted the possibility that a story may be 
merely
 a “fable”  
(5.2.287); but only a few lines later his aesthetics of inalienably accurate repre ­
sentation is back in 
place
 as he implores, “I pray you in your letters, / When you  
shall these unlucky deeds relate, / Speak of them as they are” (341-3). This in
 itself has a double-edged force: on the one hand, it returns to the misleading
 and mutually contradictory letters reporting the Turkish campaign against the
 
Venet
ians, but on the other  it chimes with the letters found on Roderigo’s body  
(309-19), which have proved potent instruments to reveal the truth. “Proof”
 has, at 
last,
 come forth, and it is in the written text that it has surfaced.
The logic of Othello’s own proof-readings is clear enough. As readers are
 so often
 
tempted  to do,  he construes the story as centered on himself— as Des-
16
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demona implicitly does with
 
the tale of Barbary, and as Barbary in turn did with  
the 'old song”
 
which,  both to her and to Desdemona,  "express’d her fortune” —  
so that, for him, even an exchange between Cassio and Bianca 
becomes
 a story  
about himself and Desdemona. This is, of course, to say little more than that
 everyone reads from his or her own highly particularized subject position 
and that readers are frequently likely to make an immense emotional investment in
 works that have, objectively viewed, nothing whatsoever to do with their own
 lives, as can easily be illustrated by the common reaction to films of books that
 "he doesn’t look anything
 
like Heathcliff/Rhett  Butler/Mr. Darcy” In one way,  
this is precisely the key to the secret of Iago’s success with Othello, since it is
 
by
 his omissions that  he gets Othello interested enough  in his narrative of Des ­
demona’s supposed infidelity to make the Moor wish to fill in the gaps by his
 own imaginative engagement with them. Writing ourselves into films, books,
 and plays, we constitute a fantasy out of a narrative in ways very closely analo
­gous to Iago’s Hamlet-like "interpreter” role for the script elements with
 
which  
the actions of Desdemona and Cassio supply him.
Othello, though, 
may
 operate rather differently. Michael D. Bristol, com ­
menting on the story of the spectator who shot dead the actor playing Othello
 to stop a
 
black man from killing a white woman, notes that "[g]iven the painful  
nature of the story, the history of both the interpretation and the performance
 of Othello have been characterized by a search for anesthetic explanations that
 allow the show to go on” (79). If Bristol
 
is right, does the demand for  the anes ­
thetic 
actually
 foreclose our response to the aesthetic pleasures of the text?  
Rowland Wymer, discussing Webster and Ford, has recently commented that
 "[m]odern 
academic
 criticism, in its concern with meaning and contextualiza-  
tion, has often given an inadequate account of the experience provided by works
 of art,” and he goes on to quote Susan Sontag’s insistence that “[in] place of a
 hermeneutics we need 
an
 erotics of art” (Wymer 104). Perhaps our own high ­
ly tuned interpretative 
abilities,
 consistently trained to the making of meanings,  
tend to blind us to the possibility that at the heart of Othello lies an exposure
 both of the indeterminacy and opacity at the heart of all narratives and of the
 problematics of our own responses to them,2 as the play insistently underlines
 in its repeated emphasis on both the
 
hermeneutics and  the erotics of enactment,  
reenactment, narration and representation. It is only in the re-presentation of
 Othello — in the temporally conditioned, imaginatively engaged process of
 responding to the actors’ own engagement
 
with it in the theater — that  we re ­
experience the quality of the play’s exploration of the dynamics of narration  
staged. Throughout the play, we are made powerfully aware of that urgent  
imperative that underlies the triple-layered use of the Willow Song, expression:
 "an old thing ’twas, but it express’
d
 her fortune.” Characters in Othello tend on  
the whole to 
be
 bad at explaining — both Cassio and Desdemona fail spectac­
ularly at it — but they are good at expressing. Every time that the play is per
­formed, they are given a rich and full opportunity
 
to do s , which, as the play’s  
own use of reading metaphors reminds us, touches us in ways distinct from the
 experience of reading.
17






See Cheadle for the interesting suggestion that “the reference to the  
anthropophagi 
could
 . . . even figure as Othellos most apposite rebuke of the  
man who has proved credulous in being prepared to believe in fabulous crea
­tures no less than love charms” (492).
2.
 
In the case of Othello, the norms of critical response have in fact been  
distorted 
by
 what Rochelle Smith terms “the tendency of Othello criticism to  
mirror the perspectives of the play
'
s main characters.” She cites various exam ­
ples of this tendency (311).
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“If I were to make a critical comment on the
 
English department, I would say that it
 
is not  
enough like the media representation of it.”
—Stanley Fish 
on
 the Duke English  
department
1.
“No word of this meeting is to 
be
 spoken outside this  
room.” So spake my chair
 
both at the beginning and  
the end of the biggest department meeting in recent
 years. All but one of twenty-one permanent, tenure
­track members were present. Our occasion was to
 choose candidates for two new positions. The search
 committee had labored long and hard. Everybody
 was abuzz with anticipation. The meeting had even
 drawn 
me,
 for only the second time that year. What  
is electing an English department? In a very real
 sense, it is a narrative, including the story of why a
 senior member would disdain its formal delibera
­tions, why hiring usually proves so contentious, and
 why a chair would be moved to mark all business as
 strictly private.
One thing especially needs to 
be
 stressed about  
this 
narrative:
 it is never told in specific t rms. "In  
the department,” begins Nicolai Gogols great story,
 “The Overcoat” — but then the narrator wavers:
 “but perhaps it is just as well not to say which
 department. There is nothing more touchy and ill-
 tempered than departments, regiments, government
 offices, and indeed any kind of official body” (5).
 Any academic department is no different. The only
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departments that receive public representation are those, such as Duke’s, whose
 
members or whose institutions already enjoy enough renown that they have
 specificity to waste. Even in these cases there are limits; we never 
expect
 to  
learn what Fredric Jameson really thinks of Frank Lentricchia’s divorce. My
 narrative
 
will be designed at once to challenge and to explore these limits. The  
following account would be different if I had made the same discreet 
choice
 as  
Gogol’s narrator,
 
who “in order to avoid all sorts of unpleasant misunderstand ­
ings,” concludes that “we 
shall
 refer to the department in question as a certain  
department."
How much difference? To some, no doubt, not much. Nobody in my
 
department commands a national reputation. No one outside my department
 
could
 recognize anybody referred to here, or would care to. Indeed, to some w  
will all variously appear familiar
 
enough in some stereotypical sense, and  to read  
a specific tale of our deliberations will appear the stuff of banality rather than
 transgression. To others, however, the following pages will represent a breach
 of discretion. The actual department business of real departments is properly
 conducted in private, and a public narrative of even 
one
 hiring decision is nei ­
ther responsible nor ethical. How much difference
 
will such a narrative make?  
Perhaps it depends upon what sort of inquiry it is designed to serve.
It might be more accurate to characterize the following pages as an explo
­
ration into the nature of academic departments with a narrative embedded in
 it. The argument is that a department as a social entity has been continually
 repressed in educational discourse; indeed, this is why we lack 
narratives.
 Two  
things especially result from this repression. First, the necessary fiction of a
 department 
can
 be stabilized as a structure, recreated ultimately in the interests  
of the research university model that initiated the modern conception of a
 department. Secondly, the social foundation of this structure fails to be grant
­ed any discursive existence, because all authority derives from the elite model,
 founded on scholarship. It maybe the case that all departments suffer from this
 repression; hence the reason — to take a recent example — why in his most
 recent study James 
Sosnoski
 must sort through so many varied definitions of  
the term “discipline,” as if it had strictly to do with either intellectual work or
 bureaucratic rule (see Modern Skeletons 28-42). Departments such as my own,
 however, 
suffer
 most, because they abide in institutions that cannot support  
research, and therefore are unable to reconcile their professional identity with
 their social one. Only this latter identity gives my department its life, even if
 the former provides its occasion.
But how to express its business as a narrative? Immediately there is the
 
question of whose story it is
 
— and the prospect that  there are as many versions  
of any one department as there are members of it. Everybody has heard of
 departments whose members are at such complete odds with one another that
 they cannot even agree when to have a meeting. I heard of another this past
 year, some of whose members communicate with each other only by e-mail.
 “We’re not that bad,” 
assured
 my man (at the same institution but in another  
department). “We all talk to each other in our department.” Nonetheless, 
one can be 
fairly 
certain that  if each of the people in this virtual department was to  
try to relate the story of so much as a single
 
year, all would be astonished at the  
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previously unspoken differences among them. So individual differences must
 
be acknowledged and some risk taken if 
one
 wants to open up the conditions  
by which the basic organizational units of 
an
 academic discipline are compre ­
hended: departmental truth is not only muffled and inward but 
deeply
 person ­
al. In order to give one
'
s own department as the story of one vote, and to give  
one 
vote
 as the story of the department, much is going to be told that will  
sound like sheer fiction.
Exactly what sorts of social organizations are departments?  Why do so
 
many fall by the wayside along the high road of disciplinarity? Electing a
 department does not involve a direct, explicit consideration of such questions
 by its members, even if the questions are lodged at the center of virtually any
 departmental deliberation. Indeed, it is probably the essence of the 
election process that such a consideration cannot take place, and in this respect, it seems
 to me, a narrative of electing a department accords with our deepest sense of all
 
narrat
ives arising from academic life. They are simultaneously heard in two  




It seemed a foregone conclusion. The local
 
favorite for one of the  positions was  
the lover and companion of 
one
 of the two most powerful people in the  
department. In addition, the woman had been teaching composition in the
 department off
 
and on for a number of years and enjoyed easy social contact  
with a majority of its members. Finally, everyone seemed agreed that she was
 a good teacher and that she had conducted her formal
 
job interview with her  
usual poise. Therefore, it almost appeared vindictive to point out that, among
 other imperfections, she had not had one graduate course in the area for
 
which  
the position had been advertised, had never taught a course in it, and had
 
writ ­
ten her dissertation in an entirely different area. I pointed these things out at
 the meeting anyway.
A few others also wondered about what claims for specialization we were
 
being offered. More spoke in the womans favor — all discretely ignoring her
 lack of credentials and emphasizing instead her interview performance. There
 was really only 
one
 other candidate, very well qualified, even if in the context  
of the meeting she finally
 
had to matter  less for herself than as a locus for  prin ­
cipled opposition to the local favorite. At last we voted. A tie, with two
 abstentions. Another vote. Another tie, with no abstentions. We were out of
 time and one vote short of the absolute majority that department rules stipu
­lated. A special vote was quickly announced two days hence, ballots to be 
cast in a box on the department secretary’s desk.
What story
 
of the department had transpired to this point? In one respect,  
it is a narrative having to do with the enormous recent increase in 
temporary, part-time faculty. Whatever principles of sociality obtain, it is difficult to
 ignore adjuncts at the departmental coffeepot. No matter that it happens all
 the time anyway; one of the crudest academic stories I know is of an adjunct
 who thought she was on friendly terms with a permanent member until 
he abruptly said to her
 
one day, "I really  don’t want to talk  to you anymore because
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adjuncts are always leaving.” Tenured people, in my experience, are often 
capa­
ble
 of talking more frankly to the untenured (in large departments, this includes  
grad students) than to their own permanent colleagues, and they often fight
 ferociously for
 
less secure friends if a spot on the tenure track opens up. In this  
particular election, the spot had been created, by the simple procedure of
 adding the local favorite to the three already selected 
by
 the search committee.
In terms of my emphasis, her addition more sharply reformulated the con
­flict
 
between two quite separate  visions: the department as a professional orga ­
nization and as a social one. Indeed, given the way in which a department such
 as my own is inscribed in the institutional hierarchy of American higher 
edu­cation, this conflict is inescapable. Supporters of the local favorite might not
 agree, of course. Undoubtedly supporters of any local favorite never agree —
 rightly or wrongly —
 
that  the person is finally being considered solely for social  
reasons, and of course this may not always be the case, even if in departments
 such as mine it is almost guaranteed to be so. More interesting, though, is the
 fact that social reasons must remain unenunciated, even among a group of peo
­ple for whom they are decisive.
Of course, in one sense this is as it should be. Few departments labor with
­
out the illusion that new members are chosen on the basis of criteria safely
 removed from the conviction that certain people are "just not one of us,” as I
 recall a colleague blurting out years ago during another meeting. In another
 sense, however, the repression of the social exacts a terrible cost, because even a
 candidate not worth the name must be publicly accountable as a good teacher,
 a sound scholar, or a knowledgeable theorist. There is 
no
 other official vocab ­
ulary. Thus, the moment f the social imperative always marks any depart
­ment s division from itself. It shouldn’t ever happen from a strict 
professional vantage that a department would be caught in the throes of its affection 
for
 a  
local candidate. My guess is that it happens all the time — everywhere.
Clarions difference from Harvard or Duke lies in the fact that departments
 
at these distinguished institutions do not have to face this division, over and
 over again. There, local favorites are exceptions — if
 
not (one trusts) excep ­
tional. Hence, for example, Harvard
'
s famous dean, Henry Rosovsky, is quite  
clear: Harvard staffs its departments according to who is the best 
in
 the world  
in any field.1 It is left to most other universities to manage their own versions
 of this lofty standard. The official conception of the department handed down
 to them by the dynamic, ambitious research model ignores how few can 
approx­imate it and disdains any other idea, especially a social one. To R sovsky, the
 social represents a 
suspect, 
if not degraded, realm of petty jealousy.” Or,  to take  
another, more recent example, the social has to be almost ignored — if not
 entirely unlamented — in David Damrosch’s account of the sovereign figure of
 the individual scholar, who works alone and 
belongs
 to a department only in  the  
most nominal fashion.
Clarions local favorites, on the other hand, are not exceptional, because the
 
department is not in place to define itself exclusively as a disciplinary entity.
 Local favorites are instead a constitutive feature of our departmental composi
­tion. The pain is that, 
each
 time we elect someone into the department, the  
decisive role of social pressures cannot be admitted — although, each time, it
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must somehow be assessed. Even though the results have not always been
 
unhappy for the English department — at least we don t openly scream at the
 chairman, as a senior man did at 
my
 first department meeting many years ago  
— the process never transpires without bitterness, resentment, and renewed
 factionalism. To put the ultimate consequence still more crudely, the depart
­ment finally is this 
division
 between the professional and the social.
Granted, few will dispute our authority to teach topic sentences, the Pearl
 poet, and slave narratives — although many members were alarmed a couple of
 years ago when, at one of those meetings convened so that the administration
 
could
 “engage in dialogue,” the new dean instructed the department to have a  
proposed position in medieval literature reborn as one
 
in cultural studies so that  
we would have a better chance to consider minority candidates. Nevertheless,
 as a department we are not ultimately a group of professionals who “profess”
 such subjects as much as a group of 
individuals
 who  have  to relate to each other,  
day by day, in terms of them.




this question by reformulating  it: why be enjoined not to? And then  
to pose a further question: whose interests are being served by everybody so
 being enjoined? Those of the department considered as a family? But a chair
 is not a father, nor do the rest of the members of a department
 
bond or dispute  
among themselves as siblings. Nowadays their individual backgrounds are like
­ly to be too varied, while the old paternalistic model of a chair
'
s authority has  
become exhausted. My department was more familial when I joined it over
 twenty-five years ago and immediately fell under the venerable tyranny of
 
an  
old chair whom just about everyone feared, hated, and loved to tell incredible
 stories about. I felt enlisted into a Freudian Band of Brothers (there were only
 two women), before the patricidal deed had been done. It never was, though.
Our father's end came rather lamely and sadly. He just crept away like the old
 
bachelor he was, and we children 
were
 left without any clear image of how to  
reproduce his power.
The peculiar authority of any chair cannot be put better than it is by
 
Richard Ohmann: “the chairman
'
s power  comes from the multiversity in which  
departments find themselves, and it is necessary because decisions have to pass
 back and forth between a managerial and a professional setting” (218). There
 is a sense in which a chair is structurally compromised. Because a chair is at
 once representative of the “remotest arm” of the administration (as Ohmann
 goes on to explain) and of the inner recesses of the department, it is often not
 clear in whose name s/he acts. Whether or not enjoining us on this particular
 occasion not to speak outside was intended by the chair simply to encourage
 discussion, 
discussion
 was in fact discouragingly brief and restrained. Energies  
at variance with fictions of professionalism were free to continue and to issue
 their own challenge in terms of the upcoming vote. Everybody knew what
 seethed beneath the rules. In whose name, finally, were we being asked to for
­get?
Worst of all, it seemed to 
me
 that we were being ask d this day to make  
over our own departmental interests, such as they 
could
 be made manifest, in  
the image of the institution. Of course in many
 
ways the interests of the part
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and the whole are identical; one could even claim that a department has no
 
interests apart from the larger ones of its institution.2 What I want , to claim
 myself is that the category of the social marks the limits of mutual interest. The
 administration can only
 be
 concerned about the members of a department get ­
ting 
along
 with each other insofar as the department’s administrative function ­
ing is threatened. The members themselves, on the other hand, not only know
 far more intimately how
 
this functioning is dependent  upon getting along; they  
know how sometimes sheer getting along is more important — bureaucratic
 license or disciplinary integrity be damned. This
 
vote was one such time. Once  
again, the English department had to decide on its own reason for being.
I have 
failed
 to emphasize how excited I had grown at the prospect. “All  
bets are off,” somebody said. Others knew for how many years all bets had
 already been settled because all important decisions were based on the same two
 factions. Could these factions have at
 
last dissipated, as rumored? Only in the  
last couple of years had a significant number of new people come into the
 department. "It’s a different department now,” people had taken to exclaiming,
 always with a certain wonderment. Everybody sensed that no vote so much as
 this one over hiring a local favorite would reveal how new
 
the department  real ­
ly had become. 
Before
 the meeting, I even thought of my old retired colleague,  
and how he used to relish the infrequent times when 
business
 as usual was  
going to fail. "God, how
 
I love chaos, Terry. It’s all we can hope for.”
Perhaps those ready to 
vote
 for the local favorite were in thrall of similar 
energies. Ohmann begins his chapter on English
 
departments  by citing George  
Bernard Shaw’s aphorism about all professions as conspiracies against the laity,
 and then compares English departments to "the conspirators’ cell groups”
 (209). He means the conspiracy to be directed at the public. What about a
 conspiracy directed at the department’s own disciplinary self-image, as dictat
­ed by the
 
public? Maybe from the outside it  does not make sense why a depart ­
ment would settle for mediocrity, familiarity, and other unworthy professional
 goals, each heedless of the official imperative for unremitting innovation 
in
all  
things. (The number of untold departmental narratives about forced compli
­ance to affirmative action guidelines must be legion.) From the inside, howev
­er, where these 
sorts
 of things can be casually misrepresented, where inertia  
sometimes feels sweet, and
 
where few care to hear about new knives, much less  
cutting edges, it can be deeply satisfying to bond once more against the vast,
 threatening outside, and to hell with administrative directives about multicul
­turalism, disciplinary ones about the latest theory from Duke, or political ones
 about outcomes’ assessments.
Exactly what unites a group? At root, certain prescribed ways of negotiat
­
ing with the outside so that the group can perpetuate its identity. The peculiar
 groups that are academic departments have their respective identities so con
­summately rationalized, though, that a species of fatigued formality quite typ
­ically transpires with respect to the outside. Donald Barthelme has a lovely
 story, "The New Member,” about this operation. Members of a
 
unnamed com ­
mittee begin their meeting by taking note of a man looking in from outside a
 window. Immediately the meeting comes to be about the group’s fascination
 with this man, or perhaps rather its inability to direct its attention to the "press
­
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ing items” of the agenda. The only item actually addressed is "the Worth girl.”
 
One man moves she be hit by a car. Another woman moves that the Worth girl
 fall in love with the man outside. Eventually all agree to invite him in, where
­upon he states, no, he has no grievance, he just wants to ‘“be with somebody’”
 (184). The committee understands. A motion is soon forthcoming
 
to make  the  
man a member. The motion passes easily. The man sits down and 
begins
 to  
announce, among other things, that everyone has to wear overalls, no one can
 wear nose rings, and gatherings of 
one
 or more persons are prohibited.
What Barthelme presents is an exquisitely incoherent 
dance
 of social ener ­
gy, collapsed into formalism. The old members need a 
new
 member not so  
much to change the rules as 
to
 reinvigorate themselves in relation to each other.  
(This, in turn, is the point of having rules.) I suppose the need arises 
in
 any  
group grown idle about its energies. Was this the case in my own department
 at the time of the
 
vote for its own new member? Perhaps there are times in the  
history of a group when only a new member can reveal how old everybody is.
 My truest objection to the local favorite was that she was not new. Indeed, so
 
wel
l integrated into the department was she, and not only because of her rela ­
tionship to one of its most powerful members, that you could hardly see around
 her. Consequently, a vote against her appeared to 
me
 as a  vote for the Outside  
itself. What story could a department tell itself if it was willing to renounce its
 need for an 
outside? Of course there are always plenty of official 
narratives
 to be constructed  
each year for versions of outsides. In large part, even the day-to-day business  
of a department consists in its mutual commitment to the necessity for such
 narratives. Everybody has to write teaching observations on everybody else
 according to the bargaining agreement, committees have to report at meetings
 to the department as a whole, the chair has to draw up curriculum and peda
­gogical stories for the administration to hear — to mention these only. (The
 previous year much of our own departmental time had been invested in a grand
 narrative 
called
 the NCATE report, required each ten years for certification on  
the national level. I chanced to ask the chair what the letters stood for, and she
 had to ask somebody else.) But all these 
narratives
 are  really registers of a deep ­
er, if wider, interiority whereby a department simultaneously recreates 
an
 insti ­
tution and is recreated by it. Hiring raises the possibility of other story.
But what story? Normally, in most departments, I suppose, the plot lines
 
hardly get established as something very different. Any recruitment remains
embedded in the institution. It is still conducted along disciplinary lines. Yet
 a new member might not fit — or might fit in unusually provocative ways. A
 group has every right to be excited at the prospect. I could not help but
 
sit amid  
mine the afternoon of the vote and wonder precisely how I belonged myself. I
 had once been friends of a sort with the local favorite,
 
for example. What sense  
did this make now, much less the reasons why we were no longer friends? I
 knew of a position in another department where a friend of mine was the local
 but not, evidently, the favorite. How different
 
was this man’s situation? How  
different is
any
 department from another? Does every departmental narrative  
have to refract into its most individual, personal plot lines? Was my own lack
 of sympathy to the social currents energizing
 
our favorite merely because, in  the
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end, I didn’t feel part of them — whether as a colleague 
or
 as a scholar, it made  
no real difference?




 more easily remain apart, I think, from the pressure of such ques ­
tions. Hence, for example, in his recent memoir, Frank Lentricchia can write
 as follows: “I teach English at a
 
distinguished university, in which like all Eng ­
lish departments I have known or heard about, we have virtually nothing in
 common, not even literature” (11). Lentricchia can be forgiven for being
 unable to broaden 
his
 social,  if not discursive, base. The circumstances in which  
most academics labor, however, are far more unforgiving. An old friend likes to
 recall the first jobs of her and her husband at a small liberal arts school. Early
 in the year, they attended a concert. A 
couple
 from his department sat next to  
them. At intermission, the man confessed to being bored and suggested they
 all retire to 
his
 house for a drink. My friend and her husband looked at each  
other. Alas, they demurred. The story of how he lost his job over this incident
 is too intricate (and unbelievable) to tell. “We should have known better,” my
 friend concludes. True. Embedded within the professionalized departmental
 narrative we should all know better. The 
basic
 point of this latter narrative, 
however, is that what we would 
know
 should remain uncontaminated by the  
debased social 
realm
 of the anecdotal, which is irrelevant to the discipline.
For a time in a foreign country I taught with a man
 
who came from a junior  
college in the South. “We 
like
 each other,” he used to say of his department;  
“we do lots of things together.” Periodically I asked him to repeat how collec
­tively happy
 
everybody was, so incredible did  it seem to me. Could it only hap ­
pen in a junior college, consigned to a lowly position in academic ranking? (Or
 else it could only happen long ago, and then probably only through the efforts
 of an exuberant chair. See Spilka for the sort of richly anecdotal account that
 College English would not very likely publish today.) One admits how much
 
socia
lity matters (because research does not) only very grudgingly. More  
recently at a conference I met a woman from another
 
junior college. I asked  
her how many courses she taught. She said five: "It’s all right, 
we
 have fun 
together. We don’t have the pressures you do because we don’t have any airs.’”
One could hazard an axiom: the more institutionally low, the more depart-
 
mentally happy. And yet people will not necessarily like each other because
 they have only themselves or lack some official basis on which to compete; for
 one thing, there will always have to be elections to hire 
new
 members. The fol ­
lowing formulation seems better: the more illusions (warranted or not) about
 scholarship, the less acknowledgment of the significance of sociality. There
­fore, most departments regularly purchase the first at the expense of the second
 — as no 
one
 will have to remind the dour Lentricchia (or even the misunder ­
stood Fish, his former chair). Alas, though, groups of people need occasions in
 order to 
be
 revealed to themselves as groups, if not to experience themselves in  
this way. My department (as opposed to its factions) has always been poor in
 such occasions. I stopped going to the few
 
sporadic ones, including the Christ ­
mas party some years ago when a drunken colleague arrived late and proceed
­ed to vomit on her hostess’ rug. Everyone agreed afterwards that
 
the event was  
at least a lot more fun than anything that happens at a department meeting.
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what story? Can the real one about any department be  
told as merely how someone in the group relates to the others? Or is the deep
­er narrative instead the recurrent hope, manifest in a number of different ways,
 and only fitfully collective, that
 
one day a  new member will  come along to make  
good all the unused, stale, or disvalued social possibilities? Granted, such con
­cerns about a department could not be more different than, say, those of James
 Phelan, when he laments the Duke phenomenon of
 
securing preeminence by  
hiring away top people and speaks of the necessity for a “better moder’ (196).
 It involves “people with diverse interests and expertise who share more funda
­mental beliefs about education, critical discourse, and inquiry.” The telling
 thing to me is that Phelan is apparently
 
under no pressure to realize how utter ­
ly his wish is rebuked by the disturbing moment where he meets a
 
colleague and  
they just “have a good talk,” much to Phelan s amazement that such a thing so
 rarely happens (48).
Such things probably happen more often in my department, 
because
 we are  
not subject to the research demands of Phelans (which is the first thing he and
 his colleague begin to talk about). “How is your research going?” is not, after
 all, a question designed to elicit profound human contact. Indeed, it could eas
­ily be argued that the purpose of an academic department is to inhibit such
 contact, as meetings transpire over each year’s budget, 
each
 semester’s course  
schedule, and the constitution of standing and ad hoc committees. These are
 almost exclusively the terms in which Joel Colton discusses “The Role of the
 Department in the Groves of Academe”
 
in The Academic Handbook. It is not his  
concern if
 
someone refuses to post office hours, if nobody wants to chair the  
evaluation committee, or
 
if there simply are no curricular dreams to be dreamed  
this year.3 Colton begins by noting the common wisdom once expressed by a
 popular faculty member, speaking to students and extolling the virtues of an
 academic career. He is asked if there are any disadvantages. “Yes,” the profes
­sor replies, “the colleagues in one’s own department” (261). In such a context,
 how not to long for Phelan’s notion of a department?
There are two basic reasons why not. First, Phelan’s vision is 
simply
 false.  
People in an academic department are defined in terms of their commitment
 
to  
their discipline, not to 
each
 other. Hence they are academics in the first place  
(and only committed to each other in some other way after the fact). Hence
 also, Phelan himself rarely gets together with any of his colleagues in order to
 share fundamental beliefs. The Ohio State English department may have fewer
 parties than the Clarion English department. He mentions only a few people,
 who have 
his
 same intellectual interests. What Phelan does he does alone.  
There really is no stable structural 
analogy
 for how his real activity participates  
in the larger
 
life of his department, especially insofar as the activity  consists not  
only of solitary worrying — about teaching, giving papers, and publishing a
 book — but of aspiring to join another department (eventually his own chair
 has to be told), albeit as the occupant of an endowed chair.
Second, Phelans
 
vision lacks political  nuance. We do not need better mod ­
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because of institutional hierarchy An institution such as Ohio State simply
 
transmits the organizing logic of 
elite
 institutions, founded on a research  
imperative whereby each member of a department is comprehended not as a
 social being but as a scholar who works alone. (Again, Damrosch is eloquent
 
on
 this point.) Phelan sentimentalizes community not only because he lacks it  
but because he lacks any mandate to have any. Of course nobody else has any
 either. Yet what this means in practice is that large, doctoral universities effec
­tively set the terms. Compare to Phelan a Penn State professor in a recent let
­ter to the Chronicle of Higher Education about how my university is different
 from his: “There is a kind of unity of mission on that campus. The faculty is
 not composed of independent scholarly entrepreneurs. It is more united than
 the diverse faculty at our cumbersome multiversity” (Phillips B3). Penn State,
 in other words, gets to say what Clarion is, and not vice versa. Consigned to
 an “organic” 
realm,
 Clarion speaks only to itself and for itself. No wonder it  
opts for local favorites.
Let 
me
 enlarge on this last point by  citing a remark from a recent article of  
Graff
'
s. He has been emphasizing how disabled academics are from explaining  
what they do to anybody else because they teach in isolation from 
each
 other.  
One problem that follows from this is that even students are excluded from a
 larger conversation and prevented from understanding the intellectual alle
­giances or identities of their various professors. “‘You call yourself a Marxist-
 feminist, but you sound like just a bourgeois liberal to me.’ This contesting of
 identifications takes place frequently at our 
academic
 conferences but rarely in  
our lassrooms” (“Academic Writing” 16). More to my context, such contest
­ing rarely takes place in our halls, or our coffee lounges, or our department
 meetings. Undoubtedly it should. But it does not — and instead conferences
 seem to multiply, especially at the regional or even local level. Could this be
 
because
 departments have become more constricted? What is a haplessly  
socialized member of one to do, for all manner of other invigoration, but go to
 a conference? Graff’s line appears scarcely conceivable anywhere else. There
­fore, the most searching and consoling stories available to the profession at the
 present time may no longer be the product of departments, but of conferences.
Meanwhile, we fail to get better fictions about departments because the
 
focus for an academic discipline continues to 
be
 lodged at the departmental  
level. Once more this paradigm serves the interests of research institutions that
 in fact secure their preeminence by a disciplinary organization based on linkages
 among departments rather than on membership 
in
 any one. (Berkeley hires  
from Yale and vice
 
versa. Phelan, from Chicago, is understandably  sour  that he 
came in second at Berkeley. He still makes all his important professional moves
 at conferences, and from there emerge all his candid conversations.) One way
 this organization consolidates itself
 
is precisely through conferences; they are  
expensive to attend, feature papers expressive of the
 
latest fashions, and encour ­
age in all sorts of ways the maintenance of institutional boundaries 
based
 on  
status. (To be from a 
place
 no one has heard of seldom elicits conversation at  
the cash bar.) However, more conferences — many
 
now  organized by universi ­
ties that enjoy little status — do not necessarily open up the possibilities for
 who 
gets
 to deliver  papers at the MLA or the English Institute. These confer ­
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ences do, however, offer increased opportunities for sociality, and especially for
 
recuperating lost, idle, or stagnant sociality back 
home.Perhaps the social actuality of a department may finally not be intelligible
 except in terms either larger or smaller than those of the disciplinary or admin
­istrative unit. Most may never 
experience
 themselves in larger terms. Most  
may not want to. (At any conference one is guaranteed to hear about these.)
 What difference does it make to such a department to be mindful of another
 whose whole identity is founded
 
upon easy access to a wider professional world?  
English departments at the majority of universities throughout the United
 States function, after all, as small, intricate entities only nominally related to
 this world. Members 
in
 these departments may read about it. Their universi ­
ties lack the resources to enable them to contribute to 
it;
 instead, only highly  
localized versions of the values of the great world are possible. At 
one
 point  in  
Molly Hite’s novel, Class Porn, the heroine hears a tenured member exclaim
 about another man on their committee that he’s a “great guy,” and then she
 thinks as follows: “It’s 
one
 of the conventions of our committee that  when you  
mention the name of somebody on it you’re supposed to be overcome with
 emotion. The emotions differ hierarchically, of course. When my name is
 mentioned, for instance,
 
presumably everybody laughs” (145). She’s just  a lowly  
lecturer without her dissertation finished. People who lack a Ph.D. lack even
 the recognition of another university.
Hite’s amusing novel is not an example of what I mean by a better fiction
 
about departmental life. For one thing, Eleanor Nyland renounces this life by
 the novel’s 
end.
 Renunciation happens recurrently in academic novels — and, 
if
 
not, at least academic life has been sorely tested, usually by erotic horizons  
heretofore unimagined. Stories that trace the. precise contours of a department’s
 own narrow bounds in order to embrace them by the end are, 
on
 the other  
hand, far more rare, harsh, and precious. I think of them as fictions of friend
­ship. Friendship really doesn’t have anything
 
to do  with departments at all, and  
may more
 
often function in them as yet another threat to their  social coherence;  
even friends, as in my
 
own late instance, have to vote.4 Nonetheless, to friends,  
the sheer conspiracy of professional
 
life is eased. Friendship is probably the best,  
most humanizing possibility available to most of us in departments, because it
 promises the story neither of structure nor hierarchy, although inescapably
 implicated in each.
Let me conclude with one of the finest academic 
fictions
 I know: Bernard  
Malamud’s “Rembrandt’s Hat.” Arkin, an art historian, is a dozen years
 younger than Rubin, a sculptor, at the New York art school where both teach.
 The men are friendly, but not friends. They become enemies after the day
 when Arkin admiringly compares one of Rubin’s many odd hats to one from a
 middle-aged self-portrait of Rembrandt. After that Rubin ceases to wear the
 hat and appears to Arkin to be avoiding him. Months pass. One day Arkin
 happens into Rubin’s studio. There’s really only one piece that he likes. Anoth
­er day, while showing some slides, he sees that the hat Rubin wore months ear
­lier more resembled that of a cook at a diner than it did Rembrandt’s. Later he
 returns to the sculptor’s studio, congratulates him on the fine piece, and apolo
­gizes for mixing up the hats so long ago. Rubin accepts the apology. But the
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 the bathroom mirror in a white cap that now really does  
appear to resemble Rembrandt's hat.
What seems to me especially beautiful about this story is how the air of a
 
very peculiar human contact — close, fragile, intolerably slight and painfully
 interiorized — lifts off its plot. Where else but in an academic department
 could Rubin have taken the exact kind of offense he does, and who else but an
 academic such as Arkin could have expressed it with such apparent casualness?
 There are departments in which people teach together for decades and yet fail
 to achieve as much clarification of their mutual feelings for each other as Mala-
 mud
'
s narrative provides his two characters. How necessary is it to us for oth ­
ers to tell us who we are? Or are we content to think we know already? In the
 end, the distinctive thing about the stories possible in any department may be
 that they must remain partial, blunted, 
baffled,
 or just silenced. Beyond the  
estimable professional reasons, I am not sure why this should be so — unless
 there are embodied in academic attire such depths of self-regard that no disci
­plinary formation, no administrative directive, and no social group can be




the department vote: when the third round was counted, two days later,  
the local favorite was defeated, 
11-9.
 One member  continued to abstain. There  
was speculation. 
Few
 really know  why he did. Another member switched his  
or her vote. More speculation. No 
one
 could be absolutely certain who. The  
new member returned her signed contract in time to permit the fact to be





Gerald Graff awards Daniel Coit Gilman, the first president of Johns  
Hopkins University, the honor of having created the modern research universi
­ty on the model of German graduate schools, which included specialized
 departments. “The word ‘department’ had been in use in colleges throughout
 the nineteenth century,” notes Graff, “but only now did it take on connotations
 of disciplinary
 
specialization and administrative autonomy” (Professing 58). For 
the best recent consideration of the costs of the 
specialized
 model, see Sos-  
nosky, Modern Skeletons, although his alternative attempt to redistribute the
 same elements of method and subject matter as those he contests seems to me
 to set aside the important distinction of his earlier study between token and
 elite professionals.
Arguably the most unspoken question in the profession today is what sort
 
of a specialized department is possible anymore for a group consisting largely
 of either “token” professors, unrewarded with research time, or “defielded” or
 “Taylorized” ones, overcome with general education courses and bureaucratized
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timetables. Such departments 
may
 now be better comprehended in terms of  
the larger critique of downsizing practices and corporate values to which the
 entire spectrum of American labor is subject; see Aronowitz and DiFazio.
2.
 
This is an extremely complicated question. James Phelan just deals with  
it by taking the high road; of the members of an ideal department, he writes as
 follows: "They make a commitment to each other, and to their institution
 because they know that without it the ideals won
'
t be realized” (196). Back on  
the low road, can we assume that the commitment of many department mem
­
bers
 to each other is, very much on the contrary, based on the felt fact that the  
institution will never realize their ideals?




s discreet citation from the minutes of a "major midwest ­
ern English department” could not be more in contrast; the whole point of the
 meeting is that the department has suffered a loss of ranking in a national
 report. But what about the majority of departments whose institutions enjoy
 no prestige in national terms? The less claim to larger social or cultural recog
­nition 
an
 institution has, I believe, the more inward — in my  terms, incoherent  





It is, however, the chair 's concern. Coltons interest  in the human linea ­
ments of this figure is in striking contrast to the rest of his exposition. At one
 point, for example, he effuses over the 
"ideal
 chair”: "mediator, negotiator, and  
arbitrator; budget, personnel, and recruiting officer; advisor on community
 housing and schooling, and on career opportunities for spouses; chief justice;
 pastor; parliamentarian; social director; lecture bureau director; team coach;
 Dutch uncle (or aunt); statistician; housekeeper; general office manager; and
 personal counselor and mentor” (274). As is common in many
 
accounts of aca ­
demic departments, the multiplicity and heterogeneity that could be accorded
 the department as a whole, as well as many other members of it, is used up in
 a highly interactive, process-oriented idea of
 
the chair, as if this figure could  
restore in himself or herself the effaced social dimension.
4.
 
And friendship is likely to be more sorely tested when the vote is over  
tenure rather than a new hire. I must trust that it is clear why my account has
 to do with the latter rather than the former: nothing is normally at 
stake
 over  
tenure at an institution such as Clarion. Instead, hiring someone is equivalent
 to giving the person tenure, 
because
 we relate to each other not as scholars but  
as teachers who share common problems and close quarters. Therefore, social
 controls govern the tenure process long before a tenure vote occurs, so anyone
 who 
could
 have been denied tenure simply has not lasted to the point of a  




is also why the one person who for the first time was recently refused by  
the department was nonetheless confirmed by the administration — as a
 department we simply lacked experience in the tenure process as something
 other than a form of ritual acceptance. The recent episode illustrates, I think,
 how tenure decisions, unlike ones involving hiring, are less timeless, even at
 institutions such as Clarion; as Jeffrey Williams puts it (invoking Pierre Bour
­dieu),
 
"the habituating mechanism of tenure ensures the reproduction of extant
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 on place, media, and cultural identity.
Now the environment of
 
America is media.  
Not the land itself, but the image of the land.
 The focus is not the people so much
 
as it is on  
the interplay
 
between people and screens.
—Michael Ventura
The project of this essay is to outline an approach to
 
cultural and media studies responsive to changing
 experiences of 
place
 and identity  in an electronic cul ­
ture. My undertaking of this project, which should be
 understood primarily as the search 
for
 a writing prac ­
tice, was prompted
 
by the tasks facing me as a teacher  
in a multicultural environment
 
and by an experience I  
shared
 
with many of my students of geographical and  
social separation mediated
 
by  electronic technologies.  
I will call this shared cultural condition “post(e) iden
­tity,” intending to evoke both Jurgen Habermas’
 notion of a “postconventional identity” responding to a crisis of national identity, and Gregory Ulmer
'
s 
post(e) (poste: the French word for TV set) pedagogy
 designed to transmit the various posts of modernism,
 structuralism,
 
and colonialism. The other term  I have  
borrowed from Ulmer is "chorography,” which names
 an application of the theories of Jacques Derrida to
 composition in hypermedia. My discussion of
 chorography is situated between a consideration of
 televisions and cinemas role in constructing and
 maintaining a sense of national identity and the pro
­ject of an experimental interface with new communi
­cation technologies in the classroom.
The reflections that
 
I  will offer here on pedagogy  
are the result of several years of teaching undergrad-
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uate courses at the University of Florida to an often intensely multicultural mix
 
of students: southern blacks and whites; exiles from Cuba, Panama, and Nicara
­gua; Jamaicans and Haitians; first-generation Chinese, Indian, Korean, Mexi
­can, and Filipino Americans; and others from 
many
 different countries and  
regions of the US. 
As
 a stranger myself in this environment, my time in Flori ­
da involved a gradual coming-to-consciousness of the dynamics of cultural dif
­ference in the North American context, shaped both by my own experience of
 displacement (I am a New Zealander) and by the emergence of postcolonialist
 and multiculturalist discourses in the academy.
An historical function of cinema, TV, and now video and personal comput
­
ers has been to supply the culturally and geographically displaced urban and
 suburban masses with a simulation of a missing homeland or community. But
 anyone who has experienced the transition from a relatively monocultural soci
­ety into a multicultural or cosmopolitan one will also have noticed the central
 role that the imagery of electronic media plays in providing spaces of escapist
 fantasy that can be shared with others of diverse ethnic backgrounds. These
 fantasies have sometimes to do with a shared emotional experience of bereave
­ment and loss, at other times with a shared hope of
 
self- and social transfor ­
mation. The screen promises both the return home and the escape from the
 limitations and problems of home.
The classroom, as a social space where cultural difference must be negoti
­
ated and a common discourse established, offers opportunities not only to dis
­cuss and critically examine media culture but also to invent new interfaces with
 it
 
and, in an electronic classroom, on it. In the classroom, if only briefly, we can  
attempt to create and define together a public sphere and thereby a different
 mode of social participation than usually presented in mainstream media 
cul­ture.
 In a range of courses based primarily in the study of American literature,
 
film, and popular culture, I attempted to explore with students the question of
 Americas cultural diversity and the increasing embeddedness of its social rela
­tions in electronic media. Some of the standard themes of American literature
 and film — the gothic as a mode of representation, the frontier as a space of
 self-transformation, the emerging mass cultural forms of the twentieth century
 — served as the starting point for class discussions about how difference and
 identity have become such controversial issues on a global level today. 
For instance, in an introductory class on American literature we read Nathaniel
 West’s The Day of the Locust alongside Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s
 essay “The Culture Industry” and compared these early critiques of American
 media culture with two postmodern constructions of history, Spalding Gray’s
 Swimming to Cambodia and Theresa Hak Cha’s Dictée. Moving between these
 journeys in hyperreality (West and Gray) and exilic voices (Adorno and Cha)
 helped to show how electronic media promise an adventure of becoming (as a
 profoundly American mythology) but also
 
pose dilemmas of mourning and dis ­
placement. Hollywood and TV have served as America’s 
means
 of  remaking  
history as spectacle or virtual reality, but the mise-en-scene in which this quest
 takes shape is also inhabited 
by
 other histories (it is a haunted space) and nav ­
igated with an accompanying sense of fragmentation and loss.
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As students face their individual screens in the fully computerized class
­
room, the question of community and difference can
 be
 focused  in a more direct  
way around the social role of technological media. More directly, because now
 the electronic word and image have become the means of reading and writing,
 but also more indirectly, because this interface has for the most part replaced
 oral face-to-face communication. All of the cultural hype and commercial pro
­motion that surround the internet and the ideologies of the “information super
­highway” support a certain excitement and enthusiasm that students generally
 exhibit as users of the 
new
 technologies (along with a certain technophobia  
which in 
my
 experience is fairly easily dispelled). But the promise offered by  
hypermedia needs to be tested, in my view, by posing to the class the problems,
 and indeed often the social catastrophes, that have accompanied the global
 expansion of technological 
modernity.
 This does not amount to posing a  “pes ­
simistic” against an “optimistic” account of the new technologies, as both
 dystopian and utopian visions become part of a negotiated and experimental
 engagement that leaves the business of critical evaluation until the closing dis
­cussions of the course. The central pedagogical strategy
 
is that ethnic diversity  
in the classroom be called forth as a kind of collective testimony to the unre
­solved tensions between technological dream and lived history.
Chorography
Chorography names a process of
 
mapping post(e) identity as it takes shape in  
the non-sites of electronic spatiality, the mediascapes in which our experience
 of communitas is simulated. The Greek word chora means land or place. In
 Heuretics: The Logic of
 
Invention, Ulmer associates the word at various moments  
with the concepts of nation, motherland, and America (74), proposing that
 those concepts might be reformulated in the terms in which chora is described
 by Derrida: as pure surface without depth, infinitely containing without
 imposing limits, open and 
foreign
 to itself at the same time (Heuretics 65).  
Unlike our conventional idea of the nation as a territory bestowing or denying
 the rights of citizenship, chora is a transitional space that does not impose bor
­ders or demand proof of identity
 
but provides a passage through which identi ­
ty can be renegotiated. Because of this, chora offers a means by which we might
 rethink our relation to 
foreignness
 in an historical situation in which earlier  
forms of community have been displaced and in which a common language
 (and market) of electronic images is proliferating on the global scene. Chorog
­raphy offers a rhetorical mode 
for
 a postconventional identity in a televisual  
culture.
Ulmer has suggested elsewhere that he is inventing a peculiarly American
 
application of deconstruction (Teletheory 202-3). Loosely adapting Ulmer
'
s 
theory of the “mystory” (a collage/montage essay in which the
 
writer juxtapos ­
es different fragments of individual, community, and national histories), I have
 asked students to construct travelogues and, in hypermedia, homepages that
 assemble these fragments in ways that emphasize the transitory and nomadic as
 well as the regional and multicultural dimensions of life 
in
 North America. (I  
will discuss 
some
 examples of students’ work in later sections.)
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Chora closely resembles choros, the Greek word 
for
 a band of  dancers and  
singers. The emphasis chorography places on the collective determinants of our
 identities locality, community, nation — unsettles the priority accorded to
 the individual consciousness by the European Enlightenment and takes as its
 point of departure the Freudian, Marxian, and structuralist subversions of the
 subject as well as the postcolonial critique of Western ethnocentrism and impe
­rialism. The political and historical contexts in which chorography poses a new
 conceptualization of
 
a self-in-process can be better understood by comparing  
some of the different forms of social identity presented by contemporary cine
­ma and TV. With reference to 
my
 experiences in the classroom, I will discuss  
some examples of ambitious attempts by German filmmakers to confront the
 disturbing legacies of their national past, as well as the invention and mainte
­nance through TV of a community of exiled Iranians in California. Finally, I
 will offer an example of an experimental text, Theresa Hak Cha
'
s Dictée, that  
can serve as a model for doing chorography in the classroom.
Electronic Mourning
The politics of ethnic nationalism confront us with the catastrophic threat that
 
can accompany nostalgia for a native land and people. At the same time that
 we 
may
 choose  to engage  in or support localized struggles against  cultural dom ­
ination in all of its forms, we must also face the problem that local and ethnic
 identities increasingly find themselves displaced or fractured not only geo
­graphically but in ways mediated by new information technologies and markets.
 Such a situation invites the production of new cultural forms: hybrid texts that
 
can
 incorporate and remix ethnic and community traditions with mass cultural  
styles and images. The politics of the future
 will
 have much to do with how we  
negotiate what Dean MacCannell has called these
 
“empty meeting  grounds,” or  
“the 
realm
 of possibility for the future of human relationships emerging in and  
between the diasporas” (7).




 Studying a series of encounters between American and European  
star actors, directors, and cinematic styles, we inquired into the role of 
film
 in  
defining national identity and collective memory. From Casablanca to Blue Vel
­vet, Hollywood has incorporated and reconstructed European history and style
 in terms of American mythologies while, conversely, European 
directors
 such as  
Roberto Rossellini, Jean-Luc Godard, and Wim Wenders have staged their
 own ambivalent attraction to Hollywood. One of
 
the texts we read for that  
course, Eric Santner
'
s Stranded Objects, examines how cinema and TV have  
been used to explore the problematic of national identity in postwar Germany.
 Although the guilt experienced by the different generations of Germans alive
 during and born after the Third Reich presents an extreme case, it in some
 respects offers a model for how national identity in general needs to be rein
­vented. Such a reinvention, Santner argues, would “work through” (in a psy
­choanalytic sense) rather than repress collective feelings of guilt and 
shame about the past. In response to the problem that “coming to terms with the
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past,” as Adorno perceived, often 
means
 refusing to confront the mistakes and  
catastrophes for which one is ethically responsible, Habermas has noted the
 emergence of a “postconventional identity” (Santner 50) 
in
 which a sense of  
national coherence or historical continuity has become increasingly fragment
­ed. This recent cultural condition includes the decentering of the nation as an
 economic and political 
entity,
 new patterns of migration and structures of eth ­
nicity, and the development of global information networks and electronic
 media that locate us in simulated communities and spaces. All of these deter
­minants of cultural identity demand that we learn to mediate foreignness in
 new ways.
Postwar Germany confronts on one side the legacy of Nazism and the
 
Holocaust and on the other the impact of American “mass culture.” As a con
­sequence of this situation, Santner argues, when German artists attempt to
 stage their national identity in order to perform a kind of healing of the disas
­ters in their collective past — his examples are Edgar Reitz’s TV epic, Helmut
 (Homeland), and Hans Jurgen Syberberg’s monumental film, Hitler, a Film
 from Germany — they reveal strong tendencies toward reinscribing the insular,
 xenophobic, and racist world views that supported fascism. In Helmut, which
 nostalgically recreates a small rural community of the war years, Santner per
­ceives the figure of the migrant or foreigner (associated
 
with both the Jews and  
America) presented as scapegoat for the unresolved ambivalence within the
 ethnic group. Much of Santner’s 
discussion
 of Heimat (which is now available  
on video with English subtitles) transfers usefully onto a reading of Wenders’
 American Friend, featuring antihero Dennis Hopper as a “Cowboy
 in Ham ­
burg.” The displacement of German guilt (the main character is a Swiss who
 murders a French 
Jew)
 onto the American presence in postwar Germany  
becomes 
readable
 as a collective repetition compulsion. Drawing on D. W.  
Winnicott’s theory of transitional objects, Santner argues that mourning
 requires social empathy, allowing a self to develop the capability of identifying
 not only with his or her immediate group but also with the figure of the
 
victim  
or outsider — rather than reconstituting, as American Friend does, the national
 self as the real victim.
While making his diagnosis, Santner does not himself
 
propose what the  
role of televisual media might become in this process. He does, however, pro
­
vide
 a prehistory of the place electronic media hold with regard to the notion  
of chorux
The exotic landscapes of the East and the American West (whether colo
­
nized in fact or merely visited in the imagination), the psychic terrain as
 explored and mythologized by Freud, the flickering projections of light 
on white screens, and the fictions and myths that one creates out of the frag
­mented materials of one’s own life, all become 
ciphers
 for a singular, primal  
yearning. (120-1)
A sense that communal wholeness has been shattered in the age of technolog
­
ical
 modernity gives rise to a general homesickness that looks for narcissistic  
satisfaction in the substitute aura of celebrities and charismatic leaders. In my
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History of Film class, the figure of Marilyn Monroe served as a counterexam
­
ple to Germany, suggesting how electronic mourning operates in an American
 context. Just as Julia 
Kristeva
 has explained the chora in terms of pre-Oedipal,  
preverbal semiotic functions (Revolution 25-30), S. Paige Baty understands
 Monroe as an icon who has emerged out of a mass-mediated matrix — a kind
 of collective, archetypal womb (59). Like the presymbolic world of the infant
 not yet individuated and separated from
 
the mother’s  body, the electronic screen  
serves as a chora where semiotic fragments of media culture take on a virtual
 unity or flow. The example of Marilyn reminds us of the primary ideological
 function of this space, as the image of the celebrity condenses various histori
­cal narratives. The iconography of media culture serves as a simulation of a lost
 wholeness postulated, retroactively, as prior to the narcissistic wounds by which
 cultural identity is formed. According to such an account of popular culture,
 Marilyn functions as an all-American girl of the 1950s who through her asso
­ciation with the Kennedys somehow carries the blame for their assassinations
 and all of the wounds that would subsequently scar America’s self-image in the
 1960s and 1970s. This scapegoating of the
 
woman as femme  fatale supports the  
conservative reactions of the 1980s against the liberal 
"
excesses” of the previous  
two decades, reactions that 
led
 to the reassertion of “family values.” In a soci ­
ety such as the United States, global in its ethnic diversity and
 
yet mediated by  
an (often numbingly) homogeneous media culture, a figure like Marilyn — or  
for that matter, Madonna — can serve as a guide to collective memory and
 thereby also to its repressed histories.
What must be given up, or mourned, writes Santner, is “the notion that
 
alterity is something that requires a solution” (151). In place of the paranoid
 narcissism of regressive nationalism, a post(e) identity would learn to discover
 the repressed past in reaction to which media cultures have established their
 symbolic currency
 
and thereby to excavate alternative identifications. What we  
need are practices of writing and
 
research that can  interface with the new media  
and 
help
 us to remake our identities in  ways that more adequately acknowledge  
cultural difference. So one way to understand the chora is in its relation to the
 voices of foreigners, or as Kristeva has put it, to the stranger “who lives within
 us” (Strangers 1). The chora
 
is a model for an intersubjective space in  which the  
primary alterity of the self-image is re-encountered. In the classroom such a
 re-encounter means learning to acknowledge the exclusionary mythologies of
 national
 
identity. Chorography can thereby be a means by which we can recov ­
er a solidarity with the 
foreigners
 who reside within us.
Exile on Television
Alongside examples from media culture that reveal the construction of nation
­
al identity, I believe the teacher has 
an
 ethical responsibility to present students  
with alternative narratives and modes of representation. A case 
study 
that pro ­
vides another counterpoint to the German example is Hamid Naficy’s analysis
 of TV produced by Iranian exiles in Los Angeles. In contrast to the way 
in which a nation such as Germany seeks to rediscover a lost sense of unity, Iran
­
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ian collective identity is reasserted through a common experience of political
 
exile and reassembled using the imagery of contemporary popular media. As
 Naficy explains, exile cultures are always a hybrid of influences from the home
 and host societies:
On the one hand, Iranian exiles have created via their media and culture a
 
symbolic and fetishized private hermetically sealed electronic communitas
 infused with home, past, memory, loss, nostalgia, longing for return, and
 the communal self; on the other hand, they have tried to get on with the
 process of living by incorporating themselves into the dominant culture of
 consumer capitalism by means of
 
developing a new sense of the self  and  
what can be called an “exilic economy.” This economy is fueled principally
 by various advertising driven media, which cross fertilize each other and
 hegemonize the consumer
 
lifestyle as ideal. (xvi)
While New German filmmakers like Reitz and Wenders carry the legacy of
 
Adorno’s critique of the American culture industry and use it to
 
justify a cer ­
tain cultural insularity, the adaptation on the part
 
of Iranians to American-style  
capitalism and electronic media acts out a different set
 
of possibilities emerging  
in the spaces between commercial imagery and historical experience. Naficy
 gives the example of two children of Iranian exiles, displaced in different
 nations and speaking different languages, communicating through a shared
 familiarity
 
with a Disney film (1-2). The point of this anecdote for Naficy is  
that rather than offering another instance of global domination by American
 media, it dramatizes the emergence of
 
a new kind of transnational encounter  
mediated by screen language rather than completely determined by it. With
­out taking this example as another confirmation of the triumph of Western
 democracy or a realization of McLuhans “global village,” we are nevertheless
 compelled to explore what possibilities such a mode of communication might
 make available.
Iranian exile culture is produced in the liminal space that arises only
 
through separation from the original location of one
'
s culture. Exile cultures  
participate in the deconstruction of ethnic
 
identity, insofar as they become self-  
conscious about the ways in which culture is “always already” on its way from
 one elsewhere to another. TV
 
produces this liminal state through its electronic  
simulation of community. The difference between the German and Iranian
 examples lies in the perception of place: both media cultures idealize and
 fetishize the homeland, but the narcissistic attachment to locality becomes in
 the liminal space of exile a more palpably fragmented, partial, improvised, and
 intertextual construction. Both kinds of
 
post(e) identity are operative in the  
North American context.
Certainly the children of immigrants, exiles, refugees, and minorities often
 
engage — once they 
are
 invited to — quite openly  with the kind of split sub ­
jectivity that Naficy theorizes
 
with  reference  to  the  Iranian example. Moreover,  
once one introduces the question of ethnicity
 in
 the classroom it  becomes clear  
very quickly that many
 
of the students’ cultural identities are composed of a mix  
of diverse backgrounds and experiences that defy the classification system
40





by  state institutions. The university is, after all, itself a non ­
place (and thereby might be 
associated
 with the notion of chord) that forcibly  
unifies through disciplinary and discursive formations a heterogeneous social
 body, and it is for many the space of their first encounters with cultural differ
­ence. Because of this, Ulmer argues 
in
 Teletheory, scholars and students alike  
need to mourn the losses undergone in the passage into the symbolic orders of
 schooling and print literacy. What electronic media introduce into this devel
­opmental process is a virtual chora by which identity can be renegotiated,





 As in the case of exilic TV, it is between the homogenizing drive  
of global media culture and the differential 
economy
 of localized communities  
that ch rography might be situated.
National Identity
How then can post(e) identity be explored drawing from the global language
 
of televisual imagery and allowing for transcultural exchanges but without
 denying the strength of residual attachments to national identity? A new kind
 of polis, no longer located in a unified spatio-temporal zone but rather self
­consciously in the liminal spaces made available by electronic media, would
 have something to learn from the cultural traditions that have developed in
 exile.
In the context of the 500th anniversary
 
of the discovery  of the New World,  
Ulmer takes up the problematic of national identity and electronic media with
 
referenc
e to the voyage of Columbus, which he sees as providing “the chief  
metaphor of research in Western civilization” (Heuretics 24). Comparing the
 dilemma posed by this Columbian metaphor for research to the blocked
 mourning experienced by Germans, Ulmer finds American identity bound to
 the image of Columbus and thereby to the extermination of Americas indige
­nous peoples (94-5). Like 
Syberberg
 in Hitler, Ulmer proposes a therapeutic  
staging of libidinal attachments to mythic 
stereotypes
 that allows a working  




s project in Heuretics implies that compulsive repetition and denial  
remain in some respects inevitable aspects of national
 
identity without  an active  
staging of those mythic identifications that supersede rational argument or
 analysis. The experience of self- or subjecthood amongst the contemporary
 proliferation of information networks 
will
 mediate the question of foreignness  
in 
new
 and not so new ways. How can the repetition of racist stereotypes, so  
visible in mainstream media,
 
be effectively  displaced in the classroom? Critical  
analysis may not 
be
 sufficient. It is this question about which Ulmer's post(e)  
pedagogy compels us to think.
Like the liminal zones of exilic cultures, the chora names an intertextual
 
space in which hybrids form and a
 
certain undecidability  suspends ethical judg ­
ment and allows libidinal energies to be both called forth and disinvested
 through a playful
 
engagement (like the process Freud observed in his grandsons  
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game of fort/dd). The solidarity with the victim that Santner emphasizes is
 
evoked in Ulmers account of Columbus by the “other scene” of the European
 arrival as witnessed by Native Americans. It is by
 
opening the ideological iden ­
tification with Columbus to a restaging that empathy with the victims of that
 historic encounter 
becomes
 possible.
I will mention two examples of student assignments that negotiate this
 question in different
 
ways. In one a student juxtaposes the story of his family’s  
arrival in the United States as Irish immigrants with his experience as a 
child on an American military base in Japan. The media 
icon
 around which these  
memories circulate is John Wayne, a culture hero whose status is traumatically
 subverted when the student encounters a mass ceremony commemorating the
 victims of Hiroshima. Around these narratives of heroism, displacement, cat
­astrophe, and mourning the student stages a developing empathy with the for
­eigner, enemy, and
 
victim. Another student, after a series of what she rejects as  
misrecognitions of her as "colored,” discovers the lost history of her Native-
 American grandmother who has “assimilated” into European culture and sur
­rendered her indigenous identity. In these two examples, the Hollywood
 imagery of the frontier takes on different inflections.




 individual screens. In this reconfiguration of private and public  
selves, foreigner and native, insider and outsider, encounter each other in an
 electronic space collectively
 
defined by the particular  group. While there is not  
space in this essay to discuss in more detail the many
 
ways in which the intro ­
duction of computers transforms the intersubjective experience of the class
­room, let me offer at least the following comments: the immediacy of oral
 group discussion is lost, but it has often been noted that voices more likely to
 be silenced in mainstream life — especially those of minorities — can emerge
 strongly when mediated by the 
new
 technologies. In fact, the power dynamic  
of majority and minority can be substantially challenged within the limits of
 the classroom situation. Such a change, however, does not come without the
 ever-present threat of a wholesale backlash against “political correctness” by
 those who see themselves as the victims of the change in climate.
Foreigners in the Classroom
“Which parts of 'Columbus’ are relevant to America after 1992?” asks Ulmer
 
(Heuretics 162), for Columbus has become an American emblem of invention
 (158) and of scientific discovery in general, at least since Francis Bacon’s Great
 Installation. Columbus survives today as a hero of an ideology of 
adventure that celebrates risk, exploration, and change (166) and serves as a central
 mythology of colonization and market capitalism. This invader’s ideology
 affords 
an
 interesting comparison with the psychology of the foreigner, of  
whom Kristeva writes:
Riveted to an elsewhere as certain as it is inaccessible, the foreigner
 
is ready  
to flee. No obstacle stops him, and all
 
suffering, all insults, all rejections are  
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indifferent to him as he seeks that invisible and promised territory, that
 
country that does not exist but that he bears in his dreams, 
and
 that must  
indeed be called a beyond. (Strangers 5)
At a moment when demographic changes and global influences are once again
 
recasting the ethnic identity of America (and many other nations), 
one
 might  
ask whether Columbus should be reimagined 
in
 the terms posed by Kristeva  
rather than those suggested by Bacon. Maria Rosa Menocal has recently
 emphasized that 1492 was also the 
year
 in which the Jews were expelled from  
Spain. For Menocal the tableau of Columbus departing from Palos in 1492
 cannot 
be
 recalled apart from the “other scene” in the larger port of Cadiz  
thronged with Jews facing the final deadline of their expulsion (Shards 4).
 Indeed, 1492 can 
in
 hindsight be seen as a primal scene of European identity  
formation 
in
 which both the Jews of Europe and the indigenous people of the  
Americas are constructed as Other. So Ulmer’s notion of chorography can be
 related to Menocal’s evocation of those voices of diaspora, dispersing the
 Enlightenment master narrative of research and development (or genocide and
 imperialism) with hybrid cultures and lyric traditions in which the homeland is
 evoked always in the terms of a lost beloved. It is a legacy of
 
the European  
Enlightenment that in technologically 
advanced
 Western societies today televi ­
sion and cinema screens both call forth and banish the Other as image. (The
 Gulf War was perhaps the most catastrophic example yet of that representa
­tional economy.)
In response to the cultural hegemony of mainstream media, the classroom
 
needs to be reimagined as a space of foreignness. In the multicultural class
­room both teacher and student can learn to renegotiate difference. The most
 common way to respond to diversity is usually by passing
 
over it in silence: for ­
eigners are thus effectively expelled. How can we effectively call forth the mul
­titude of tongues (Naficy
 
cites the figure of 96 languages spoken by students in  
Los Angeles [5]) inhabiting this common space? My proposition in this essay
 
has
 been that understanding the classroom as an intersubjective space mediat ­
ed by the electronic screen (whether it is the available medium of writing or
 not, whether the class is online or not) can direct
 
us toward a pedagogical prac ­
tice supporting a multicultural public sphere.
As new foreign cultures establish themselves in America or remake their
 
traditions in hybrids with the images of electronic pop 
culture,
 the various tra ­
ditions and discourses, the interfaces of global and local cultures, out of which
 our subjecthood emerges can be better understood and critically evaluated
 through an imaginative staging analogous to a psychoanalytic working through
 and to a Hollywood remake. Ulmer’s term “chorography” names such a prac
­tice. Now I want to close my 
discussion
 by considering an example of  a text  
that I have used as a model for chorography in the classroom: Theresa Hak
 Cha’s Dictée.
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that presents the formation of your cultural identity in relation  
to its different languages, institutions, communities, and their ghosts.
Cha’s Dictée is a collage text that assembles disparate fragments of personal
 
memories, family stories, and the history of her nation, Korea. The categories
 into which these fragments are collected — History, Epic Poetry, Astronomy,
 Tragedy, Love Poetry, Lyric Poetry, Comedy, Choral Dance, Sacred Poetry —
 combine traditional mythopoeic modes with a poststructuralist understanding
 of the subject as an assemblage of images and discourses. The lyric and choral
 modes of Cha’s text recall what Santner
 
refers to as the “elegiac  labor of mourn ­
ing” (151). Like Syberberg’s Hitler,
 
Dictée stages the myths of the national self.  
But
 
Dictée is also a text of exile.
Dictée begins with a presentation of a classroom dictation exercise, the
 Korean student’s first 
lesson
 in the language of the colonizer’s culture, French.  
Dictée attempts to render the materiality of language as 
experienced
 by the body  
that by learning it must attem t to introject it. The first day at school is the
 first experience of becoming a foreigner. Just as the entry into language brings
 about the entry into society’s symbolic relations and thereby the separation
 from the primal relation to the mother, to learn a new language is always also
 to mourn the mother
 
tongue. At the same time, the urge to speak the unspeak ­
able is figured as a drive to give birth:
It murmurs inside. It murmurs. Inside is the pain of speech the pain to say.
 
Larger still. Greater then is the pain not to say. To not say. Says nothing
 against the pain to speak. It
 
festers  inside. The wound, liquid, dust. Must break.  
Must void. (3)
The experience of enculturation is traumatic. The pain of first learning to
 
speak and to write becomes a repressed memory that is reawakened by new
 experiences of separation and exile. In Cha’s experience, with French came
 Christianity and an entire colonial ideology, against or next to which she
 invokes a national martyr, Yu Guan Soon, who led the Korean resistance
 against the Japanese. And after Yu, Cha presents another role model and pre
­cursor, her mother (a schoolteacher), who suffered exile in China. Catholicism
 and motherhood can be understood as forces of both repression and resistance.
 So the
 
problematic of mourning in any postcolonial situation involves acknowl ­
edging our sometimes conflicting
 
investments in different discourses and iden ­
tifications.
I have taught Dictée in conjunction with Swimming to Cambodia, a
 
text that  
also mixes personal and collective histories in the context of America’s military
 interventions in Indochina. Gray’s monologue dramatizes the
 
rejection but  also  
the repetition of conventional 
gestures
 of American heroism. Swimming to  
Cambodia is Gray’s “remake” of
 
The Killing Fields (a Hollywood film about the  
Khmer 
Rouge
 in which Gray played the American ambassador’s aide) and is
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in the pattern of exploitation and racist  representations ana ­
lyzed in other classroom discussions.
The problem for America, Ulmer
 
argues in Heuretics, is essentially the same  
as for Germany (the most problematic legacy
 
in recent  American history being  
the intervention in Vietnam). In Santner’s analysis the nation must seek “to
 avoid the two extremes: global disavowal of identification with ancestors on
 the one hand, revision of the past into a less abhorrent version, on the other”
 (151). Without simply co-opting the place of the victim one must neverthe
­less attempt to learn the difficult lessons of “solidarity with the oppressed of
 history” (162).
Rather than simply asking my students to accept Dictée as a “correct” his
­
toriographical model and to reject the Hollywood 
one,
 I ask them to use Dictée  
as a model by which to set forth the different identifications, discourses, and
 histories that they perceive as having shaped them. For some of them this will
 involve histories of oppression and
 
exile;  for others it will involve identifications  
with heroes whom we have identified in class as participating in imperialist or
 exploitive behavior. From the more controversial space of class discussion and
 argument, the student is asked to move toward constructing a personal mythol
­ogy in which s/he may come to recognize those foreigners who reside within.
Cha edited an important anthology of film theory, Apparatus, and Dictée
 
also includes a meditation on the screen. An image from Carl Dreyer's Passion
 of
 
Joan of  Arc brings together the image of Yu Guan Soon with the legacy of  
Chas French Catholic education but also invokes the famous sequence from
 Godards Vivre Sa Vie in which Anna Karina contemplates Dreyer
'
s cinematic  
image of the 
medieval
 martyr. Through this series of images, superimposed to  
produce a mise en abyme, Dictée constructs an intertext of cinema, passion play,
 and martyr drama and pursues a deconstruction of archetypal identifications.
 So Cha mourns the fragments of her self and constructs a post(e) identity in the
 hybrid spaces of community traditions and media 
culture.
 Yun Ah Hong has  
made a 
video
 based on Dictée called Memory/All Echo that makes some of the  
books connections to electronic media more explicit, as it includes archival
 materials such as historical footage of the Korean War and filmic representa
­tions of Korean domestic life.
While texts such as Dictée, which incorporates representational devices
 
from the avant-garde and explores non-European histories, are not enjoyed by
 most undergraduates in the same way. in which Swimming to Cambodia or The
 Killing Fields may be, they can be made more accessible through explanation
 and discussion. However, it may be that their very strangeness can 
help
 to  
open up an unfamiliar but potentially rewarding mode of writing for students
 to experiment with. 
Some
 students will be more sensitive than others to the  
poetics of
 
Cha 's text or will identify more easily with her exilic sensibility. (I  
was fortunate enough to have in 
one
 of  my classes two students with Korean  
mothers who helped make the text more understandable to the other students.)
The complexities of multiculturalism can 
never
 be completely resolved.  
The dynamics of the classroom and
 
writing experiences for  African Americans  
are different than for those with Korean or Cuban backgrounds. The daughter
 of Cuban exiles attempts to mediate images of the lost homeland with those of
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the American frontier; a southern black student explores the place of print lit
­
eracy in her community around the figure of her culture hero, Zora Neale
 Hurston. As Santner comments with reference to the German example, the
 inability to connect with and “work through”
 
our collective pasts leads to a gen ­
eralized melancholy. Often students find such issues and assignments too
 threatening to respond to without a sense of victimization: “I blame my loss of
 cultural identity on the way my parents chose to bring 
me
 up”; “I envy those  
people with strong 
ties
 to their cultures.” As a teacher one hopes that chorog ­
raphy might offer a sense of renewal to those who are able to engage with the
 fragments of identity and memory that it puts into circulation. One of the
 most challenging tasks of a post(e) pedagogy is to create an environment where
 this process can be made accessible to all. As an example of chorography, Dic
­tée constructs interzones, liminal spaces where identifications can be mourned
 and reinvested in the form of documents: maps to chart a postconventional
 identity.
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book is entitled Yeats's
 
Nations
: Gender,  
Class, and 
Irishness (Cambridge UP,
 1996). She is a con
­tributing editor to The
 Field Day Anthology
 of Irish Writing, Vol
­ume 4.
The mid-nineteenth-century movement known as
 
Young Ireland marked the emergence of an Irish
 nationalism that was more ethnic and cultural than
 civic and constitutional. Although the movement
 fizzled in the abortive rising of 1848, its cultural and
 political legacies were extensive. The poetry of
 Young Ireland was arguably the most popular body of
 literature in Ireland for the rest of the century
 (Morash, ed. 
30),
 and Young Irelands nationalism  
played a key role in structuring later movements.
 Critics such as David Lloyd and Sean Ryder have
 sketched out its major related features: Young Ire
­land was overwhelmingly bourgeois, organized
 around the production of
 
identity, and heavily gen ­
dered, equating true nationalist subjectivity with
 masculinity.1 These general features, far from ren
­dering Young Ireland ideologically simple or mono
­logic, determined the shape of its complexities and
 contradictions. The purpose of this essay is to exam
­ine
 
one particular writer’s engagement with  them and  
in so doing to illuminate some aspects of Young Ire
­land’s cultural nationalism that have been previously
 neglected by critics.
Young Ireland was associated with a group of fig
­
ures that included Thomas Davis, Thomas Dillon,
 Charles Gavan Duffy, William Smith O’Brien,
 James Clarence Mangan, Lady Wilde and several
 other women
 
poets. It originated in and  emerged  out
of Daniel O’Connell’s Repeal Association. Deliverer
 of Catholic Emancipation and campaigner for repeal
 of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland,
 O’Connell dominated, and indeed could be said to
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have invented, popular nationalist politics during the 1820s, 30s and early 40s
 
in
 Ireland. His primary method was a peaceful, pragmatic constitutionalism.  
When The Nation began publication in 1842, its leading minds were part of
 O’Connell
'
s movement. Various disagreements developed, mainly over the  
question of violence and the issue of the nondenominational colleges the British
 government proposed to set up in Ireland. Young Ireland was more idealistic,
 more influenced by German romanticism, less shaped by Irish Catholicism, and
 tended to conceptualize the Irish nation in cultural rather than constitutional
 terms. Its members 
were
 more willing to advocate physical force openly and  
more hospitable to the “godless colleges” than O’Connell. In 1846 these ten
­sions led to a split between Old and Young Ireland.2
Wilde was born Jane Elgee in 1821, to a conservative, middle-class, Protes
­
tant family in Wexford. She married William Wilde 
in
 1851 and became Lady  
Wilde when 
he
 was knighted in 1864. As a  young woman, she was part of the  
second generation of nationalist poets that rose to prominence in the late
 1840s, after Thomas Davis’s death in 1845. 
She
 published poetry and prose in 
The Nation under the pen name Speranza and was noted among her contem
­poraries as one of Young Ireland’s most violent, emotional and inflammatory
 writers.3 She published
 
Poems by  Speranza in 1864 and wrote a  number of other  





became disillusioned with Irish nationalism; later she concen ­
trated increasingly on other literary projects and 
on
 her aspirations to run a lit ­
erary salon. In the late nineteenth century, she was 
generally
 acknowledged as  
an important, if eccentric, figure in the Dublin literary
 
and social scene. When  
her son, Oscar Wilde, toured the United States in 1882, headlines in New
 York’s Irish Nation lamented, “Speranza’s Son .. . Phrasing about Beauty while
 a Hideous
 
Tyranny Overshadows His Native Land” (Ellmann 195). Ten years  
later, when W. B. Yeats wanted to praise the fiery eloquence of Maud Gonne’s
 political speeches, he dubbed her “the new Speranza” (61).




was considerably more visible to her contemporaries than she  
was to later cultural critics. Although her contributions to The Nation were
 nearly as popular as those of Davis, its most charismatic writer (Davis 85), she
 has been largely neglected by studies of Irish cultural nationalism as well. To
 the extent that she has entered literary history, Wilde has done so primarily as
 a figure defined by her gendered “excesses” — emotional, political, and stylis
­tic.5 These excesses are usually characterized as a surfeit of sentimentalizing
 emotion and an extravagant interest in violence, bloodshed and death: a con
­stant sense that the history of Ireland was, as she wrote in a pamphlet on “The
 American Irish,” “an endless martyrology written in tears and blood” (1). This
 essay will argue that Wilde’s preoccupation with the dramatic shedding of these
 fluids reveals her particular engagements with the major structures and contra
­dictions that distinguished Young Ireland from Old. In a letter to his con
­stituents, O’Connell wrote: “My plan is peaceable, legal, constitutional; it is
 part of that general scheme by which I incessantly contemplate the regenera
­tion of Ireland, and her restoration to national dignity from her present
 
provin ­
cial degradation, without a crime, without an offense, without
 
a tear, and, above  
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all, without the possibility of
 
shedding one drop of human blood” (Cusack 2:  
414-5). In Wilde
'
s works, Young Irelands tenuous relation to the Irish masses,  
whom the movement
 
both idealized and distrusted, its interest in and anxieties  
about subject constitution, and the masculinity of
 
its ostensibly transcendent  
nationalist subject, are negotiated and structured through representations of
 tears and blood.
Tears
Wilde’s nationalist poems are awash with tears — the tears of men, women and
 
children; the tears of poets, patriots and peasants; the tears of sufferers, specta
­tors and gods. These tears structure an important aspect of Young Irelands
 construction of its project as subject constitution. David Lloyd’s Nationalism
 and Minor Literature offers the most ground-breaking and insightful examina
­tion
 
of this project. While Lloyd’s work focuses mainly on issues of identity and  
unity 
in
 the  work of James Clarence Mangan  — unity as homogeneity between  
the individual and the nation, identity as the consistency of the subject over
 time —
 
another way to think about subject constitution is as the production and  
organization of affect. Of course, most nationalisms are primarily 
"
about” feel ­
ing; the question for the critic is how particular nationalisms conceptualize and
 organize “feeling.” In most 
accounts
 of  nationalism, its engagement with the  
question of feeling 
takes
 the form of an erotics.6 This assumption tends to pro ­
duce two related narratives of the relationship between gender and nationalism,
 both focusing on the nationalist practice of representing
 
the nation as a woman.  
In the first, the nation-as-woman is an eroticized lover, and her patriots wor
­
ship
 her with an ecstatic heterosexual devotion. In the second, the nation is fig ­
ured as an idealized mother whose purity secures her sons’ faithfulness and
 mediates their potentially dangerous homosocial attachments to each other
 (Innes; Cullingford; Valente; Ryder). The distinction between these narratives
 is 
one
 of degree and emphasis rather than kind; both involve suppressing  homo ­
sexual desire between men and presenting heterosexual love as the appropriate
 model of national affect. Such narratives do form an important part of Young
 Ireland’s cultural production,
 
but  they do  not exhaust the functions of gender in  
nationalist writing, nor do they encompass all the ways in which cultural
 nationalism engaged
 
with the question of national feeling. In addition, women  
writers often have an especially problematic relationship to such iconography.7
 While these representational
 
patterns are not wholly absent from Wilde’s work,  
they do not structure it
 
in a significant way. Young Ireland also employed a dif ­
ferent set
 
of tropes for conceptualizing  and organizing  national feeling, one that  
was arguably more congenial to women writers. Through representations of
 tears, her poetry illustrates this alternative conception of cultural nationalism as
 
subjec
t constitution and that project’s relation to gender and class boundaries.
While O’Connell wanted to achieve 
his
 political goals without shedding  
blood or tears, he was no less sentimental than Young Ireland; his nationalism
 simply imagined a different relation between nationality and feeling. O’Con
­nell’s movement relied upon a combination of feeling and reason.8 His nation-
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alism was largely a modernizing, Enlightenment project, and several critics have
 
argued that disciplined, mass, constitutional politics in the British isles origi
­nated with his movement (Davis 2; Eagleton, Heathcliff
 
274). He emphasized  
the calm rationality of his own political arguments
 
— “I am cool, and quiet, and  
deliberate; no bursts of passion sway my soul” (Cusack
 
2: 373) — and exhorted  
his followers to legal, orderly agitation. On the other hand, O’Connell also
 employed, and was shaped by, the nineteenth-century discourses of sentimen
­talism and melodrama. His speeches, especially at the “monster meetings” of
 the 1840s, 
were
 often calculated to arouse the passions of his audiences, and did  
so quite effectively. Even his written effusions, in a letter to his followers, on
 the death of Thomas Davis aspired to the status of a spontaneous, unmediated
 outpouring of feeling: “I can write 
no
 more — my  tears blind me.”9 The main  
difference between O’Connell and Young Ireland, then, was that 
for
 O’Connell,  
although nationalism involved feeling, feeling was not the quintessential mark
 of national subjectivity. This was 
because
 O’Connell had little investment in  
Irish culture or identity as bases for political action or arrangements; his Irish
 nationalism was not primarily a project of subject constitution. He viewed the
 decline of the Irish language with equanimity, and, as Oliver MacDonagh
 observes, he would have found such concepts as “anglicization” or “mental colo
­nialism” incomprehensible (Emancipist 137). For O’Connell, nationality was a
 matter of location rather than feeling. “The Irish people” simply meant all the
 inhabitants of Ireland, and the power and legitimacy of his movement
 
rested on  
its mass 
character,
 rather than on its “Irish” character. He liked to intone, “I  
speak the voice of seven millions” (Cusack 1: 517).
For Young Ireland, speaking the voice of the Irish was more complicated.
 
Many critics have remarked on the doubleness that characterizes discourses of
 the nation; these discourses assert that
 
the nation already exists, and at the same  
time they seek to create it.10 This doubleness assumed a particularly virulent
 form for Young Ireland. On one hand, an anticolonial nationalism has to
 
work  
harder to illustrate the preexistence of the nation than a statist nationalism, and
 in the case of Ireland, sectarian division provided glaring evidence that a uni
­fied nation did not already exist. On the other
 
hand, Young Ireland arose under  
circumstances that made the task of a didactic, transformative nationalist pro
­ject particularly difficult, so the possibilities for creating the nation appeared
 slim as well.11 For Young Ireland, “the Irish people” was a problematic, para
­doxical 
entity,
 made  up of subjects who were already, ineradicably constituted as  
national
 
yet who, at the same time, stood in dire need of such constitution.
Wilde’s representations of tears encapsulate this ambiguity. In some
 instances, tears are the mark of a suffering and passive populace that lacks
 national consciousness or feeling (these two being virtually equivalent for
 romantic nationalism). Such tears indicate the masses’ inadequate response to
 their own conditions of oppression, conditions that cry out for political action.
 One poem asks, “But can we only weep, when above us lour / The death
­bearing wings of the angels of power” (Poems 18). Another
 
criticizes the “abject  
tears, and prayers submissive” (34) of the people who refuse to rise. In “Who
 Will Show Us Any Good?” tears literally blind the masses to their true identi
­ty and interests: “Suffering Ireland! Martyr-Nation! / Blind
 
with tears thick as  
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mountain mist; / Can none amidst all the new generation / Change them to
 
glory [?]” (59). Tears as the sign of colonial abjection are often gendered femi
­nine; the same poem describes a passive Ireland as the “Saddest of mothers”
 (60). 
Such
 representations fit smoothly  into the main stream of literature pro ­
duced by other Young Irelanders such as Davis or Mangan. Another Nation
 poet put it this way: “Serf! With thy fetters o’erladen, / Why crouch you in
 dastardly woe? / Why weep o’er thy chains like a maiden, / Nor strike for thy
 manhood a blow?” (Spirit 17). Like Wilde, “Mary” (Ellen Downing) and
 
“Eva”  
(Mary Eva Kelly) of The Nation also exhorted their men to nationalist fortitude
 by denigrating a weak and tearful femininity as the alternative; as Ryder has
 
observed,
 their poetry “differs little from that of their male colleagues in its  
r pro uction of bourgeois nationalist gender relations — the difference being
 that it often articulates such relations from a womans point-of-view” (219).
Not all Irish woe was dastardly;
 
Young Ireland 's writers frequently invoked  
the tears of the suffering
 
to describe the  brutalities of English rule and the hor ­
rors of the Great Famine of the 1840s. Mary 
Eva
 Kelly 's “A Scene for Ireland”  
describes a starving mothers inability to feed her baby: “
She
 has no food to  
give it now / Save those hot
 
tears outgushing” (Morash, ed. 61). But such a  lit ­
erature of Irish misery still equated weeping with helplessness, and thus lent
 itself
 
to appropriation by a version of imperial sentimentality, exemplified by  
writers such as Ernest Renan and Matthew Arnold, that constructed the Irish
 as sensitive, romantic, and politically inept. Thomas Moore’s 
Irish
 Melodies  
illustrates the potential ease of such appropriations. Moore
'
s work expressed  
enough nationalist sentiment to get him condemned by the conservative Eng
­lish
 
press and quoted religiously by O’Connell. But Moore was a liberal union ­
ist, and his poems were immensely popular in the drawing 
rooms
 of England  
several decades before they became household words in Ireland. Although he
 sometimes took up a nationalist call to armed resistance, at other times Moore
 portrayed the Irish as the nation of the smile and the tear. In this formulation,
 the purpose of Irish cultural
 
production was to express the suffering  of the Irish  
with such 
lyrical
 poignancy that “Thy masters themselves, as they rivet thy  
chains, / Shall pause at
 
the song  of their  captive, and weep” (Poetical Works 237).  
This image perfectly captures the classic mode and dynamics of imperial senti
­mentality, in which the empire nostalgically cathects that which it is in the
 process of destroying.
Wilde’s works attempt to navigate between the nationalist Scylla of tears
 
that indicate contemptible helplessness and
 
the imperial Charybdis of tears that  
indicate picturesque helplessness by transferring the imperative of nationalist
 subject constitution and action to the spectator or reader. Such a transfer is
 implicit in Young Ireland’s laments for Irish suffering and in its privileging of
 popular forms like the ballad. It also accords with Young Ireland’s project, dis
­cernible in a number of its intellectual structures, to transform the history of
 Irish suffering, national and individual, into a source of and blueprint for a glo
­riously victorious future. But Wilde theorized, more thoroughly than many of
 her contemporaries, the processes and mechanisms through which tears under
­go this transformation. In her works tears constitute a spectacle of suffering
 capable of generating national feeling and spurring nationalist action; they also
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signify that a 
viewer
 is reacting properly to that spectacle. As this description  
suggests, such representations of
 
weeping are generically related to the late-  
eighteenth-century discourses of sensibility and their sentimental Victorian
 descendants, though they do not 
coincide
 completely with either. Terms like  
sensibility and sentimentality are notoriously hard to define; their political
 implications are even more slippery. Sensibility could be organized around
 individualistic, democratic, and liberal principles, or it 
could
 be mobilized in  
the service of "natural” social and political hierarchies (Jones; Johnson; Vin-
 cent-Buffault). The politics of sentimentality are similarly uncertain and in
 contention.12 The various formulations of these discourses shared a conviction
 of the immediately political significance of feeling and a concomitant concep
­tion of feeling as the basis of the social bond. Thus when Edmund Burke
 attacked the French Revolution, the excesses of which are widely supposed to
 have irrevocably tainted the vocabulary of sensibility after the 1790s, he did it
 by claiming sensibility’s terms as his own without acknowledging them,
 lamenting the elimination of natural sentiments and affections as the basis 
for a hierarchical and harmonious social order (see Johnson, especially 1-19).
Burke,
 
Wilde, and various Victorian sentimentalists shared a double inter ­
est in feeling as a spectacle to be 
observed
 and as the response that a particular  
kind of spectacle should produce in the ethically and politically enlightened
 observer. The tears of the suffering object and the tears of the observing sub
­ject go together; the former produce the latter. Wilde’s often millenarian
 vocabulary tended to interchange an earthly observer with a heavenly one. One
 poem urges, “Let us lift our streaming eyes / To God’s throne above the skies,
 / He will hear our anguish cries” (17). In “The Voice of the Poor,” the speaker
 claims: “If the angels ever
 
hearken, downward  bending, / They are weeping, we  
are sure, / At the litanies of human groans ascending
 
/ From the crushed hearts  
of the poor” (14). Similarly, “Ruins” predicts that the weeping of the poor will
 “Start the angels on their thrones” (40). If God and the angels could be trust
­
ed
 to respond with the appropriate sympathetic tears to the weeping of the  
oppressed, however, members of the Protestant Ascendancy could not. “The
 Faithless Shepherds” (45-7) castigates the landed aristocracy for
 
its cruel indif ­
ference to the plight of the poor during the famine by asserting 
in
 a manner  
that resembles contemporary descriptions of
 
Famine victims that the Ascen ­
dancy are the walking dead: “Dead! — 
Dead!
 Ye are dead while  ye live; / Ye’ve  
a name that ye live — but are dead.” This ethico-political (or national) death-
 in-life manifests itself as an absence of feeling — “For the heart in 
each
 bosom  
is cold / As the ice on a frozen sea” — and of sympathetic tears: “With your
 
cold
 eyes unwet by a tear, / For your Country laid low on your bier.” The  
absence of national feeling indicates the corruption of the current regime and
 presages its violent demise, just as the presence of such feeling in heaven sug
­
gests
 that the nationalist revolution is divinely directed or sanctioned.
“The Brothers,” subtitled, “A scene from ’98” (7-9), presents a spectacle —
 an execution — and revolves around its potential ability to generate national
 feeling, measured in tears, and the nationalist action such tears should also pro
­duce. Insofar as it is cast as an 
exemplary
 or paradigmatic spectacle, the kind  
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of scene supremely suited to produce the desired sentiments, we might also
 
think of the poem as Wilde
'
s equivalent to Burke’s famous description of Marie  
Antoinette in Reflections on the Revolution in France, The prisoners of Wilde’s
 poem, “two 
noble
 youths,” are “in pride of life and manhood’s beauty,” bearing  
their 
fate
 with exemplary heroism. Christlike, they are “Pale martyrs” who die  
for the sake of their fellow Irish. The poem emphasizes its narrative of events
 as a national spectacle whose significance lies primarily
 
in its effect on its audi ­
ence. Before introducing the brothers, the first stanza describes the “pale and
 anxious crowd” that witnesses the execution and positions the reader among its
 members: “You can see them through the gloom.” The second stanza also
 insists 
on
 the importance of the crowd, for whom the emotional effect of the  
spectacle is measured in tears: “All eyes an earnest watch on them are 
keeping, / Some, sobbing, turn away, / And the strongest men can hardly see for weep
­ing, / So noble and so loved 
were
 they.” The syntax equates watching and  
weeping, spectatorship and sympathy: “There is silence in the midnight — eyes
 are keeping / Troubled watch till forth the jury come; / There is silence in the
 midnight — eyes are weeping— / ‘Guilty!’ is the fatal uttered doom.” The
 crowd’s lamentations are an index to their level of feeling, but tears alone are
 not enough: true national feeling must express itself in action. 
As
 in Wilde’s  
other representations of weeping as the mark
 
of colonial abjection, tears that  do  
not generate politically conscious resistance are feminizing: “Oh! the rudest
 heart might tremble at such a sorrow, / The rudest cheek might blanch at such
 a scene: /
 
Twice the  judge essayed to speak the word — to-morrow— /  Twice  
faltered, as a
 
woman he had been.” The judge is moved, but the inadequacy of  
his feelings, which manifests itself as feminine  weakness, is structural as well as  
personal, springing from his position as the imperial official presiding over the
 brothers’ conviction and execution.
Wilde’s poem thus explicitly 
rejects,
 in conventionally gendered terms, the  
imperial sentimentality that figures captors weeping over the chains of their
 victims as a positive conception of national feeling
 
or identity. The penultimate  
stanza juxtaposes the crowd’s passive weeping with the active intervention
 imagined 
by
 the narrator, a more advanced nationalist who sounds oddly like  
Burke:
Yet none spring forth their bonds to sever
 
Ah! methinks, had I been there,
I’d have dared a thousand deaths ere ever
The sword should touch their hair.
It falls! — there is a shriek of lamentation
From the weeping crowd around;
They’re stilled — the noblest hearts within the nation—
 
The noblest heads lie bleeding on the ground.
The crowd’s tears cannot prevent the spilling of the heroes’ blood. The last
 
stanza places the spectacle in the distant past 
for
 the first time in the poem. At  
the 
same
 time, it figures the execution scene as a kind of perpetual present,
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embodied in the 
heads
 that refuse to decay and in the continued appeal of the  
spectacle to nationalist sensibilities:
Years have passed since that fatal scene of dying,
Yet, lifelike to this day,
In their coffins still those severed 
heads
 are lying,  
Kept by angels from decay.
Oh! they preach to us, those still and pallid features—
 
Those pale lips yet implore us, from their graves,
To strive for our birthright as God
'
s creatures,  
Or die, if we can but live as slaves.
Having
 
transferred the burden of reacting properly to the scene from the weep ­
ing but passive crowd to the narrator, the poem then transfers this burden to its
 readers. The poem itself, as well as the events it features, exists as a permanent
 national
 
spectacle, waiting for  the reader in whom it will inspire sentiments and  
actions like the narrators. Wilde locates the power to constitute the subject of
 Irish nationalism simultaneously in the timeless spectacle, which should pro
­duce it automatically in anyone, and in the contingencies of the poems partic
­ular readership.
Weeping is thus a figure for the doubleness of the nation; it can signify
 
either the ineradicable plenitude and force of the spirit of the nation, or their
 devastating absence. As a way of structuring Young Ireland
'
s anxieties about  
cultural nationalism as subject constitution — defined as the production and
 organization of
 feeling
 — this ambiguity generates a problematic that differs  
substantially
 
from the problematics produced by an erotics of nationalism. The  
erotics of nationalism raises the threat of 
homosexual
 (as opposed to homoso ­
cial) bonds between men; the possibility that the patriot will choose his wife
 over her sexual rival, the nation; and the specter of the woman-as-nation whose
 sexual betrayal or rape is equivalent to colonial conquest. The tearful strand of
 nationalism exemplified in Wilde’s work, however, grapples with the danger
 that the signs of national feeling are ambiguous, their meanings contingent on
 who displays them. Wilde’s work manages this ambiguity
 
by constructing tax ­
onomies of feeling based on gender and class distinctions. Thus Young Ireland’s
 representations of tears also occupy the intersection between the movements
 drive towards a transcendent national unity and its need to maintain the divi
­sions that unity supposedly transcended.
Men and Women; Leaders and Peoples
Wilde’s
 
work is structured by two hierarchies of tears: the tears of men over the  
tears of women, and the tears of
 
patriot leaders over the tears of the masses.  
While O’Connell’s movement was largely for and populated by men, he was
 well aware of the potential intersections between feminine sentimentality and
 political reform. He was passionately opposed to slavery and once claimed
 
that  
Thomas Moore’s Captain Rock was to the struggle for Catholic emancipation
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what Uncle Toms Cabin was to the abolition of slavery (MacDonagh, Emancip
­
ist 17). Maurice R. O’Connell has argued that the logic of Young Ireland
'
s 
romantic cultural nationalism, which emphasized the uniqueness of peoples,
 militated against its sharing O’Connell’s Enlightenment, universalist concern
 with American slavery and other instances of oppression outside Ireland
 (“O’Connell” 130-6). I would add that this emphasis on identity, and on a sup
­posedly ungendered national subject that
 
was actually a male subject, also mil ­
itated against Young Ireland’s embracing Stowe’s “feminine” brand of reform.
 Like Stowe, Wilde insists that political change begins with and depends on
 conversion, a change of heart. Unlike Stowe, however, Wilde does not locate
 this change in the feminine, domestic sphere of the hearth or give women any
 special power to effect it. In Wilde’s taxonomy of tearfulness, the most ethi
­cally and politically laudable tears are mainly the privilege of middle- and
 upper-class men.13
Wilde’s acceptance of Young Ireland’s equation of true nationalist subjec
­
tivity with masculinity means that
 
while weeping as a sign of powerlessness or  
a lack of political consciousness is often feminized in her 
work,
 tears as evi ­
dence of positive national feeling are associated with masculinity: “Meekly
 bear, but nobly try / Like a man with soft tears flowing” (26). Similarly, while
 the tears of the populace often reveal its despair and pre-political stupor, the
 
tears
 of patriot leaders embody the riches they can offer the nation:
And woe to you, ye poor—
Want and scorn ye must endure;
Yet before ye many noble jewels shine
 
In the sand.
Ah! they are patriots’ tears — even mine—
For Fatherland! (99)
This impulse towards hierarchy and differentiation within the boundaries of
 
the nation was the inevitable companion to Young Ireland’s drive 
towards
 var ­
ious kinds of unity —
 
political, aesthetic, and ethical. While the latter impulse  
has received more critical attention, the former is particularly
 
crucial to Wilde’s  
work. Since the nation was always in the process of being forged, the nation ­
alization of the masses was always incomplete. This was particularly true for
 Young Ireland, given its relative lack of organic connections to the Irish 
mass­es. O’Connell’s movement, in contrast, had
 
been more genuinely popular, with  
the emergent Catholic middle classes, particularly in cities and rural towns, as
 its backbone of support.14 Young
 
Ireland never achi d the popular following  
that O’Connell had; the enormous 
early
 success of The Elation depended  in  part  
upon O’Connell’s Repeal Association, which distributed it. In addition,
 though O’Connell
 
continued to have a popular following, the Famine destroyed 
his political machine (Boyce 171).
Accordingly,
 a number of scholars have read Young Ireland’s project as an  
attempt to create in culture a unity that did not exist in the political sphere.15
 Thus Young Ireland’s founding premise of a unified spirit of the nation located
 in the Irish masses arose as the chances of achieving such unity and politiciz-
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ing the masses were 
actually receding.
 But this compensatory response created 
its own contradictions; it is not often observed that nationalization had to be
 incomplete or it risked undoing some of cultural nationalism’s other founding
 premises.16 Young Ireland’s healthy respect for property and general economic
 conservatism (with a few exceptions) set limits on its unifying, assimilative
 ideals, and led it to privilege the leading role of the bourgeois intellectual. As
 Wilde wrote in an essay on 
an
 anthology of Irish songs, “The utterances of a  
people, though always vehement, are often incoherent; and it is then that men
 of education and culture are needed to interpret and formulate the vague long
­
ings
 and ambitions of the passionate hearts around them” (quoted in Wyndham  
160). For Young Ireland, the relationship between leaders and peoples
 demanded both that the masses assimilate themselves to the model of the lead
­ers and that this assimilation remain perpetually deferred.
As a result, the 
figure
 of the nationalist leader carries enormous weight for  
Young Ireland, embodying both an ideal of unity and the continued significance
 and the superiority of the bourgeois intellectual. Wilde’s work
 
is obsessed with  
leaders — the current dearth of effective national leaders, the qualities and
 techniques associated with leadership, the nature of the relationship between
 leaders and peoples. Her poems refer to leaders with epithets such as “poet
­prophet” (53), “poet-priest” (25), “prophet-leader” (39), and “patriot leader”
 (28);
 
her leaders are heroic, Christlike, or Godlike. At the same time, her works  
constantly return
 
to the faults of the masses who have failed to assimilate them ­
selves to the model offered by such leaders. “Have Ye Counted the Cost?”
 sneers, “Let the masses pass 
on
 scorning, / Seek not courage in their mind; /  
Self-devotion, patriot fervour, / Spring not from the craven kind” (34). When
 she became frustrated with the national movement, she blamed the populace,
 writing to Duffy, “I do not blame the leaders in the least. In Sicily or Belgium
 they would have been successful” (quoted in Wyndham 31).
Along with other Young Irelanders, Wilde subscribed to Carlyle’s dictum
 
that the history of the world is a series of biographies — the biographies of
 great men. 
She
 wrote biographical essays about a number of figures, including  
Thomas Moore and Daniel O’Connell. David Lloyd has explored Young Ire
­land’s preoccupation with biography and autobiography, arguing that for Irish
 cultural nationalism the hero’s biography represents a repetition of the nation’s
 history, 
prefigures
 its destiny, and asserts the seamless continuity of the indi ­
vidual with the nation (Nationalism
 
59-60). Wilde’s essay on O’Connell exem ­
plifies this pattern. His life, she wrote, was “one long gladiatorial wrestle
 against oppression and bigotry in which every step was a combat, but every
 combat a victory.... The life of O’Connell is, indeed, the history of Ireland for
 nearly a century. . . . He lived through all, incarnated all, and was the avenger,
 the apostle, and the prophet of her people” (“O’Connell” 180). This view of
 Irish history as a series of gladiatorial triumphs was, to say the least, counter
­intuitive, and it may seem particularly perverse in the wake of the Famine. In
 contrast, for O’Connell, the history of Ireland was a history of Irish patience
 and reason in the face of British cruelty and provocation. For Wilde, O’Con
­nell’s life was part of the incomplete process of resistance as well as an image of
 its successful completion;
 
it  embodied a  history of suffering  and defeat and pro ­
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vided a diagram of victorious revolution. The contradictions that inhabit such
 
a formulation are compounded by the leader’s relationship to the people,
 
whom  
the leader must both represent and exceed.
Wilde
'
s works foreground the question of the leaders success or failure in  
transforming the masses, invariably imagining this transformation occurring
 when the leader
 
breathes the spirit of the nation into the populace through his  
passionate oratory. Thomas Davis
'
s essays emphasized the skill of past Irish  
orators and encouraged present would-be 
leaders
 to study the character of their  
audi nc s and the techniques of oratory. Wilde described O’Connells powers
 as 
an
 orator  using a language of the mythical and the magical: “Never,  perhaps,  
since sirens gave up sitting and singing upon rocks, did such witch-music fall
 on the ear
 
of listener. The effect was magical —  it acted  like som  potent spell.  
... Men were charmed, subdued, enchanted — forgot everything but him, and
 could not choose but listen, love him, and swear to do or
 die
 for him” (“O’Con ­
nell” 188-9). Although O’Connell was famous, in Parliament and in Ireland,
 for his oratorical skills, he was not inclined to think of himself as a 
siren.
 He  
theorized his effect on his audiences and his role as a lead r in very different
 terms. O’Connell was well aware of something Benedict Anderson would the
­orize later: that print capitalism and increased literacy made the rise of his
 modern popular nationalism possible (Boyce 160). In 1839 he threatened his
 colleagues in Parliament by asking
 
whether they  realized “that the Irish people  
almost universally were now readers? — that where newspapers formerly
 
hard ­
ly went out of the great towns, they were now to be found in every village, and
 almost in every cabin?” (Cusack 1: 536). O’Connell described the mass polit
­ical power of the Irish as a nation using Anderson’s figure for “the secular, his
­torically-clocked imagined community” (Anderson 39) of the nation: the daily
 plebiscite of the newspaper. For O’Connell, the Irish people were no less a
 people, and no less a political force, for being apparently isolated, each in 
his
 or  
her own cabin. Luke Gibbons has pointed out that Anderson’s argument
 requires some modification in relation to Ireland and other colonized nations
 which had
 
important  traditions of resistance  in oral culture. In addition, news ­
papers like The Nation 
were
 often passed around and read aloud to groups. So,  
while Irish newspapers 
were
 central to O’Connell’s movement, and their effec ­
tive circulation and cultural authority was far greater than sales figures 
suggest (MacDonagh,
 
Hereditary 208), they were closely connect d to oral culture. But  
O’Connell did not privilege speech over writing, and he explicitly theorized the
 importance of print culture, rather than 
his
 own siren-like powers, to his  
nationalist project.
Although Young Ireland consciously promoted and exploited print media,
 
set up Repeal reading rooms, and lauded its literary projects as part of the
 national struggle, its rhetoric, in contrast to O’Connell’s, went to some lengths
 to conceal its dependence 
on
 print. Cultural nationalism’s representations of  
the nation 
erased
 the mediated national community created by print and visu ­
alized by O’Connell as 
each
 Irish citizen reading a newspaper at home, and  
replaced it with
 
the  physical immediacy of an orator addressing a  crowd. Young  
Ireland’s definition of
 
the leader as orator cast him less as the people’s repre ­
sentative than as their hypnotist, or as Wilde put it, their siren. Although the
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people formed a natural and inevitable national community, they needed the
 
leaders magical eloquence 
to
 make them aware of their nationhood and to give  
it political force. To imagine the orator relying on logic, persuasion or choice
 in mobilizing the people was tantamount to recognizing the nation as con
­structed and contingent, so Young Ireland described
 
its orators using  a language  
of 
mystical
 transformation, in which the masses simply "woke up” from the  
nightmare of their own ignorance and passivity. Wilde asks in 
one
 poem,  
“Then trumpet-tongued, to a people sleeping / Who will speak with magic
 command[?]” (61). Another poem calls 
for
 a leader to “Pass the word that  
bands together— / Word of mystic conjuration” and predicts the result: “And,
 as fire consumes the heather, / So the young hearts of the nation / Fierce will
 
blaze
 up, quick and scathing, gainst the stranger and the foe” (31). The hearts  
of the masses respond automatically, irrationally and uncontrollably, like a field
 set ablaze, their reaction unmediated by distance, time, or thought.
As
 the repositories of the spirit of the nation and the instruments of that  
spirit’s emergence in the people, poets and leaders were interchangeable in
 Wilde
'
s work. “The Young Patriot Leader” describes the hero’s eloquence as an  
overpowering natural (and ultimately supernatural) force, capable of achieving
 the transformation of the heart that sentimentalists like Stowe imagined 
in
 less  
violently martial terms: “As a tempest in its force, as a torrent in its course, /
 So his words fiercely sweep all before them, / And they smite like two-edged
 swords, those undaunted thunder-words, / On all hearts, as tho’ angels did
 implore them” (29). Similarly, “A Remonstrance” asserts: “Flashes from Poet’s
 words / Electric light, strong, swift, and sudden, like / The clash of thunder
­clouds, by which men read / God’s writing legibly on human hearts” (52). In
 Wilde’s works, the
 
words of patriot leaders and poets burn, smite, act as “thun ­
der crashes” (24) or “God’s thunder” (30); they are both physical objects with
 concrete effects and fetishes, 
magical
 objects with absolute power to transform  
listeners. The greater and more Godlike the orator’s transformative powers,
 however, the greater his distance from the masses with whom he was eventual
­ly supposed to be merged. Young Ireland’s 
emphasis
 on the unmediated char ­
acter
 
of the orator’s effect on the people formed the very vehicle through which  
to inscribe 
his
 absolute separation from them. Conversely, it was O’Connell’s  
faith in the mediation of print
 
that made it possible for him to imagine himself  
a member of the Irish nation, similar to other 
members.Most of Wilde’s works emphasize that the masses have yet to be trans
­formed by the spirit of the nation. The exhortatory
 
language of her work casts  
it as an attempt
 
to generate that spirit among her  readers. The didactic impuls ­
es of Young Ireland’s project are well known. But in Wilde’s case, representa
­tions of gender play a particularly
 
important role in organizing those impulses.  
The recalcitrance of the masses, and the necessary, continued separation of the
 leader from them, are expressed 
in
 the discrepancy between the women poet  
and the male patriot leader. “Who Will 
Show 
Us Any Good?” laments: “Alas!  
can I help? but a 
nameless
 singer— / Weak the  words of a woman to save; / We  
wait the advent of some light-bringer” (61). The female poet is the pale, inad
­equate shadow of the true inspirer of the nation, the patriot leader. The dou
­bleness of the nation, which exists eternally yet remains to be 
created,
 is  
mapped onto a gender gap between them.
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The first poem in Poems by Speranza, “Dedication. To Ireland” (iii-iv),
 
introduces the volume by emphasizing this discrepancy. The opening stanza,
 written entirely in the conditional mood, 
details
 how the speaker  would like to  
inspire the nation but also implies that she cannot:
My Country, wounded to the heart,
Could I but flash along thy soul
Electric power to rive apart
The thunder-clouds that round thee roll,
And, by my burning words uplift
Thy life from out Deaths icy drift,
Till the full splendours of our age
Shone round thee for thy heritage—
As Miriam’s, by the Red Sea strand
Clashing proud cymbals, so my hand
Would strike thy harp,
Loved Ireland!
The second stanza confesses: “I can but look in God’s great face, / And pray
 
Him for our fated race, / To come in Sinai thunders down, / And, with His
 mystic radiance, crown / Some Prophet-Leader . . The poem turns on the
 speaker’s gender, which renders her an inferior substitute for a true poet-leader:
 “The woman’s voice dies in the strife / Of Liberty’s awakening life; / We wait
 the hero heart to lead, / The hero, who can guide at need.” The poem’s last
 stanza affirms the efforts made by the “woman’s hand” of the speaker, while
 insisting on their limited efficacy. Even the reference to Miriam indicates that
 she 
will
 never achieve the status of a true poet-prophet. Miriam was Moses’  
sister, and her only prophecy was a song of praise for Moses after he parted the
 Red Sea. Later, she was punished by God for complaining that Moses had too
 much power; Wilde’s speaker is unlikely to incur punishment for a similar
 offense.
Like the other women writers of The Nation, in general Wilde did not
 
explicitly critique or resist the major structures of Young Ireland’s cultural
 nationalism. Instead, I have been arguing that she inhabited their contradic
­tions in a particular way. Wilde emphasized a sentimental rather than an erot
­ic model of national feeling, but she did not make the claims to specifically
 feminine power that other sentimental literatures did. She used Young Ire
­land’s gender conventions to mediate a bourgeois nationalism’s necessary but
 problematic separation from the people, embodied in the weak feminine tears
 of the masses and the worthy, masculine tears of the true patriot. Similarly,
 rather than explicitly assert the worth of
 
the woman writer, Wilde employed  
the figures of the woman poet and the male patriot to inscribe the doubleness
 of the nation and the ambiguous status and potential the masses had for Young
 Ireland. But if Wilde found a despairing, pre-national people problematic, she
 hardly found a mobilized, nationalist people less so, as is illustrated in her rep
­resentations of blood.
60




O’Connell struck (or, perhaps more accurately, failed to strike) an uneasy bal
­
ance between threatening revolutionary violence and condemning 
it.
 Although  
the British political classes viewed him as a figure who deliberately aroused the
 passions of the mob, O’Connell feared and distrusted the masses who support
­ed him, he hated social unrest, and 
he
 condemned revolutions and agrarian 
secret societies (MacDonagh, Emancipist 229-31; Hereditary passim). His  
speeches and essays counseled
 
legal agitation, orderly  mass demonstrations, and  
nonviolence: "Let there be no riot, no outrage, no violation of the law, 
and above all, no despair. We are eight millions” (Cusack 2: 394). He repeatedly
 insisted that "the best possible political revolution is not
 
worth one single drop 
of human blood” (441). Much of O’Connell’s pacifist politics was based, how
­ever, on the implicit threat of a mass uprising. His speeches sometimes
 
empl
oyed martial language, especially when he wanted to  whip up popular feel ­
ing at the monster meetings of the early 1840s. The meetings themselves,
 which scholars have compared to people’s festivals, religious revivals, and the
­atrical spectacles, bristled with potential mass violence and encapsulated the
 tensions between violence and nonviolence in the movement. They were elab
­orately staged, with much pomp and pageantry, and audiences responded pas
­sionately to O’Connell’s famed oratorical skills. Crowds were often organized
 into ranks and marched in step, in a display of quasi-military discipline that
 
suggest
ed their potential to become a real army.17 It was this combination of  
O’Connell’s ability to mobilize the passions of the masses and his skill in con
­trolling them, in the manner of an inspired military leader, that many contem
­porary observers found particularly threatening.
In some respects, Young Ireland’s warlike rhetoric simply stated plainly
 
what O’Connell had been careful to suggest obliquely. However, the devasta
­tion of the Famine, England’s largely uncaring and inept handling of the crisis,
 and the French Revolution of
 
1848 radicalized some of the remaining nation ­
alists by the late 1840s. Wilde began contributing to The Nation just after the
 Famine began, and as the crisis worsened nationalist writers confronted the
 issue of how to represent death and suffering on an unprecedented, and 
nearly unrepresentable, scale. Blood, like tears, can illustrate the violent abjection of
 a colonized people, and the "excessive” carnage in Wilde’s work is, in part, a
 response to the ethical imperative to render the excessive carnage of the Famine
 adequately.18 Like tears, blood has other functions in Wilde’s work as well.
While Wilde’s representations of tears are inflected by the dominant dis
­
courses of feeling, her representations of blood are informed by the major
 impulses of contemporary religious discourses, the importance of which, as
 Maria Luddy has shown, can hardly
 be
 overestimated as a shaping force in the  
lives of publicly active nineteenth-century Irish women. Her preoccupation
 with blood, violence and death is structured by a Protestant millenarianism in
 which the apocalypse signals the end of this world,
 
judgment, and the begin ­
ning of the new millennium. Chris Morash has pointed out that Irish Protes
­tantism was heavily indebted to millenarian thought in the nineteenth century
 and that interest in millennial prophecy was especially high in the late 1840s.
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Morash argues that although millenarian thought among most Protestants was
 
reactionary and anti-Irish, it also 
offered
 Young Ireland a way of narrating the  
Famine that exposed the massive suffering it caused while also casting it as an
 apocalyptic harbinger of a utopian world (Writing 79-127). In addition, Young
 Ireland
'
s conception of the nationalization of the masses as a magical transfor ­
mation, its fetishistic 
emphasis
 on the power of words, and its vagueness about  
how revolutionary change was 
actually
 to come about are all characteristics Eric  
Hobsbawm associates with millenarian movements (57-107).
Like her interest in biography, Wilde
'
s millenarianism is a way of writing  
the history of the nation and the individual as both a record of oppression and
 a blueprint for victory. The cataclysmic nature of the suffering involved
 becomes an index to the radical nature of the transformation it heralds. Poems
 such as “Foreshadowings” (17-19) graft the vocabularies and structures of mil
­lenarian thinking onto a discourse of nationalist resistance. The poem 
begins, “Oremus! Oremus! [Let us pray!] Look down on us, Father!” and conflates the
 horsemen of the apocalypse
 
with imperial coercion and famine: “On rushes the  
war-steed, his lurid eyes flashing / There is blood on the track where his long
 mane is streaming, / . . . / There’s a tramp like a 
knell
 — a cold shadow  
gloometh— / Woe! ’tis the black steed of Famine that cometh.” “Signs of the
 Times” (21-3) claims, “By our prophets God is speaking, in Sinai’s awful thun
­ders, / By pestilence and famine, in fearful signs and wonders,” and describes
 the rough beast that slouches towards Ireland as a successor to the French Rev
­olution: “On its brow a name is written — France 
read
 it once before, / And  
like a demon’s compact, it was written in her gore— / A fearful name —
 thrones tremble as the murmur passed along— / RETRIBUTION, proud
 oppressors, for
 
your centuries of wrong.” The signs of a better world are liter ­
ally “written”—
 
both determined and predicted — in violence, blood and gore.  
The Irish might be suffering horribly, but God, and the nationalists whose
 
divine
 sanction  was indicated by the interchangeability of the earthly  and heav ­
enly avengers that Wilde’s poems constantly invoke, will
 
judge the oppressors  
and avenge their crimes.




with its nostalgic, mythologizing, backward-looking  impulses (see  
for example Kearney). But Young Ireland’s nostalgia 
for
 lost origins and pris ­
tine pre-colonial culture did not prevent it from needing, and embracing, how
­ever ambivalently, a modernizing, nineteenth-century narrative of progress.
 Hobsbawm points out that millenarianism is the most “modern” of “primitive”
 social movements, and can be fairly easily harnessed in service of modern polit
­ical revolutions. Wilde’s bloody millenarianism coexists with her commitment
 to progress, most often
 
imagined as the “onward march  of nations” (69) through  
history. “Who Will Show Us Any Good?” asserts, “Ireland rests mid the rush
 of progression,
 
/ Asa frozen ship in a frozen sea,” and laments, “we alone of the  
Christian nations I Fall to the rear in the march of Man” (61). In fact, her
 bloody rhetoric offers an alternative, apocalyptic narrative of progress rather
 than a backward-looking 
resistance
 to it. “The Year of Revolutions”  asks, “Shall  
we, oh! my Brothers,
 
but weep, pray, and groan,  / When France reads her rights  
by the flames of a Throne? / Shall 
we
 fear and falter to join the grand chorus,  
/ When Europe has trod the dark
 
pathway before us?” (35). The apocalypse of
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the Famine and the nationalist apocalypse it prefigures propel Ireland forward
 
along the path of civilization.
Wilde imagines violence and bloodshed as both the mark of oppression
 
and a sign that
 
the nationalist cause is advancing. But while the tears that indi ­
cate the weakness of the masses become the enlightened tears of the patriot or
 reader/spectator, her representations of
 
blood usually revolve entirely around  
the masses, organizing her conception of the masses’ role, once mobilized, 
in nationalist politics. This conception is the logical complement to Young Ire
­land’s impulses to limit (as well as to achieve) the merging of leaders and peo
­ples. Her version of O’Connell’s disciplined army, that is, of the Irish people
 mobilized as 
an
 effective political force, is a raging mob. She assumes that  
mass politics is by nature violent and irrational, so when she imagines the suc
­cessful transformation of the masses, she emphasizes the unthinking and
 bloodthirsty propensities of the masses so transformed. Often, the mobilized
 populace becomes part of the landscape 
itself,
 taking the form of some blindly  
powerful and destructive force. “Signs of the Times” lists the “signs apocalyp
­tic” (21) of a coming upheaval, comparing disturbances among the people to
 surging oceans and tempest-tossed forests: “When mighty passions, surging,
 heave the depth of life’s great ocean— / When the people, sway, like forest
 trees, to and fro in
 
wild commotion” (21). “Forward”  threatens,  “And the heav ­
ing myriad surges, / To and fro in tumult swaying, / Threaten death to all who
 
vainl
y would oppose them in their might” (31), while “The Year of Revolu ­
tions” exhorts, “On, on in your masses dense, resolute, strong” (36). Wilde’s
 descriptions of violent nationalist mobs as blazing fields, human oceans, wind
­swept 
forests,
 thunder clouds and other powerful natural phenomena fit them  
into millenarian narratives of upheaval. They also embody Young Ireland’s
 anxious conceptualization of mass politics as irrational and bloody.
Wilde’s conception of mass politics as crowd violence makes a transition
 
from tears to blood an inviting figure for the nationalization of the masses.
 “France in ’93” (53-5) compares the French bread riots of the 1790s to the cry
 of the starving
 
Irish during the Famine and describes the transformation of the  
abject people into a savage agent of crowd violence. The first stanza presents
 the lower classes as crude and lacking national consciousness: “Hark! the
 onward heavy tread— / Hark! the voices rude— / ’Tis the famished cry for
 Bread / From a wildered multitude.” The “wildered multitude” signifies its
 helplessness and despair by 
weeping:
 “Thousands  wail and  weep with hunger.”  
The 
second
 stanza traces their transformation into “an armed multitude.” The  
armed multitude has exactly the same “heavy tread” and “voices rude” as the
 despairing crowd in the first stanza. The only visible mark of their transfor
­mation is that they have stopped shedding tears and have begun shedding
 blood: “Bloody trophy they have won, / Ghastly glares it in the sun— I Gory
 head 
on
 lifted pike. / Ha! they weep not now, but strike.” Young Ireland’s  




The poem gleefully addresses the guilty, aristocratic victims of the crowd’s
 revenge, threatening and taunting them, as in “Calculating statesmen, quail; /
 Proud aristocrat, grow pale; / Savage 
sounds
 that deathly song,” or “What!  
coronetted Prince of Peer, / Will not the base-born slavelings fear?” Through
­
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to O’Connell 's conception of violence  in politics, the crowd’s power lies  
not 
in
 threat or disciplined action but in its blind, uncontrollable hunger for  
violence: “Blindly now they wreak revenge— / How rudely do a mob avenge!”
 The poem points to hunger as the source of the riot, repeating words like “fam
­ished” and “bread.” In Wilde’s apocalyptic reading of the Famine, the masses’
 hunger for food — which represents their colonial subjugation — and their hunger for violence
 
— which represents their mobilization as an effective polit ­
ical force — become indistinguishable. The dismembered bodies of aristocrats
 become strange fruit, to borrow a phrase from a later description of mob vio
­lence: “Ghastly fruit their lances bear— / Noble heads with streaming hair.”
 The speaker imagines the carnage of the riot in terms of a savage “harvest” of
 aristocratic blood: “Royal
 
blood of King and Queen / Streameth from the guil ­
lotine; / Wildly on the people goeth, / Reaping what the noble soweth.” Thus
 the lines “Hunger now, at
 
last, is sated / In halls where once it wailed and wait ­
ed” have multiple 
referents:
 food, blood,  blood as food. While national feeling 
among the male patriot
 
leaders manifests itself as tears, national feeling among  
the masses manifests itself as a blind bloodlust as deep and instinctive as the
 hunger 
for
 which it is a metonym.
Current criticism often theorizes cultural nationalism’s project of subject
 constitution as the formation of a centered subject whose autonomy prefigures
 national autonomy, and whose national feelings are embodied 
in
 unmistakable  
signs such as love of country. Wilde’s work illustrates that, at the same time,
 Young Ireland’s bourgeois nationalism also produced a different, more unset
­tling version of national subject constitution,
 
particularly in relation to the Irish  
masses. In this version, the signs of national
 
feeling are ambiguous, their mean ­
ings contingent and shifting. Moreover, this national subject’s bodily integrity
 is tenuous — defined through shedding tears, spilling blood, even ingesting
 blood — and its autonomy dissolves into the unreasoning mind of the crowd.
 These divergent conceptions of 
subject
 constitution mark Young Ireland’s  
ambivalence about the Irish masses; subject constitution as the achievement of
 individual integrity, autonomy and 
stable
 signification is the province of the  
elite. The necessary complement to Young Ireland’s drive towards unity, its  
dreams of
 
assimilation, and its faith in the people as the embodiments of the  
spirit of the nation is its reliance on class and gender hierarchies, its
 
will to sep ­
arate bourgeois leaders and intellectuals from the populace, and its fear that the
 masses cannot
 
be constituted as national subjects, or that they can only be con ­
stituted as threatening, ambiguous kinds of national subjects. As a woman
 writer engaging with a deeply
 
masculinist tradition, Wilde had cause to be par ­
ticularly sensitive to the latter set of impulses — those that emphasized dis
­junction, distrust
 
and hierarchy. The major tropes and patterns of Wilde’s work  
embody, rather than resist, many of Young Ireland’s gender 
conventions. Through those conventions, however, Wilde illustrates with particular clarity
 the disintegrative and divisive aspects of the contradictory formulations that
 distinguished Young Ireland from Old.
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For extended discussions of these features, see Lloyd, Nationalism and  
Anomalous States, and Ryder.
2.
 
On Young Ireland’s origins, development, and intellectual structures, see  




The authorities considered her anonymous 1848 essay, entitled "Jacta  
Aiea Est” ("The Die is Cast”), seditious enough to warrant prosecution, and
 tried Duffy for writing it, even though he was already in prison when it
 appeared. When Wilde disrupted his trial by standing up 
in
 the gallery and  
claiming authorship, the government declined to prosecute her, and four dif




She translated a novel, Sidonia The Sorceress, in 1849, translated Lamar ­
tine’s Pictures of the First French Revolution and The Wanderer and His Home in
 1850, published The Glacier Land in 1852 and The First Temptation in 1853.
 Poems: Second Series; Translations
 
appeared in 1866. In 1880 she completed and  
published a book her husband had begun before his death, Memoir of Gabriel
 Beranger. Driftwood From Scandinavia appeared in X&A, Ancient Legends, Mys
­tic Charms and Superstitions of Ireland in 1887, and
 
Ancient Cures, Charms, and  
Usages of 
Ireland
 in 1890. Notes on Men, Women, and Books (1891) and Social  
Studies (1893) were collections of essays, all or 
nearly




Thomas Flanagan’s The Irish  Novelists, 1800-1850 described her as "the  
silliest woman who ever lived” (quoted in Ellmann 18), and Terry Eagleton’s
 play St. Oscar pokes fun at her vehement and sentimentalizing nationalism.
 While her work is included
 
in a number of turn-of-the-century anthologies (for  
a list see Morash, Writing 112), later
 
in the twentieth century her work was sel ­
dom anthologized. Hoagland includes only her most famous poem, "The
 Famine Year,” and A. 
A.
 Kelly excludes her on the grounds that her poetry  
"[a]ppears turgid to the modern ear” (19). She does not appear anywhere in the
 first three volumes of The Field Day Anthology of
 
Irish Writing. However, she is  
included in Leighton and Reynolds.
6.
 
Parker et al. observe, "Whenever the power of the nation is invoked —  
whether
 
it be in the media, in scholarly texts, or in everyday conversation — we  
are more likely than not to find it couched as a love of country: an eroticized
 nationalism” (1), and influential 
books
 such as Mosse’s Nationalism and Sexual ­
ity and Theweleit’s Male Fantasies take as their starting points the assumption




For a discussion of the Irish case, see Boland.
8.
 
As a young man, the two books he was most influenced by were God ­
win’s Caleb Williams and Mackenzie’s The Man of
 
Feeling,  representing the cults  




Quoted in MacDonagh, Emancipist 272. MacDonagh also notes that  
for most of his life, O’Connell’s favorite writer was Thomas Moore, famous for
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See Lloyd, Anomalous States, especially 88-124; Eagleton, Heathcliff,  
especially 226-72; and Bhabha
'
s influential formulation in “DissemiNation.”
11.
 
Radhakrishnan succinctly sums up this dilemma in the context of Indi ­
an nationalism: “The masses can neither 
be
 bypassed (for they are the real  
India) nor can they be legitimated qua people” (89).
12.
 
For example, Douglas argues for the reactionary nature of sentimental  
fictions tendency to reinforce nineteenth-century stereotypes of women, while
 Tompkins argues for its revolutionary potential because it locates the crucial
 scene of social and political transformation in the sphere traditionally associat
­ed with women: the heart and hearth. For another
 




Similarly, Johnson argues that, rather than feminizing culture, politics,  
or 
men,
 the late-eighteenth-century discourses of sensibility entailed the mas ­
culinization of formerly feminine traits; those traits were legitimized only
 because and only insofar as they 
were
 recoded masculine (14).
14.
 
Foster observes that O’Connell 's origins, which “blended Gaelic clans ­
men and local Catholic gentry,” allowed him to assert his organic connection to
 both successfully (300).
15.
 
See for example Deane, “Poetry and Song,” in which he argues that  
“[t]he political rhetoric could not
 be
 translated into action because it  bespoke a  
unity of purpose that did not exist” (1).
16.
 
The fact that this formulation echoes the ambivalence Bhabha has  
identified in imperialist discourses of native assimilation reminds us once again
 of cultural nationalism’s formal similarities to imperialism. See The Location of
 Culture, especially 85-92.
17.
 
See MacDonagh, Emancipist 229-3 1, and Davis 41. Some peasants in  
the south of Ireland actually interpreted an 1828 meeting and the agitation sur
­rounding it as preparation for an uprising (Boyce 141).
18.
 
For an insightful discussion of these issues, see Morash, Writing, and  
Morash, ed. 15-37.
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Wallace Stevens begins his poem, “The Pleasures of
 
Merely Circulating,” with delicious nonsense: “The
 garden flew round with the angel, / The angel flew
 round with the clouds, / And the clouds flew round
 and the clouds flew round / And the clouds flew
 round with the clouds.” But I want to 
exit 
from these  
giddy circles and come down to earth, asking the
 reader to join me on a journey less certain of its plea
­sures. Come down, then; let
 
us run the length of this  
field, sallying back and forth between two ill-
matched citations: the first an inviting statement of
purpose from a new academic journal, the second an
oddly moving, oddly spectral statement from Derri-
da:
Journal x is not committed to any particular set of
 
answers or even approaches to the question of
 pleasure, only to the question itself. . . . Our
 immediate editorial goal is a good deal more
 modest, indirect, and open-ended: to serve as a
 sort of ongoing research archive into what Žižek
 might call “enjoyment as an intellectual
 
factor” by  
publishing scholarly and personal essays that
 themselves give pleasure. (Kamps and Watson 2)
First of all, mourning. We will be speaking of
 
nothing else. It consists always in attempting to
 ontologize remains, to make them present, in the
 first place by identifying the bodily remains and
 by localizing the dead (all ontologization, all
 semanticization . . . finds itself caught up in this
 work of mourning but, as such, it does not yet
70





 we are posing here the  
(Derrida 9)
question of the specter, to the specter).
L'Allegro, Il
 
Penseroso; gang of pleasure, gang of pain; Team Jouissance, Team  
Specter. Running over and through this field, I really want to run around it: to
 run, if nowhere else, amok. But for me there is no other way. If I am to write
 this essay, I have to navigate the work of mourning in order to arrive at plea
­sure's archive, sliding between opposing manifestos, hoping to create a small
 universe in which I can suture two inverse inclinations — namely, our irre
­pressible longing for pleasure and our traffic in specters: our omnivorous con
­versations with the implacable dead.
As I start to write this an announcement comes in from Pretoria. Five of
 
the murderers of Steven Biko have confessed under the auspices of a general
 amnesty. A few days later, The New York Times article on Biko’s death features
 a strange double picture from a museum exhibit in Pretoria. At its outer reach
­es the camera has recorded a grand, upflung portrait of Biko
'
s head — suggest ­
ing a persona already classicized, at a distance, monumental, heroic. A didactic
 body, yes, but also, in its way, a body 
for
 pleasure, evoking identification with  
the spirit of a deeply ethical man. Beneath this picture the 
museum
 has flung  
another replica of Biko’s person (this ti e solid, tactile, plastic, inert) depicting
 a body facedown, on the floor, bound, contorted, bleeding, opened: a terrifying
 representation of a person battered and left to die on the floor of a South
 African jail (Burns 4).
Between the heroic picture and its obscene plastic double, this exhibit
 
attempts to instantiate two different versions of mourning. First, it offers a
 body that is easy
 
to introject, to sublimate into a system of great, representative  
men. But beneath this 
sublime
 portraiture we meet something more tenuous  
and closer to home: a body that seems harder to swallow. Instead of
 
Biko’s  
greatness we are reminded of the power of his political adversaries and his own
 loss of agency: of flesh that is open to brutality,
 
inertia, decay; of a world unap ­
proachable through grief but openly melancholy over the body’s vulnerability
 and its unfinished projects — a space with too much ancestry. In presenting a
 butchered body that refuses to be consumed (tipping the viewer
 
back and forth  
between anger and melancholy, between heroism 
and
 the desuetude  — the dis ­
quiet — of unusable grief), this double picture attempts,, as Derrida says, to
 “ontologize remains,” to give them density, spatiality, to identify bodily
 
remains  
“by localizing the dead.”
How
 
do  we speak to the dead? Or speak  about  them? What weight  should  
they have in our texts? Last week I waved the picture of Biko’s bodies at 
my students, trying to drive home the contrast between the semiotics of the
 upflung body and the relentless grotesque, trying to say, “Look, body politics is
 not just a topic in this course but a set of tropes we constantly deploy.” And yet
 my voice
 
breaks when I talk  about the body that inhabits the  bottom half of the  
frame, and I think, I don’t like my dead to 
be
 this local. It upsets the balance,  
calls out too many ghosts. But every
 
time I get rid of one ghost, another takes 
its place. This time I am shopping. I see a placard in the back window of a
 
large
 van. “My son was killed by a drunk driver. I am MADD.” Once again  
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the unexpected ontologizing of remains, the making present, the relentless
 
localizing. I want to walk away, 
and
 yet my own flesh surprises me with its  
vehemence, an anger directed not at the drunk driver, but at the narrator, the
 
driver
 of this car. I think, "Why is she saying this to me?” before I construct  
the proper empathic response. Of course this woman has as much right to hurl
 invectives, to call out the ghost, as anyone.
What do we owe to the dead? 
For
 IRA nationalists (those who became  
political prisoners during the 1970s and supported 
Bobby
 Sands throughout  
the Hunger Strike of 1981),
 
the dying demanded a special brand of silence;  they  
aroused  a painful new consciousness about the irrelevance of everyday speech.
When a guy was on hunger strike in the wing, the noise level went down.
 
Everybody was conscious all the time that there was someone next to you
 dying. When the food came around you had to be conscious about not
 shouting, "What do you think of the meat today?” Your complaints were
 relegated to something meaningless. You couldn’t go to the door and shout,
 "There’s something with this grub.” (Feldman 248)
It seems all too clear what 
one
 owes to the dying, but with the dead, the case  
seems utterly different and perhaps more diffuse:
The night
 
Bobby Sands died was just... you never  heard a sound  for  hours.  
Nobody spoke and nobody would go near the door. The way
 
we knew he 
was dead, a screw 
came
 down and there was a grill at the end of the wing,  
and with his baton he started banging the grill slowly, Dong! — dong! —
 dong! — like a church bell. It was just a hollow 
sound.
 From that point on 
whenever someone died the screws would ring the grill and another one
 would
 
walk up the wing slowly  pulling a trolley behind him, saying, "Bring  
out your dead. How many dead do youse have 
for
 us today?”: It was like  
the plague. (249)
Once we enter this hollow space and try to imagine Sands’s slow and deliber
­
ate death, the thematizing question —
 
what do we owe to the dead? — seems  
both impertinent and much too obtuse. And yet deferring this question seems
 equally counterproductive. We need to take note of the ease with which Bobby
 Sands’s heartbeat, his voice, can be displaced by a screw, a prison guard, bang
­ing the grill slowly. As the guard cries out in his mocking voice, the empty
 space left by a man’s death becomes frighteningly co-optable, available to oth
­ers; it demands renewed efforts at counter-speech. Yet how do we narrate or
 speak for the dead? What allows this speech to grant them proper weight, sub
­stance, dignity? If this weight is too heavy, can we go 
on
 writing? Do  we  want  
to? If the weight
 
is too light, can we do justice to the injustices endured by  the  
specter?
In interviews with members of the IRA prison collective recorded in Allen
 
Feldman’s Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror
 in Northern Ireland, we learn that for those who bore witness to Sands’s death,
 "a new sense of urgency ... set in all around. It meant that you were scrubbing
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[writing] all day. . . . [I]t gave everybody a sense of doing something” (247). It
 
is the question of writing, of finding proper tropes, that obsesses Sands’s fellow
 prisoners:
The Hunger Strike completed the textualization of the prisoner’s body. As
 
Bobby Sands and subsequent
 
hunger strikers lay dying, the rest  of the Blan ­
ketmen engaged in the intensified production of political texts that were
 smuggled out of the prison. These texts constituted a literature of conver
­sion, letters to international organizations, political groups, unions, govern
­ments, and prominent individuals which publicized the Hunger Strike and
 asked support 
for
 the protest. Certain prisoners writing with pen refills on  
cigarette papers were able to produce 200 letters a day. It was a remarkable
 literary production which seemed to flow directly from the dying body of
 the hunger 
strike.
 (250)
The ventriloquism we lend to the dead, the tropes we clothe them in, can have
 
the power to re-dress their 
bodies,
 to speak  volumes.
Differently positioned (not only not incarcerated, but at relative leisure to
 pursue polymorphous political passions), liberal academics also reproduce for
 themselves and their students stories of trauma, structural violence, systematic
 injustice, slaughter, inequality. These painful stories — about deterritorializa-
 tion, decolonization, people pushed past the margins, bodies brutalized, chil
­dren victimized, populations dying, in exile — suggest a world of subsemantic
 history that
 
demands the weight  of political speech. At the same time (or with ­
in the same heterodox space but under another name), we inhabit an academic  
world that is
 
busy consuming trauma — busy eating, swallowing,  perusing,  con ­
suming, exchanging, circulating, creating professional connections — through
 its stories about the dead. We are obsessed with stories that must be passed on,
 that must not be passed over. But aren’t we also drawn to these stories from
 within an elite culture driven by its own economies: by
 
the pains and pleasures  
of needing to publish, by salaries and promotions that are themselves driven by
 acts of publication, by, among other forces, the pleasures of merely circulating?
From within this complex matrix of pleasure and
 
pain, I want  to come  back  
to my earlier question. Given the danger
 
of commodification and the pleasures  
of academic melancholy — of those exquisite acts of mourning that create a
 conceptual profit — what are our responsibilities when we write about the
 dead? In describing the fate of 
Bobby
 Sands, or the bodies of "cunts” (desig ­
nated male victims of political violence) and "stiffs” (dead bodies that deliver a
 ""message” of feminization to the other side) that have transformed Belfast’s
 political geography, does Feldman meet these responsibilities, does he take the
 right tone? Do I? How are we allowed to taste the dead’s bodies, to put their
 lives in our mouths? How do we identify the proper tone, the proper images,
 for holding — for awakening — someone else’s bodily remains?
This question has been called forth unexpectedly, reluctantly, unpre
­
dictable by the last issue — also the first issue — of Journal
 
x. Turning its  
pages with a prospective happiness and dread (a bizarre, all-too-familiar hap
­
piness
 bred of proprietorship: there’s my name, I’m part of this editorial board;  
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there’s my space, I’ve been asked to write a review-essay 
on
 “Reading for Plea ­
sure”), I’m enjoying myself I 
like
 reading about late-night TV in the essay on  
Céline and “Lettermania”; I’m interested in Civil-War American freaks, and
 then I turn to the next to the last
 
essay, “Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmak ­
ing 
in
 Mississippi’s Jails” — thinking randomly, circumlocuitously (as I sit in  
the dusky half-light of a midwestern afternoon, awash in that meditative fren
­zy bred of reading too much southern literature) — I think — oh, here’s a
 
piece  
on the South, and I dive into the article, feet first, before my exuberance turns
 to 
dust. “Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails” is an essay
 that begins with portraits of black men who have died 
in
 Mississippi’s jails.  
Andre Jones, the son of local NAACP activists, was brought to the Simpson
 County
 
Jail on August 22, 1992, on multiple charges that included carrying a  
concealed weapon and
 
possessing a stolen vehicle. He was 18. Less than twen ­
ty-four hours later
 
Jones was found hanging in his cell — dangling from the  
shoelace of his own Nike sneaker.
Reading this essay about Andre Jones and other people who have died in
 
Mississippi’s jails, I no longer feel able to write about my own acts of reading
 for pleasure. Instead, I want to take up the status of griefwork, of the work of
 mourning, in academic writing. What happens when we “textualize” bodies,
 when
 
we write about other people s deaths (or other people’s cultures) as some ­
thing 
one
 “reads”? The author of “Estranged Fruit,” Barry Gildea, argues that  
“jails are sites for complex and plural readings, especially where contested hang
­ings occur. The incidental death category marks the first opportunity to
 explore a more imaginative or creative interpretation of the jail hanging as a
 mythic and literary act of incidental annihilation through intentional civil dis
­obedience” (124). What does it mean to convert someone’s death while in cus
­tody into a
 
“literary act”? If this in fact, a suicide, how should  we respond  
to the suggestion that Jones’s failure to leave a suicide note must be “read” as an
 act of resistance? (That is, what constitutes proper evidence 
for
 drawing such  
a conclusion? Who is doing the “writing” here — and why?) Or how do we
 evaluate this conclusion: “By resisting the urge to determine and dictate the
 meaning of his death, Jones has insured that he will be 
heard.
 He imposes no  
meaning, but still ‘imprisons’ you
 
within a text, a world of his own (un)making,  
a world which soon becomes peopled with the texts of other hanging bodies”
 (116)? In what sense can a hanging body be “a text”? What happens when
 “imprisons”
 
becomes a floating signifier that slips away from its referent so eas ­
ily? No longer a description of the physical crisis experienced by a black man
 in custody, it becomes a loosely held metaphor describing
 
the  psychological  sta ­
tus of an elite group of readers.
This transferability suggests a too easy equivalence between epistemologi
­
cal prisons and actual
 
ones, between the dead and the  living. What are the dan ­
gers inherent 
in
 figuring  — or dis-figuring  — the specter? How far should we  
go in invoking the ghost, how far in consuming its traumas? If circulating the
 suffering of others has become the meat and potatoes of our profession, if this
 circulation evokes a lost history
 
but also runs the dangers of commodification,  
then how should we proceed? In producing figures that are either too vacuous
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or too lurid, too theatrical or too theoretical, can one reproduce trauma or loss
 
in the wrong way? To put this somewhat differently, how do we control our
 own acts of écriture, of seeming to 
read
 bodies, when we may really  be reading,  
then acting upon (interpreting and reinscribing) our own figurations?
To answer these questions, my argument needs to extend beyond
 
“Estranged Fruit’”s local strategies. To stay honest, I will have to turn back on
 my own mode of troping the death of Steven Biko, my own act of 
invoking
 the  
specter. (Is this a too opportunistic, too lurid way of inviting the audience into
 this essay? And who decides?) But I also want to focus on two urgent ques
­tions. First, what is the role of the critics own writing in producing someone
 else's death as a “text”? Second, what resources should 
elites
 bring to bear in  
ventriloquizing the world on behalf of non-elites — how conscious should we
 be about usurping others’ worlds with our words? These are questions with
 subtexts: in asking whether there are proper and improper styles for eliciting
 the stories of the dead, we need to reexamine the appropriations of anthropol
­ogy’s powerful methods within the burgeoning field of cultural studies. And in
 asking whether we can participate in critique without overriding the effects and
 affect of local mourning, we need
 
to reexamine the thematics of loss that  so pre ­
occupies a post-Marxist academy. For if the abiding question of this essay is
 what we owe to the dead, this question has to be nuanced once again. The
 question is not only what is our
 
stake in their narratives, but  what is their  stake  
in ours.
With these questions in mind, let us turn again to “Estranged Fruit: Mak
­
ing and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails,” for 
here
 is an essay that speaks about  
the recently dead, of a young black man, and then another black man, of white
 men and women, all found hanging. The deaths of these black men while in
 custody have been interpreted by their own African-American communities as
 lynchings but labeled officially as suicides. Gildea’s verdict, as well, is that these
 deaths are suicides, that they “indicate a strong commitment to live or die 
by
 a  
nomos other than that of the state of Mississippi: namely, the dignity, honesty,
 and sovereignty of a pure form of American individualism. Inmate suicide is a
 singular act of subversion, both a renunciation and an enunciation of violence”
 (139).
Before launching into my critique — set off, in part, by disbelief
 
in such  
purity — I should say that I’m convinced Gildea embarked on this essay with
 the best will in the world — that is, with every intention of making new space
 for the dead to speak. But 
for
 me the fine line between ventriloquism and  
depersonification (what I will later describe as the de-anthropomorphizing of
 the persons of black men who have died while in custody) gets breached 
here again and again, perhaps because Gildea is so eager to close the door on the
 possibility that these men were murdered; or perhaps because, in the specter’s
 presence, “appropriate” acts of personification are hard to control. In any event,
 Gildea argues that the quick availability of southern narratives of lynching for
 describing deaths while in custody may cause politically minded, left-leaning
 critics to 
overlook
 the despairing sense of agency that drives some men and  
women to kill themselves while in jail. That is, enthralled by victims’ stories,
 critics of state 
violence
 may fail to register an inmate’s desperate attempt at  
embodied protest.
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But the desire to construct this alternative scene of instruction is complex
­
ly motivated. Gildea 
insists
 that the “theory” that Jones and his compatriots  
were lynched “has abstracted the villains, so that all of white Mississippi is
 implicated as a mob” (120). Indeed? What are the author
'
s own transference  
points, the nodes of racial crisis or white writing that motivate such 
observa­tions? What anxieties might the narrative of a black mans “heroic” suicide
 attempt to ward off? Later in this essay I want to generalize from the particu
­lars of this essay to explore the problems in transferential thinki
ng
 that can  
remain sublimated or subliminal within the current methodologies of cultural
 studies. But for now, let me 
suggest
 that Gildea’s argument about heroic sui ­
cides in custody suffers from numerous epistemological glitches, including its
 misapplication of a romantic 
version
 of unified selfhood (felt in the invocation  
of “a pure form of American individualism”), its description of the possibility of
 a purely instrumental response to prison trauma (in ecstatic tones reminiscent
 of Byrons “The Prisoner of Chillon”), and its ends-dominated interpretation of
 events (the notion that we’re allowed to write history backwards, from results
 we can see to intentions we can only intuit). But however strong my sense of
 epistemological recoil at the model of history that constructs these conclusions
 — the teleological assumptions about how history works, the transcendental
 assumptions about how imprisoned subjects function — my first response, 
in reality, was not this academic.
What disturbed 
me
 even more than this essay’s facts or its argument is the  
question of how the dead are narrated — how their bodies are glossed. The
 pivotal, mediating figure, the point of transference that introduces this essay, is
 Andre Jones, a black man found hanging by his own shoelace. The section
 introducing his story begins with a subtitle, “Starting on a Shoe String,” a string
 of words that makes Jones’s body
 
the subject of cleverly nuanced academic play.  
What is gained by this painful irreverence, by a pun that works over and
 through a dead man’s body with the cavalier bitterness of a good Gershwin
 song? I think, what am I able to demand of the author of this or any essay, as
 she or he holds open the bodies of others for my
 
gaze? I think, language is dif ­
ficult, and 
objects
 never go into their concepts without leaving something  
behind, without leaving a remainder. But
 
in this essay that so appalls me I find  
something more than a remainder: I find too many remains. There are too
 many
 
bodies here, and too little care for them.
However bitterly or acerbically it is meant, the pun “starting on a shoe
­string” functions too glibly
 
to lighten the burden of writing about the dead. In  
taking a body already disfigured by violence and making a “figure” out of it —
 a trope, a pun, a sleight-of-word — the author relocalizes Jones’s death, his
 bodily remains, within the entrepreneurial space of academic play. Elsewhere
 in the essay this disfiguration seems even more 
dangerous:
For Andre Jones, jail
 
hanging may have been a  somatic form of cultural  crit ­
icism attesting to the incontestable reality of the pain and torture of Mis
­sissippi jails. But as Scarry would predict, the “language” of this hanging
 event is not entirely
 
clear. You cannot  be sure what the hanging is “saying”  
about the pain of the inmate. This linguistic problem calls into question
 the source and agency of Jones’s unmaking.
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Scarry’s work emphasizes the importance of reading the body as a text,
 
a valuable approach to the story of Jones’s death. The posture of Andre
 Jones emphasizes the body in a way that cancels the contents of the world:
 the suspension of a body from the 
shower
 bar, dangling like fruit, fleshy,  
pulpy, a 
liquefying
 solid. The human involved is reduced from a sentient  
being into a mere body, matter, the object of gravity’s pull. In the case of
 Jones, a single shoestring unmakes the made, 
for
 in his world shoes were  
both a possession of 
status
 and a position of plight, as in “I wouldn’t want  
to be in your shoes.” His hanging synthesizes 
each
 connotation so that the  
plight of pain becomes objectified and he 
becomes,
 like the shoe, some ­
thing that dangles from a string. Andre Jones the sentient being 
disappears and is represented by a black Nike hightop sneaker, the kind young urban
 blacks sometimes kill for. Because of shoes, some urban teenagers kill oth
­ers; by means of shoes, do some jailed urban teenagers kill themselves?
 Andre Jones did not kill for shoes but instead died by 
means
 of them, his 
Mississippi-made body transformed i to both a shoe and a field of crisis.
 Unfortunately
 
for Mississippi, however, the hanging  of Andre Jones has the  
appearance of bearing the antecedent state insignia of lynching. (115)
These paragraphs ride on the same somatic techniques that the Pretoria muse
­
um exhibit uses to vivify Steven Biko’s death; they swerve between a heroiciz-
 ing classicism and the prurient anarchy of
 
the grotesque. The author begins  
with a small gesture of heroism. If Jones has killed himself, this act becomes a
 form of “somatic cultural criticism”: that is, in death his body is wedded to the
­ory;
 
it becomes a visceral act of cultural critique (it is “like”  a  cultural critic’s acts  
of cultural criticism). But almost immediately Gildea retracts this violent yok
­ing of unlike subjectivities, and his text moves dialectically
 
to acknowledge that  





to a  halt, at least until “theory” can come to the rescue. To cope with  
the subject’s silence, the critic must borrow figures that permit the reading of
 this body as text:  
"
a valuable approach.” (But  valuable for whom? Who prof ­
its when someone’s else’s body is turned into a set of tropes to be perused as 
an academic commodity? Here even silence can become a surplus value the read
­er can reap.)
Here two different 
modes
 of problematic thinking become visible. First,  
this paragraph appropriates figures from Billie Holliday’s “Strange Fruit,” a bit
­ter 
song
 about the effects of lynching and mob violence in the postbellum  
South. In the initial verse of this song, death is almost made bearable — it is
 lightened — by displacing the traumas endured by once-living men onto an
 aestheticized object from the natural world: “Southern trees bear strange fruit,
 / Blood on the leaves and 
red
 at the root. / Black bodies swinging in the south ­
ern breeze, / Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.” But while “men” and
 “fruit” are so easily linked, what the 
song
 points to again and again is the dis ­
tance between the living metaphor and the dead body. That is, the fact of dis
­placement (the way that the personification of “fruit” is so eerily mapped onto
 the de-anthropomorphized bodies of black men) in itself makes a political
 statement. It suggests that these bodies have already endured such displace
­
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ment long before their death. In the pre-civil-rights South, African Ameri
­
cans, whether dead or alive, were barred from crossing the symbolic threshold
 into personification; from the perspective of the dominant culture they were
 forced to hover 
in
 the uncivil space between human and inhuman worlds. As  
Hortense Spillers describes the lives of black women during this period:
Slavery did not transform the black female into an embodiment of carnal
­
ity at all, as the myth of the black woman would tend to convince us. She
 became instead the principal point of passage between the human and non
­human world. Her issue became the focus of a cunning difference . . . the
 route by which the dominant
 
male decided the distinction between human ­
ity and  
"
other” . . . [decided that] black is vestibular to culture. In other  
words, the black person mirrored for the society around her what a human
 being was not. (76)
Billie Holliday’s song defines the hanging 
bodies
 of black men as another  point  
of impossible passage. That something as heavy
 
as a body can  be made so light,  
so irrelevant, so metaphoric, is the first ironic point of this song. The second is
 that this very lightness is only possible because African-American men have
 already been de-anthropomorphized by white society. Thus Holliday’s allusion
 to the lynched bodies of
 
black men as ‘strange fruit” resounds so caustically  
because these men have died several deaths. As metaphors, the song
'
s spectral  
bodies offer a doubly mimetic space, the frightening specter of “emphasis
 added” to injury. This 
song
 not only calls out to the traumas endured by black  
men but 
opens
 a space for exploring the dehumanization (the lost personhood  
or
 
personification) suffered by the African-American community at large. The  
re-imaging and de-animation of black 
bodies
 as “fruit for the crows to pluck”  
offers a commentary not only on the practice of lynching but on a
 
white meta ­
physic that makes blackness vestibular to humanity.
My central critique of Gildea’s “reading” of Andre Jones’s body is that his
 
metaphors are complicit in rather than critical of these older acts of dehuman
­ization. He 
ignores
 what the Holliday song knows too well: namely, that the  
dangers implicit in the rhetoricization of a black man’s body can have material
 effects
 
—  that the depersonification of African Americans is an ongoing, repet ­
itive stratagem within American history. The argument his essay proposes —
 that
 
in creating his own hanging death, Andre Jones “objectifies” himself on his  
own shoestring — seems too self-serving. In “Estranged Fruit” men are made
 into metaphors so they can be harvested by the critic.
To put this somewhat differently, the racially-marked bodies of Gildea’s
 
essay seem all too available for acts of rhetorical seizure and conceptual vio
­lence. Gildea begins his essay
 
with the deaths of two black men, Andre Jones  
and
 
David Scott Campbell, even though he wants to argue that the inmate “sui ­
cides” in Mississippi’s jails are evenly distributed among black and white males
 as well as among black and white females. Color is esssentially effaced as a topic
 here, but it is all too present as the spectacular site of
 
exoticism and readerly  
transference. What part does race (or ethnicity or sexual or religious prefer
­ence) play in making bodies available for academic consumption? For example,
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in the paragraphs just cited, Jones’s body is said to cancel the world. (But does
 
it? For whom? For his parents? His peers?) A string of metaphors follows, as
 if the body of a hanged man could dangle from a series of tropes, transformed
 from fruit to shoe to ghetto tough: a persona killed (or killing) because of his
 shoes; a person who is already depersonified.
And
 
this is my second critique of the problematic thinking that makes these 
lurid figures possible.1 While "world-canceling” is meant to suggest
 
the world ­
negating capacities of suicide itself, this cancellation of the world, offers a limit
 case for examining what happens when we read synecdochally, when a 
body becomes a “text,” is excerpted from its context, and then asked to re-represent
 the meaning
 
of this dissipated context. That  is, this illusion of world-canceling  
marks the spot where Gildea’s own prose starts to saturate the dead man's “evac
­uated” space; this is the beginning of a series of phrases that attempt to make
 trauma available for a certain kind of argument, a certain kind of consumption.
 What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric?
Let me give a brief overview. First, we are told that
 
Jones’s dead body is  
hanging, like fruit, like the hanged men from the 
old
 Billie Holliday song. But  
if it’s “like” a fruit, it’s also not like a fruit at all: a shower head is not a branch,
 a shoe string is not a twig, and Jones lived and died in a postmodern era, when
 even the Ku Klux 
Klan
 has its own web site. So, the author concludes, this  
body is not such “strange fruit” after all; instead, it is “like” a shoe — it hangs
 from a shoe string, doesn’t it? And “young urban 
blacks
” sometimes kill each  
other for their shoes — that’s common knowledge, isn’t it? — whether such
 “knowledge” is relevant to Jones’s life or not. (Notice how cultural context
 returns in this selective way as the outgrowth of the textualization of Jones’s
 body, of the selective pressures of a chosen field of synecdoches). Well, if kids
 kill
 
themselves for shoes, then why not  with  shoes? All this demands  is the  shift  
of one preposition — not a big deal. The body becomes — not itself—but an
 effect of reading. It is transformed into an Ovidian site that can be manipulat
­ed for the sake of a certain form of academic mastery.
What I 
am
 trying to show, in crudely approximating the logic that drives  
these two paragraphs, is the way this narrative mimics a set of techniques that
 cultural critics use all the time, techniques that cultural 
studies
 borrows from  
anthropology and anthropology borrows from literary criticism: a method
 James Clifford calls “textualization.” (It occurs in “Estranged Fruit” when a
 young man’s body is excerpted from both its jailhouse and neighborhood con




“is the process through which unwritten behav ­
ior, speech, beliefs, oral tradition, and ritual come to be marked as a corpus, a
 potentially meaningful
 
ensemble separated out from an immediate discursive or  
performative situation” (38). This corpus has extraordinarily mobile and
 metaphoric properties. By extrapolating one detail from a cultural context and
 making that detail into a “text” — a site for interpretation, for reading — what
 emerges is a gathering of synecdoches that can be read in isolation from their
 dialogic field, allowing a world to reemerge under the control of images that the
 critic herself chooses to emphasize. In other words, a part is used to reconstruct
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the whole, but with content and context blown away. When  
context reemerges, it comes not as itself, but as a narrative spun out of the
 interpreter-anthropologists poesis, her own acts of making.
The dangers of this spinning are obvious. That is, by extrapolating one
 
detail from its “background” and designating that detail as a meaning-filled
 “text,” what 
emerges
 is the invention of a tropological field that grows out of  
the abstracted detail itself. Even more disconcerting, the evacuation of a par
­ticular context can be disguised in tropes of abundance that both dehumanize
 the body and make it into an object so we can continue to “read” it — that is,
 to recreate it by piling metaphors and similes upon it so that it becomes some
­thing other than “itself.”
This observation poses an additional problem. In perusing Andre Jones’s
 
death we can say that there is, of course, no “self” 
here
 at all. What happens  
when the corpus is really a corpse? You’
d
 think the dead would be silent, over-  
easy, eager for the materiality bestowed by some critic’s “texting.” But the very
 opposite seems true, for the invocation of “Strange Fruit” has already sum
­moned the borrowed figures of the dead into the margins of this essay — and
 once they are summoned, they will not bow down. “Scent of magnolia, sweet
 and fresh / Then the sudden smell of burning
 
flesh. / Here’s a  fruit for the crows  
to pluck. / For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck. / For the sun to rot, for
 the tree to drop. / Here’s a strange and bitter
 
crop.” Holliday’s song is acrid and  
heavy; it conjures the weight of the dead to testify around the “corpus” of
 another hanged man. Later, I want to address the problematic use of “Strange
 Fruit” as metaphoric space for imagining “the new” (here, as a set of metaphors
 that Gildea uses to construct an alternate theory of violent death while in cus
­
tody).
 But for now, let me simply suggest that the ways in which this song is  
made formulaic and the 
subject
 of refutation has the effect of making the  
specter emerge even more palpably.
What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric? Rhetoric seems complic
­
it in evacuating these dead men’s worlds; it cancels the brutal facticity of the
 body’s 
local
 fate for the appropriative potentials of metaphor. At the same time,  
some form of troping, of de- or re-anthropomorphizing, is inevitable whenev
­er we speak of the dead. Given the fact that the dead can only live as tropes, as
 figures, 
for
 the remainder of this essay I want to explore the repercussions of  
this problem 
for




How do we account for, and respond to, the weight of the dead and the  
potential dissipation of the body in writing?
2)
 
What does it mean to make the dead into “texts”? Or, as my colleague  
Marlon Ross has asked, what are the 
dangers




What is the relation between reading (or writing) for pleasure and the  
specter? Marx suggests that the dead — not as the facts but as the “figures” of
 history — 
feed
 revolutions: their bodies are given leading roles in political  
movements and documents; their speciality offers the metaphoric foundation
 of the new.  If the specter provides the tropes we push off from, or push away
 from, in order to suggest other, more utopian orders, what can we conclude
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about the relation between the spectral and the pleasure of “the new”? 
Or,
 to  
make a more local intervention, how does excitement about new ideas (part of
 Journal x
'
s motive in creating a journal focused on pleasure) depend on the  
specter, rest on the spectral properties — the tropics — of the dead?
4)
 
Finally, what is the status of griefwork and the thematics of loss within  
the fin de siècle academy? How should we respond to, and in what tones should
 
we
 write about, our obsessive recoveries of subsemantic histories? Are we  
inventing new “brands” of transgenerational haunting? Or is academic con
­sumerism an inevitable outgrowth of the culture of late capitalism that 




The Weight of the Dead
The Communist Manifesto begins with a ghost: “Ein Gespenst geht um in
 
Europa — a specter is haunting Europe.” But in Specters of
 
Marx Derrida stalks  
the ghost of Marx himself. He wants to conjure not only with the lost ghosts
 of communism but
 
with Marx’s own obsession with specters:
Men make their own history [ihre eigene Geschichte} but
 
they do not make it  
just as they please [aus freien Stücken]; they do not make it under circum
­
stanc
es chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encoun ­
tered, given and transmitted from the past [überlieferten Umständen]. The
 tradition of all the dead generations [aller toten Geschlecter] weighs [lastet]
 
like
 a nightmare on the brain of the living. (Quoted in Derrida 108)
In calling out to the specter we encounter a new kind of
 
nightmare: not the  
gothic terror of being haunted by the dead, but the greater terror of not being
 haunted, of ceasing to feel the weight of past generations in one’s bones. That
 is, the words we use to hold the dead, to call out to them, are too porous, too
 leaky. Even the English version of Marx’s phrase, “the tradition of all the dead
 generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living,” has more heft
 in the German. In Marx’s original text, the specter “‘lastet wie ein
 
Alp,’ that is,  
weighs like one of those ghosts that give nightmares; the French translation
 reads simply 
'
pese d’un poids tres lourd,’ weighs very heavily; as often happens  
in translations, the ghost
 
drops off into oblivion or,  in the best of cases, it is dis ­
solved into approximate 
figures
” (Derrida 108).
The problem haunting my essay is precisely the danger of this dissolution
 of the dead into “approximate figures.” Take, for example, my own attempt to
 invoke the ghost in the paragraph on Steven Biko that begins this essay. Here
 I want to instantiate a physical dignity for the dead, to invoke the terrors of
 imprisonment and choicelessness (the nightmare weight that descends upon
 Biko) as well as the forces of history that Biko, in 
his
 political actions, sought  
to lift. I want some portion of this weight to descend on the reader’s body, to
 
creat
e a burdensome space for thinking about the relationship between repre ­
sentational melancholy and political praxis.
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But as soon as I open this scene, something else starts to happen; I remo
­
bilize the specter for a different set of rhetorical ends . Planning to talk later in
 this essay about what happens to black men in prisons, I ask the invocation of
 “Biko” to set the scene. His body lends itself to the
 
project of making this essay  
into a well-working object, an echo chamber 
for
 my most urgent ideas. In the  
midst of such considerations, where are
 
we, how close to the ghost? And what  
happens to the 
work,
 the figuration of mourning? I write a sentence, then  
strike it out: “I wanted to name my son after Steven Biko, but couldn’t, didn’t
 — a martyr’s name. But aren’t half the 
names
 in the white man’s canon mar ­
tyr’s names — just buried under centuries of overuse?” It sounds too personal,
 it breaks the tone, draws too much attention to my own psychic investments in
 this project when I want to draw out something more serious. But one of my
 criticisms of Gildea’s essay is precisely the question of transference. In making
 a body into a text, what investments does the cultural critic bring to her work,
 and when should they become visible?
Meanwhile, I’m looking over my shoulder and thinking about audience:
 
how well is 
my
 interpretation taking hold? Am I doing  better than other  inter ­
pretations? But before resolving this problem my efforts to invoke the specter
 are taken over
 
by the sheer delight of thinking, by  the spectacular lure of analy ­
sis. Invoking the ghost, I become half-acrobatic, take pleasure in associative
 vertiginousness and move farther from the 
lure
 of the specter. That is, the  very  
act of thinking about the spectral object makes it even more spectral. Theodor
 Adorno defines the problems that the thinking subject encounters in each 
act of definition or analysis 
in
 his Negative Dialectics:
The spell cast by the subject becomes equally a spell cast over the subject.
 
Both spells are driven by the Hegelian fury of disappearance. The subject
 is spent and impoverished in its categorial performance; to be able to 
define and articulate what it confronts . . . the subject must dilute itself to the
 point
 
of mere universality, for the sake of the objective validity of those def ­
initions. It must cut
 
loose from, itself as much as from the cognitive object,  
so that this object will be reduced to its concept, according to plan. The
 objectifying 
subject
 contracts into a point of abstract reason, and finally  
into logical noncontradictoriness. (139)
This is a ponderous passage containing a crucial idea. First Adorno marks the
 
impoverishment of the subject, of the “texting” person. In seeking definitions
 or articulations with “objective validity” the subject cuts herself loose from the
cognitive object. This object,
 
in turn, is cut  loose from everything except for its  
"concept,”
 
its dematerialized idea. In writing or thinking we experience a need  
to turn things into concepts so that they can be spoken about. But this very
 need casts a spell that breeds disappearance: both subject and object are dilut
­ed and spent when they are described under a common denominator. Both
 object and subject “contract,” in a simultaneous disappearance of two different
 contexts. This is the very problem that the double-bodied exhibit 
in
 the Pre ­
toria museum is trying — so awkwardly — to make intelligible. Neither of
 these bodies allows Biko to haunt us sufficiently; each flirts with the problem
 of disappearance.
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I seem to have come to a binary impasse: either the ghost speaks, or we
 
must endure — that is, become complicit in — its silence, the attenuation of
 the dead within the oblivion of approximate figures, figures designed to com
­municate but always encountering the emptiness of the concept, the flatness of
 theory, the excess of lurid projections, or the instrumentality of the body made
 spectacle. But there is a third possibility, one narrated by Homer in The
 Odyssey, in the scenes where Odysseus journeys to Hades to talk with the dead.
 Abandoning Circe for Ithaca, 
Odysseus
 is faced with another detour; he  
requires “the strengthless 
heads
 of  the perished dead” to learn “how to make  
your way home on the sea where the fish swarm” (10.540). Faced with this
 journey, “the inward heart 
in
 me was broken, / and I sat down on the bed and  
cried, nor did the heart in me / wish to go on living any longer, nor to look on
 the sunlight. / But
 
when I had glutted myself with rolling about and weeping,  
/ then at last I spoke aloud” (496-9). Odysseus must find a form of speech not
 overburdened with grief, with figures of glut or excess. In fact, his strategy for
 getting the dead to speak will involve a similar self-regulation. Approaching
 Hades, Odysseus digs a pit and pours libations for the dead, “first / honey
 mixed with milk, then a second pouring of sweet
 
wine” (519-20). Finally this  
pit is filled with the blood of the living:
Now
 
when, with sacrifices and prayers, I had so entreated  
the hordes of the dead, I took the sheep and cut their throats
 over the pit, and the dark-clouding blood ran in, and the souls
 of the perished dead gathered to the place, 
up
 out of Erebos, brid s, and  
young unmarried men, and long-suffering elders,
 virgins, tender and with the sorrows of young hearts upon them,
 and many fighting men killed in battle, stabbed with brazen
 spears, still carrying their bloody armor upon them.
These came swarming around my pit from every direction
 
with inhuman clamor, and green fear took hold of me. (11.34-43)
This “dark-clouding” blood becomes the locus of a bizarre
 
plenitude; it provides  
three different conundrums for thinking about the
 
“approximate figures” of the  
dead.
First, why is this blood necessary? It would seem that the dead can only
 
speak when they partake of the things of this world. If the images clothing the
 dead are important, it is because these figures are the gateway to their avail
­ability. At the same time, the dress that we bestow upon the phantom is
 inevitably our own. That is, the trace of the specter
'
s speech resides neither in  
the dead's wished-for presence nor in their oblivion, but 
in
 their inevitable  
hybridity. They must be fed on the life
 
blood, the figures of the  present, if they  
are to speak.
And here we come to a second conundrum. Odysseus offers this sacrifice
 
so that the dead can become substantial. But when the phantoms begin to
 swarm, Odysseus instructs his men to draw their
 
swords. Initially, only a hand ­
ful among the restless “hordes of
 
the dead” are allowed to drink; the rest are  
withheld figuration. Here we face the question of both posthumous harm and
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equal access to figuration: how do we choose who can speak, how do we account
 
for the missing persons of the dead? This gatekeeping function or archival cen
­sorship provided by historical narrative is also the source of Walter Benjamins
 famous call for a materialist, interventionist history, 
one
 that reestablishes a  
possible voice for “those
 
who are lying prostrate,” that  refuses to celebrate either  
the victor's monuments or his specters. “To articulate the past historically does
 not mean to recognize it "the way it really was’ 
(Ranke).
 It means to seize hold  
of a memory s it flashes up at a moment of danger.... Only that historian
 
will  
have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced
 that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy
 
if he wins. And this enemy  
has not ceased to be victorious” (255). For Benjamin “the way it really was” is
 always an invention of the victor’s culture. We find an example in Z Magazine
 
in
 a parodic portrait of an anchorman reading the evening news: “This just in,  
a Pakistani jet crashed into a Libyan cruise ship killing all 
5,000
 passengers  
instantly.” In the next frame he looks irritated: “I don’t get it . . . where’s the
 story?” A hand juts into the frame with an update and suddenly the anchorman
 reads with renewed emphasis: “There were three Americans on board! Oh the
 Humanity!” (17). For the phantom to speak, it must participate in the telos of
 Odysseus’s journey, in his country-seeking quest.
Given this telos, is it surprising that, among those originally withheld 
figu­
ration and left in the margins, is Odysseus’s mother? When Odysseus sees her,
 “I broke into tears at the sight of her and my
 
heart pitied her, / but even so, for  
all my thronging sorrow, I would not / let her draw near the blood until I had
 questioned Teiresias” (11.87-9). When his mother speaks, Odysseus wants
 nothing more than to hold her: “Mother, why 
will
 you not wait for me, when  
I am trying
 
/ to ho d you, so that even in Hades with our arms embracing / we  
can both take the satisfaction of dismal mourning? / Or are
 
you nothing but an  
image?” (210-14). What kind of mourning is this? Why does Odysseus, who
 at first refuses to talk to his mother, now long for her embrace? In addition to
 the question of gatekeeping, Homer 
opens
 a space for meditating upon the  
image as a way
 
of both  “holding” and “holding  off” the material presence of the  
dead.3
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau suggests that we are
 
always at the margins of
 
Hades, always surrounded by meditative spaces that  
hold open (and 
speak
 for) the dead. “There is no place that is not haunted by  
many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits one can "invoke’ or not.
 Haunted places are the only ones people can live 
in
” (108). But in a letter that  
questions these e chantments (at least as they were depicted in a recent essay
 collection on The Geography of
 
Identity), my friend Richard Godden demurs:
Concerning your account of place as haunted with the residues of wasted
 
work: the problem is that ghosts are the evacuees of memory and that to
 obtain substance they must be shed 
by
 the actions (and thoughts) of those  
who live. Unless spectres materialize through lived institutions, they will
 make no path, leave no track and evaporate. I have always been simultane
­ously impressed and skeptical over Volosinov’s claim that “no word forgets
 its path” — would that this were so. Surely the linguist meant “
no
word  
should be permitted to forget its path.”
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In search of such memories, what forgiveness, what reprieve? In recognizing
 
that every space is haunted, we are still at one remove from the enormity of
 transgenerational haunting. It is only when someone bears witness or gives the
 specter its due (its space of political and institutional articulation) that the
 empty images of the dead can be held up and held open. Given the importance
 (and impotence) of writing from within the complexity of our own killing
 fields, is “textualization” really so bad as a strategy? Isn’t the task of abstraction
 a potential response, a valiant attempt to answer Benjamin’s plea for a politi
­cally responsible history, one that
 
reaches out deliberately,  blindly, to respond  to  
a moment of danger?
2.
 
Doing Anthropology with a Dead Subject
To answer, I want to look at a series of books that ask whether it is possible to
 
theorize other bodies, other cultures, while holding open a space for mourning,
 for the lost object. What relationship to theory 
will
 help us explore our repet ­
itive love for the specter, our continual pleasure in being haunted
 else’s dead?
E. Valentine Daniel refigures these questions in Charred Lullabies: Chapters
 
in an Anthropography of Violence, a book that 
frames
 a new anthropological dis ­
course to describe the results of nationalist violence in Sri Lanka. Daniel began
 the research for this volume in 1982, when he planned a trip to collect folk
 songs by Tamil women who worked on Sri Lanka’s tea estates. But instead of
 lullabies, Daniel encountered a country torn apart by 
an
 unstoppable conflict  
between Tamil minorities a d a Sinhalese majority. He begins Charred Lulla
­bies by invoking the results of this ongoing war:
Many
 
have died. To say  more is to simplify, but to fathom the statement  is  
also to make the fact
 
bearable. Tellipali, Nilaveli, Manippay, Boosa, Dollar  
Farm, Kokkadicholai — mere place-names of another time — have been
 transformed into names of places spattered with blood and mortal residue.
 . . . Many have died. How to give 
an
 account of these shocking events 
without giving in to a desire to shock? And more important, what does it
 mean to give such an account? That is the burden of this book. (3)




the narrative strategies of anthropology but its deepest structures. In con ­
fronting atrocities, what good are methods or theories "designed to enhance”
 our understanding of coherent social units such as castes or clans? These ordi
­nary, structure-seeking explanations "had suddenly become inappropriate,”
 forcing the anthropologist to turn to more urgent questions. First, how does
 one write an ethnography of violence "without its becoming a pornography of
 violence”? Theory seems to offer one alternative. It provides a flattening-out
 of affect: abstraction instead of prurience. But theory also extracts a cost,
 namely, "the price of betraying those victims of violence (and in at least one
 instance, a perpetrator of 
violence)
 who wished to communicate with the  
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anthropologist and through him to the outside world some part of the experi
­
ence of the passion and the pain of violence in its brutal immediacy” (4).
The burden of describing the pain of another is daunting, and Daniel
 
describes the impotence any writer feels 
in
 the face of this demand. A possible  
solution would be to do nothing. But is this an adequate response to the
 anthropologist’s dialogic contract with his or her subjects? The questions go
 on. How does one protect the anonymity of storytellers whose confessions 
will single them out as informers? Will Daniel himself be able to return to Sri
 Lanka after writing so frankly about the costs of civil war and human torture?
On these several points, Daniel judges his book a failure — the prurience
 
of violence leaks in and theory is advanced
 
with a vengeance. But  in this delib ­
erate space of imperfection something haunting emerges. By refusing the easy
 marriage of theory to world, what we get is a nervous system, an anthropology
 anxious about its own logos, a writing that recognizes its own 
status
 as writing,  
as“anthropography.”4 For Daniel any theory pretending to account for the 
grim facticity of violence or death must stand both under and apart from the mate
­riality
 
it theorizes. Interpretation must proceed without complacency about its  
own accuracy; theory must never explain or evacuate “its” events. Instead, they
 must come together as “jarring juxtapositions.”
While Val Daniel opens a space for contemplating the performance of a
 
“nervous” ethnography, I want to open a coequal space for becoming nervous
 about the strategies of reading implicit in some forms of cultural criticism. To
 situate the need for a metapraxis both bold in its interventions and 
edgy
 with  
stutterance, I want to 
provide
 a quick  overview of the historiography of ethnog ­
raphy that James Clifford supplies in The Predicament of Culture, in which
 “authoritative,” “interpretive,” and “discursive” anthropology offer three differ
­ent sites for interpolating a cultural field.
Clifford 
begins
 by mapping the techniques deployed by the ethnographer  
of the 1920s and 30s, 
an
 empiricist who embraced the fiction of an “authorita ­
tive anthropology.” Defying the contradictory status inherent in the role of
 “participant observer,” confident that the monograph could control the dialog
­ic textures of other cultures, anthropology became a social “science” based on
 the belief that social systems could be abstracted from empirical evidence —
 and that these systems were separable from the anthropologist’s own aesthetic
 practice. Since observation 
could
 amass a discrete body of data to get at social  
truth, the eccentricities and discriminating habits of fieldworkers went unsung.
 That is, the authoritative anthropologist made herself into a specter. Without
 noticing, 
she
 provided another culture’s phantasmatic ground.
In the
 
work  of Clifford Geertz and Company the field shifts toward “inter ­
pretive anthropology” and the 
figurative
 nature of “the poetic processes by  
which cultural objects’ are invented and treated as meaningful” comes into
 greater focus (38). We have already seen that “textualization,”
 
an act of abstrac ­
tion in which an event
 
or behavior is separated out from a larger strata of mean ­
ing, comes to 
be
 understood as the “prerequisite to any act of interpretation.”  
But in this system of deliberate poesis, there are also blind spots. Material that
 is excerpted as “text” immediately assumes a stable relation to “context”; there
 is insufficient anxiety about the leap to synecdoche. When texts (parts taken
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for wholes) hold still, the ethnographer can assume the role of the traditional
 
critic: someone “who sees the task at hand as locating the unruly meanings of
 a text in a single coherent intention.” But without problematizing “the actual
­ity of discursive situations and individual interlocutors,” what gets lost is the
 colloquy of the colloquial, the dialogic, the situational basis of all fact-seeking
 interactions. In a sense, there are two contexts missing: the ethnographers’ and
 the informants’.
And so Clifford clamors for 
an
 anthropology of the incommensurable: for  
“discursive anthropology,” a mode of writing concerned with “situations of
 interlocution” (42). Even 
here
 the ground is sticky and the specter may go  
missing. How does one “resist the pull toward authoritative representation of
 the other”? How “to maintain the strangeness of the other voice” as well as the
 quiddities of the exchange that produced that voice? If what emerges in both
 “authoritative” and “interpretive” anthropology
 
is the problem of doing anthro ­
pology not only with abstracted subjects but with a dead or missing anthropol
­ogist, discursive anthropology also has its 
pitfalls.
 In trying to give the subject  
enough headroom, a discrete space of dialogic response, the anthropologist
 compensates with ample quotation. But the danger here is in using quotation
 in a subordinate fashion, as confirming
 
testimony (50). How does one write an  
ethnography
 
where the subject talks back? (Even worse: how does one write  
such an ethnography with the dead?)
Kathleen Stewart’s A Space On the Side of the Road provides delicious if par
­
tial answers. This is a book addressed from the coal mining regions of West
 Virginia, a space lacking monumental stature within an American imaginary
 where “African-American culture has become the talisman of cultural differ
­ence.’” Stewart wants to rethink this dialectic
 
of othering from  within the space  
of 
an
 “Appalachia” texted from both inside and out as a backwater, a space on  
the side of the road. To make this space almost visible, Stewart argues for the
 clashing of epistemologies — “ours and theirs” — and she uses that clash
 repeatedly to reopen “a gap in the theory of culture itself so that we can imag
­ine culture as a process constituted in use.” “Culture” is redefined as a site “hard
 to grasp”; it can 
never
 be found in “the perfect text and the quick textual solu­
tion” (5).
To prevent this fallacy of “perfect texting” Stewart projects a mixture of
 
voices. The rhythms of her book move back and forth between the imperative
 voice — “imagine this, picture that” — and fragrant lists that conjure fragments
 of places. Jumping from someone’s front porch to a meditation on what it
 means to report
 
“place” in this way, Stewart swerves into theory and then back  
again, meditating all along on the arc of her own voice. In reporting dialogue
 she tries to remember the circumstance of the telling, including her own “aggra
­vation” at the “constant proliferation of stories” that
 
will not hold still. Elabo ­
rating on one community’s self-description as “an old timey place,” she conjures
 yards filled with broken washing machines, scraps of metal, and cars belly up;
 she demands that
 
we arrest the gestures of “academic essentialism”: “the desire  
for decontaminated meaning, the need to require that visual, verbal constructs  
yield meaning down to their last detail” (26).
In refusing to galvanize everything “into an order of things” Stewart tries
 
to deflect “transcendent critique long enough to recognize the practices of con-
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cealment and forgetting inherent in all inodes of explanation, description, 
and 
analysis (71). What if, instead of transcendent codes and systems, “there was
 only the anecdote”? What if we refused transcendent theories of culture and
 instead flooded our own markets with contaminating voices? What if every
 academic appropriation grew “nervous 
in
 the wake of its own partial under ­
standings and dense under the weight of its own political unconscious” (210)?
 What then?
Stewart’s call for a nervous system, her refusal of singular, duplicable mod
­
els, makes for breathtaking reading, but what does it suggest about the specter?
 Doing anthropology with a dead 
subject
 already means that one is well outside  
the dialogic, talking with someone who can 
never
 talk back. “Interpretation is  
not interlocution. It does not depend on being in the presence of a speaker”
 (Clifford 39).
I feel this absence most acutely in Feldman’s Formations of Violence, a book
 
on the recent political struggles between Republicans and 
Loyalists
 in North ­
ern Ireland. Here, again and again, terrifying events are torn from their con
­text and
 
“textualized.” Often this involves an extraordinary feeling of violation.  
Feldman anatomizes a scene of violence and then theorizes the psycho-social
 sources of this violence, with little apparent concern for its victims, those
 defiled by inventive brands of territorial fury. At the same time, the very
sub­ject of this book is reflected in its methods. Feldman wants to unpack the
 volatility of violence, the way it escapes and fractures disciplinary structures,
 hacks its way into normative sites of
 
legitimation. A question Formations of  
Violence dodges is, how can we talk about those who are offed by political 
vio­
lence
 without replicating its dehumanizations? Within the apparatus f For ­
mations of Violence, theory itself becomes a kind of torture machine that
 processes the dead like so much odd filigree. And yet Feldman’s insight into
 the particularly virulent world of injustice within Northern Ireland also “legit
­imates” his book’s violent method. We learn that sanctuaries function both to
 “territorialize violence” and to create zones of “reversible violence” that contin
­ually change the terrain of “barricaded communities” (36). The complex 
ethics of “hardmen” (an old breed of Irishmen who handled conflict with fisticuffs)
 changes under the pressures of insurgency and counterinsurgency into the vio
­lent
 
ethos of “gunman” bent on a new species of genocide. Feldman argues that  
the political violence that ricochets throughout the urban environments of the
 Irish North offers an underanalyzed , mode of transcription that “circulates
 codes from one prescribed historiographic surface or agent to another. . . .
 Struggles will 
occur
 over competing transcriptions of the same body,” fractur ­
ing 
any
 vision of the body as “organic” or “natural” and accelerating one’s sense  
of politicized subjectivity (7). In a sense, there is no space for griefwork here
 because this book’s own accelerated rhythm of
 
analysis reenacts the circuit in  




I also want to argue that something like a  “holding” of the violent,  
violating, violated subject also occurs in the nervous interstices between Feld
­man’s own theories and his recorded interviews with IRA activists imprisoned
 by the British government. Here we find a particular intensive example of “tex-
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 example, Feldman describes the prisons rectal exams as “a ceremony  
of defilement and the highest expression of the prison regime’s optical colon
­ization of the captive body” — returning us to the question of the pun and
 whether the academic
 
writer should abandon the temptation to hypertextualize  
an already violated body (174). To refuse to mark this “colonic” space — that
 is, to refuse 
to
 notice or emphasize a pun already half-present, half-visible,  
describing the prisoners’ “colonized” anuses — opens a site of readerly risibili
­ty; once noted the pun is so obvious, so very much there. And yet to cite it is
 to make the bodies of others too available to the reader’s objectifying gaze.
 That is, to pun about rectal extrusion and intrusion (to make the context of
 bodily invasion and privation so playful) is to risk excessive figuration. But not
 to mark this space of punning violation seems just as reprehensible. As Feld
­man argues, for Republican prisoners reduced by
 
this continued defilement, the  
colon became wonderfully powerful, allowing colonized bodies to fight back
 using the only means available — colon-ically.
The story behind these
 
vagrant figures is textured and complex. Beginning  
in 1976 the “Blanketmen” (those IRA prisoners Feldman interviewed who
 refused to wear prison uniforms that could divest them of their political status
 by labeling them common “criminals”) began their terrible vigil. When prison
 authorities refused to grant them political standing, numbers of men lived for
 years divested of clothing, shivering in coarse blankets, their nakedness a
 
polit ­
ical protest against continued deterritorialization. But without the protection
 of everyday clothing, these men became extraordinarily vulnerable. They were
 terrorized by guards who had easy access to their bodies, so that every available
 opening became a portal for excavation. Responding to repeated beatings and
 brutal searches of their anal cavities whenever they used the latrines, prisoners
 began to cover the walls of their
 
cells with their own feces — to stink the guards  
out.
Feldman’s thick descriptions of these atrocities suggest a mode of creative
 
interpretation stretched past the limit:
The prisoners’
 
refusal to  wear the uniform has been the first interruption of  
optical circuits. The guards responded by transforming nakedness into an
 obvious surrogate tool of visual degradation in place of institutional cloth
­ing. The No Wash Protest by the prisoners reclothed their naked bodies
 with a new and repellent surface of resistance. The fecal cell, which the
 guards tended to avoid and mainly entered to inflict quick terror, also inter
­rupted compulsory visibility. In its soiled condition the cell was no longer
 a unidimensional and totally transparent optical stage. The stained walls
 and the stench endowed the cells with a sensory opacity, resistant depth,
 and blackness within which the prisoners could shelter. There was a strong
 analogue between the hiding of contraband by the prisoners in their rectal
 cavity and the withdrawal of the Blanketmen into the repelling depths of
 the scatological cell. Denied the surfaces of the
 
inmate’s body and the inte ­
rior of the inmate’s cell by fecal defilement, the prison regime extended its
 optic to the colon-ization of the physical interior of the prisoner with the
 rectal mirror search. (175)
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Here, I would argue, the practice of “texting” may go too far, but it also fails to
 
go far enough. That is, Feldman s own colonic text defamiliarizes and disgorges
 a context so habitually violent that words can barely contain it. In stretching
 one
'
s figurative capacities on behalf of bodies also stretched to the limit, in 
inventing puns that insistent
 
on making rhetorical capital out of someone else’s  
body by means of an extravagant and objectifying poesis, Feldman’s text
 becomes frighteningly mimetic. That is, in immersing us so thoroughly, so vis-
 cerally in cloacal
 
politics (running the gamut from highbrow theory to lowbrow  
wordplay), Feldman’s version of “interpretive” anthropology veers deliberately
 off course and 
becomes,
 I would argue, “discursive.” This is thick description  
with an alienation-effect thrown in: rhetorical cavities held 
wide,
 figures vio ­
lent
 
and awkward, attempting to make  readable (and therefore disruptable?) the  
space of the all too terrible and strange.
In criticizing the hard-troping, theory-hungry
 
bent of Feldman’s prose, I’m  
also arguing that its “evacuation” of griefwork or mourning is oddly compensat ­
ed for by Feldman’s own far-fetched and farcical figurations — images that jolt
 us out of a too redemptive, too stultifying
 
pathos. Given this self-contradicting  
conclusion, however, why do I object so strenuously when Gildea constructs
 equally “creative” and objectifying figures to inscribe the mute surfaces of Mis
­sissippi’s dead?
My objection is this: while Feldman tries to find a space to reinscribe the
 
fecal contexts deliberately created by his informants, Gildea participates in a
 form of cultural criticism that doesn’t recognize its own lack of information:
 namely, the complexities of doing anthropology with a dead subject who can
­not talk back. In the face of this silence Gildea creates a system that forgets to
 be nervous about its own certainties:
A convict who commits suicide out of the depths of despondency is an
 
artist enacting a dream of expressive freedom upon his or her own body. In
 the complex creativity of these forty-nine men and women, you can see a
 reenactment of the whole history of human thought and art. .. . They per
­ceived another form of sleep in their bedsheets. They found a new way to
 wear their old jeans. (132)
[S]elf-violence 
in
 jail . . . needs to be witnessed to be validated as art. In  
large part because of the debate over their authorship and their journalistic  
depiction as unmakings, the Mississippi jail hangings have not been pre
­sented to a public audience as works of 
art.
 Once revealed as makings, 
however, the power of their iconic imagery rises before you. It speaks of
 stillness, of liminality
 
and resistance. This is more than giving the finger to  
the establishment, or burning the flag, this is offering a dead body as an
 installation piece in a disciplinary space designed to be utterly devoid of
 artistic expression. (133)




but as self-texting integers (the ultimate fantasy of the body as text, of a  
body eager for the critic’s resistant readings). Those who have died ambigú-
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ously in jail become death artists, deliberate artificers of their own transcen
­
dental critique.
But where are the voices of
 
Gildea’s informants, where is his nervous sys ­
tem? To make such a grand argument out of anything but thin air, the cultur
­al critic needs to cover a great 
deal
 of empirical ground, spending time in at  
least two different material contexts: in the streets, houses, and offices where
 incarcerated subjects roamed before their incarceration, and in the inferno of
 Mississippi’s jails. Otherwise the dead offer a too timely Rorschach for the
 writer’s own fantasies — especially those deaths whose causes remain ambigu
­ous. Any ventriloquism or versioning of these now spectral lives must be large
­ly theoretical or imaginary — and must acknowledge the potential arrogance
 and inaccuracies of its own hoped-for theories. Might
 
we not see in these still  
bodies subjects who, meeting themselves on the way to jail, become frightened,
 
confused,
 fragmented, insufficient — suggesting deaths that are just messy and  
meaningless rather than blithely agential and perverse? Might we not hear, in
 the margins of this essay, the murmurs of bodies that do not speak, because they
 did not ask to be unmade but were tortured or murdered or pushed into sui
­cide? What kind of “installation space” would this make? “Estranged Fruit”
 needs to stutter here, to explore the possibility that some of these forty-nine
 men and women might experience their “texting” as posthumous harm, might
 not consent to
 
the critic’s own figurations. Without this discursive doubt, with ­
out an excavation of the critic’s own transferential need to reanimate the dead
 “as art,” the critical ecstasy and self-certainty
 
that spin off these spectral bodies  
tells us too much. It creates the possibility that these hanged bodies tell us
 more about Gildea’s own investments, and still more about the easy commodi
­fication of the dead in the face of a
 
critic’s own desire for an “installation piece.”
3.
 
8c 4. The Academy and the Commodification of Loss, or the Dead as the  
Source of the New
The source for this essay has been a gap, a space on the side of the road, in the
 
margins of the first issue of Journal x
 
where I lost myself two months ago and  
started writing. Turning from Gildea’s penultimate essay 
on
 hanged men to  
Gregory Ulmer’s playful and erudite “Exhibit X: Hoopla Dreams,” I felt lost.
 Is it permissible to make this trek from trauma to pleasure by just turning a
 page? What is the status of academic consumerism, of a world of words where
 we can channel-surf from trauma to pleasure and back to trauma again with so
 little cost?
Trying to reflect upon this discontinuity, I can recognize these feelings as
 
something perpetual; they recur, for instance, during those dim moments of
 (pseudo-)consciousness I have while reading The New York Times. I’
m
 horror-  
struck reading an article about Mexico, or Dakar, or Des Moines, or Dubuque,
 and then I 
glance
 at a body clothed by Lord and Taylor and feel reprieve (or  
anger, or desire, or bare nausea). On a really self-conscious day, shocked at the
 gargantuan presence of these ads next to tiny-print copy about people in pain,
 
91





I think, what kind of world is this? and why do I buy into it? —
 
before butter ­
ing my bagel, folding the paper and putting my thoughts away How can these
 modes of protest and packaging 
coexist
 in the same paper, in the same con ­
sciousness, on the same page? Why is it so customary to mix our pleasures with
 our horrors?




than simply gathering fads and facts about the world. To marry the  
apocalyptic delights of consumerism (brassy women 
in
 boas,, quiet young  
women buckling their 
bras,
 young men staring back at me with their sweet,  
erect nipples) and the chaos of the recently dead or the long dead or the soon
 to be dead is a ritual of nationalizing identity. I open my paper and the family
 across the street opens theirs — or used to, in any event. A sense of collectiv
­ity, of shared facts and shared modes of consumption (of consuming objects
 with our trauma) locates the self in a series of self-disciplining spaces.




 acts of reading construct a community, as, in fact, Journal x  
has begun to construct its community around the question of pleasure:
Journal x instructs its reviewers to make pleasure an explicit criterion 
for 
acceptance and publication, alongside the more orthodox academic criteria
 of originality and responsibility. To poach upon
 
Wallace Stevens’s descrip ­
tion of the 
supreme
 fiction, the Jx essay must give pleasure, must bring the  
thrill of discovery that has always alerted readers to the presence of a first-
 rate intellect engaged in the exploration of new
 
territory and the definition  
of new problems and paradigms. (Kamps and Watson 2)
What does it mean to give an academic audience ‘pleasure”? After thinking
 
hard about “Estranged Fruit” and the anthropography of violence, I’ve begun to
 suspect that such pleasures have a great deal to do with the dead. As Marx
 comments in The Eighteenth Brumaire:
And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and
 
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such
 periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the
 past to their service and borrow from names, battle cries, and 
costumes
 in  
order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured dis
­guise and this borrowed language. (103)
Marx suggests that “new problems and
 
paradigms” depend upon the dead’s bor ­
rowed names. This 
means
 that  revolutionary thinking is  “never free of anxiety”;  
or, in Derrida’s haunting of Marx, “conjuration is anxiety from the moment it
 calls upon death to invent the quick and to enliven the new, to summon the
 presence of what is not yet there” (Derrida 108-9). I would 
add
 that such nar ­
ratives seek an infusion of pleasure 
by
 instigating a powerful and satisfying  
“out-sourcing” of pain, an observation based on the self-gratifying cling-ons of
 late commodity culture. The Nike swoosh manufactured under subhuman con
­ditions in Vietnam, the Barbie dolls made in Malaysian sweatshops, represent
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an ultimate out-sourcing of the pain and alienation of labor that a “flexible”
 
economy makes possible. Do 
academic
 communities that are pleasure-based  
work
 
in a similar way? At the  very  least, the out-sourcing of pain into the trau ­
matic narratives we read and write so freely may have the effect of
 
creating a  
safely pleasurable source of self-shattering.
In thinking about The Eighteenth 
Brum
aire, Derrida makes two more obser ­
vations. First, those dead generations who weigh so thoroughly upon the
 “brains of revolutionaries” have a severe spectral density. “To weigh (lasten) is
 also to charge, tax, impose, indebt, accuse, assign, 
enjoin.
 And the more life  
there is, the graver the specter of the other becomes, the heavier its imposition.
 And the more the living have to answer for 
it.
 To answer  for the  dead, to respond  
to
 
the dead... in the absence of any certainty or symmetry” (109). But  this debt  
of responsiveness to spectral thinking creates a strange paradox. The more “the
 new” demands change or crisis, “the more one has to convoke the old, ‘borrow’
 from it.” The spirit of revolution depends upon, even as it tries to repudiate, his­tory’s specters. Facing this obstacle, Marx hopes for a sea change — a moment
 when the true revolutionary
 
will find “the spirit of  [a] new language . . . with ­
out 
recalling
 the old.” But is this anything other than a happy pipe dream?5  
According
 
to Derrida, “Marx  intends to distinguish  between the spirit {Geist) of  
the revolution and its specter (Gespenst), as if the former did not already call up
 the latter, as if everything, and Marx all the same recognizes this himself, did
 not pass by way of differences within a fantastics as
 
general as it is irreducible.  
Untimely, out of joint,’
 
even and especially if it appears to come  in due time, the  
spirit of the revolution is fantastic and anachronistic through and through” (Derri
­da 112).
Can the same thing be said about the spirit of pleasure? Certainly 
in 
“Estranged Fruit” the new can only be mediated, made conceptually profitable
 and figuratively 
pleasurable,
 via Billie Holliday’s old song. As Gildea com ­
ments: “Through the haunting beauty of her singing, Holliday was able to ‘har
­vest’ black southern lynchings of the 1930s and 1940s for a national audience,
 reaping jazz genius and political outrage from those barbarous acts. In recent
 times, Mississippi has produced
 
fresh  fruit from new  nooses.... Now that these  
forces of estrangement have been descried with the help of theories of both
 unmaking and making, it is at last possible to harvest the fruit of these Missis
­sippi
 
jail hangings” (139). This is not just a question of taste, although “fresh  
fruit” is a painful figure (whether
 
it describes murdered  bodies or death artists).  
Nor is it 
simply
 a question of what we owe the dead, although this is impor ­
tant, too. Instead, I want to return to the image itself as commodity. In trop-
 ing or turning death into figures, writing is once more exposed as an act of
 commodification and
 
consumption: a  space where death is converted into plea ­
sure.
Suddenly, we are in the territory of psychoanalysis, of
 
Freud’s death wish 
and pleasure principle, where it is customary to be swept away by gallows
 humor so reprehensible and consoling and giddy that it 
can
 only repeat itself.  
That is, in the very act of telling or troping, the object world is refigured not as
 a source of pain but of pleasure: its tension veering toward
 
zero. Can one write  
and remain in the unpleasure of death? A question terminable and inter
­minable.
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Daniel responds to these puzzles in his chapter on “Embodied Terror.” In
 
describing the pain of those tortured (by
 
the Sri Lankan Army and by Tamilese  
militants), Daniel notes the peculiar de-animation of the men and
 
women who  
describe their own torture to others. “There 
were
 no signs of contained pas ­
sion. Rather, attempts to extract information were met with expressions of
 utter listlessness. Months later I found out that it was not so much boredom
 that weighed down on the victim as it was the overwhelming sense of the sheer
 worthlessness of all attempts to communicate something that was so radically
 individuated and rendered unshareable” (143). But Daniel goes on to argue
 that those who have endured enormous pain may find some reprieve in terror
 — 
in
 the felt remembrance of pain. In “second” or therapeutic terror, “a seis ­
mic aftershock” goes through the body, terrifying those who are present when a
 torture victim is suddenly wracked by
 
sobs or anger or violent  shaking  or numb ­
ing
 
withdrawal. These convulsions have been described by a Siddha physician  
as “the pain coming out... the trembling and fear
 
that comes through remem ­
bering terrible acts” (144). This terror is not 
an
 emotion that is simply gothic  
or void of knowing but an overdetermined site for coming to deal with (not to
 heal — it offers no promise of healing) feelings so traumatic that they seem
 incommunicable, even to the self who endured them. In second, or therapeu
­tic, terror, experiences that seemed utterly alinguistic become something the
 psyche can discharge, recharge, find access to, if not control.
By
 
the end of this chapter Daniel discovers, in the poetry  and street theater  
that flourished during this period, another opening where pain can be dis
­lodged “from its fixed site.” Pain stuck
 
“at the brink of language” can be freed  
into
 
beauty, riding swiftly into our lives “on metaphor and icons of affect” (153).  
But just as swiftly, Daniel pulls back from the affective tug of his own aestheti-
 cizing argument. “Too easy,” he insists, much too easy. In seeking comfort in
 the process of recovering trauma for 
culture,
 we “need to ride our consolations 
between two echoes. . . . Poetry, prose, theater, and painting are not the only
 aestheticizing agents. The poesis of culture itself is a narcotic, and as such it
 summons us to respond to Emily Dickinson’s charge that ‘Narcotics cannot still
 the tooth / That 
nibbles
 at  the soul’” (153). It seems that we can never  be ner ­
vous enough.
Seeking such nervousness, let me turn to the letter “x.” When I first heard
 
about Journal x —
 
about the wonderfully new and borrowed name of this ambi ­
tious new journal — I felt a small shock of pleasure. The “x” seemed so au
 courant
 
and flexible, so wonderfully twenty- and thirty-something, so outmod-  
edly modish. But thinking about this journal now, as I do, through the scrim  
of 
pleasures
 derived from hanged bodies and  the hard-to-read “scene of the gal ­
lant South,” I seem to see another
 
“X” in the shadows: namely, the site of pri ­
vation and 
violence
 that marks the loss of the African name. The capitalized  
“X” of a Black Muslim idiom is not cited here, and yet it resounds in the jour
­nal’s margins, an unknown ¿/^variable that conjures up specters from the Mid
­dle Passage and beyond. What do we look for when we seek out the “x”? Do
 we seek the pleasure of the spectral unknown, or its burden? Perhaps, as a way
 of short-circuiting the proprietorship of the name, this “x” must resonate 
in both contexts, “between two echoes.”
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with an echolalia — with something  like a parable. Last night  
at dinner 
we
 were playing a “Know Your US Presidents” game with the kids. I  
asked Kiri, the 
7
-year-old, “Which president freed the slaves?” and Noah,  just  
3, shouted, “Santa Claus!” We burst into laughter at his vehemence, his cer
­tainty, and his obvious pleasure in having such a good answer. He is learning
 his history from our
 
culture's Old  Masters  —  discovering, in ways that  I’d never  
thought possible, the stinging pleasure, the consuming narcotic, the deadening
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 many others for the invaluable ideas they contributed to this essay.
1.
 
On the subject of hanging, Paul de Man, and lurid figures, see Hertz.
2.
 
In a moving essay about the the wrinkles and odors that still inhabit the  
garments of the dead, Peter Stallybrass writes about inheriting Allon Whites
 clothing — and inheriting with it
 
the grief and pleasure, the lingering of some ­
one else’s “human imprint,” even after his death. Stallybrass suggests another  
mode of continuity between the living and the dead: “Bodies come and go; the
 clothes which have received those bodies survive” (37).
3.
 
To investigate this idea in depth, Christopher Bollas's The Shadow of the  
Object seems achingly relevant. Bollas asks how we are held by aesthetic
 objects, by
 
the shadow of the maternal other that haunts every work  of art. He  
describes our 
early
 environment as “the experience of an object that transforms  
the 
subject
 s internal and external worlds” (28). But in talking about, or think ­
ing with, the dead, one faces the burden of 
having
 to become the transforma ­
tional object oneself. That is, one reshapes material that seems at once too full
 and too empty, in need of transformative labor but unable to respond to such
 labor
 
— an unknown invariable (see the penultimate paragraph of this essay).
4.
 
The phrase “anthropography” is borrowed from Daniel 's subtitle. Taus ­
sig
 
details numerous nervous systems in his description of the social as an ongo ­
ing state of emergency.
5.
 
This is gorgeously glossed by Gibson-Graham: “When Marx attempts  
to banish the specter, in that same moment he sets himself up for a haunting —
 by all
 
that must be erased, denied, cast out, mocked as chimerical or belittled as  
inconsequential, in order to delimit a certain objectivity. Indeed, the attempt
 to banish the specter
 
creates the possibility  and the likelihood of a  haunting. In  
the very moment of
 
exorcism, the specter is named and invoked, the ghost is  
called to inhabit the space of
 
its desired absence. The more one attempts to  
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